Saturday, July 1, 2017

The subsidy game





If you’re so smart, why aren’t you subsidized?

The market economies of Central Asia are a quarter of a century old, and their first blushes of ardor for Adam Smith are fading. Expo 2017 illustrates the new paradigm: When in doubt, subsidize – particularly when the subsidized will back you politically in return.

What’s wrong with subsidies? One urban legend argues that the subsidized lose money. This confuses cause for effect: Losers qualify for subsidies. The real problem is that subsidies divert resources – men, machines and ideas – to an industry where they are less valuable than they had been in their original. 

To see why, begin with an economy that already maximizes value.  This condition connotes that the value of another labor hour is the same in all industries; had it instead been worth, say, $10 in Industry A and $9 in Industry B, then we could have raised the economy’s value by $1 by moving one hour from B to A, so the economy must not have been at a max.

Subsidies move inputs in the wrong direction, from A to B.  Consider what happens. In the beginning, another labor hour was worth $10 in both A and B.  Now a subsidy to A enables an employer there to lure away a labor hour from B.  Since workers have only so much machinery to work with, adding another worker to an industry congests its capital, raising its value of production by a diminishing amount.  (Try baking more pizzas when you add the tenth cook to your one oven.) Let’s say that the additional labor hour in A is worth only $9.  Since it had been worth $10 in B, the subsidy slashes the value of total production by $1.

Of course, the honcho in A is delighted to accept the subsidy, because it boosts his profits.  Suppose that the subsidy is $3.  To hire the labor hour away from B, he will need to pay the worker $11 (since she had been receiving $10, the value of her product, in B).  That hour is worth only $9 to the A boss, so he loses $2 by purchasing it.  But the subsidy is $3, so the boss comes out ahead by $1. It’s just the economy that loses. Analysts who argue that subsidies must be good because they enable the subsidized industry to survive, are missing the point.

Of course, subsidies are not always odious.  They may give us what we want when the producer cannot collect enough value to cover costs although the former does exceed the latter. The textbook example in Almaty is clean air; since it cannot be bottled, the producer cannot confine its consumption to payers, so he doesn’t bother to supply it. The government could stimulate its supply by paying auto owners in Almaty to install devices on their vehicles that control pollution (or, in what amounts to the same thing, by taxing car owners who fail to install the equipment).

The music industry offers a more complex example. A song may cost $10,000 to record but $0 to distribute via the Web. The musician must charge enough to cover the fixed cost -- $1 per listener if he has 10,000 fans; but because the song costs nothing to provide, he should instead give it away to all who yearn to hear it. One solution is to have the government pay the $10,000. The problems in this approach are evident -- Astana may favor dreary pro-government tunes – but the example does show the brighter side of subsidies. –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com                   

Sunday, May 7, 2017

Touching base



Why did the National Bank of Kazakhstan raise the refinancing rate?


On April Fools' Day, the central bank of Kazakhstan got wise to a game played by commercial banks.  

The National Bank raised the interest rate that it charges private banks on loans, from 5.5% to 11% per year. This sounds draconian, which was probably the commercial banks’ view of the matter. But it was vital to the Bank’s modernization of monetary policy. I’ll explain.

In the West, most central banks manage the money supply, and consequently affect the economy, by manipulating the interest rate. Lower interest rates encourage firms to finance expansions with cheap loans; households also expand economic activity.

To cut interest rates, central banks create money. They buy securities in exchange for dollars and euros, which security sellers put into their bank accounts. In turn, banks lend these deposits out, lowering their interest rates to attract borrowers.  If you prefer, you can think about this monetary policy more directly: By purchasing bonds, the central bank raises bond prices. This lowers their rate of return, which is the interest rate.

Which interest rate do central banks target? The short-run rate, since they want to affect the economy quickly. In the United States, the Federal Reserve operates on the interest rate that commercial banks charge one another on overnight loans, called the federal funds rate.

The counterpart in Kazakhstan is the base rate, which is 11%. And now you see the problem. Commercial banks have little reason to borrow from anyone at 11% when they can go to the discount window (jargon for borrowing from the central bank) and load up on tenge for 5.5%, which has been the going rate at the window since 2012. So when the National Bank cut the base rate, as it did in February, it may not have elicited as much response from the economy as was possible, because the commercial banks weren’t borrowing as much as they could have at that rate, anyway.

The solution was to raise the refinancing rate (the Bank’s term for the rate at the discount window) to the base rate. That’s what the National Bank did on April 1. And, as the Bank notes, the refinancing rate “is used in civil law and administrative-legal relations for charging penalties, indemnification fines and in computation of the lost profits,” so it makes sense to ensure that it reflects the true cost of holding or earmarking money.

The Bank’s new policy does incur a few costs. One purpose of the discount window is to provide cheap bailouts to troubled banks, since bank failures imperil the financial market. Emergency loans are more expensive now. On the other hand, cheap bailouts tempt banks to take dangerous risks, not an unknown occurrence in Kazakhstan.

Things could have been worse: In the hyperinflationary days of 1995, the refinancing rate was 152% on a one-month loan.   --Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Good reading

Jane E. Ihrig, Ellen E. Meade, and Gretchen C. Weinbach.  Rewriting Monetary Policy 101: What's the Fed's preferred post-crisis approach to raising interest rates?  Journal of Economic Perspectives. Fall 2015.


References

National Bank of Kazakhstan. On convergence of the official refinancing rate and the base rate. Press release. www.nationalbank.kz March 6, 2017.

National Bank of Kazakhstan.  Statistics.  www.nationalbank.kz. May 7, 2017.