Do Central Asians fear
Russian intervention?
In the United States, NIMBY – “Not in My Back Yard” – refers
to the neighbors’ battle royale against a toxic waste dump. In Central Asia, the translation is: Not in Moscow’s Back Yard. The Kremlin would barge into regional affairs
if local politicians didn’t block it.
For example, the 2010 overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s government
may have rooted in Russia’s ridding itself of an erstwhile ally, former
President Kurmanbek Bakiev. Under
Russian pressure sweetened by Russian aid, he said he
would tear up Bishkek’s contract with the US for the military air base at
Manas. But when Washington nearly quadrupled
its payments for the base, to $60 million per year, Bakiev changed his mind. So Vladimir Putin, then the prime minister of
Russia, forced him out in April. “…Moscow suspended the shipment of subsidized fuel to Kyrgyzstan and launched a smear campaign against
the Bakiev government…,” writes Alisher Khamidov of George Washington
University.
In south Kyrgyzstan, the bloody revolt led to clashes
between ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz youths.
When the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian vehicle,
refused to intervene, Uzbekistan gave shelter to 80,000 displaced Kyrgyzstanis in
mid-June. “[Uzbekistan]
President [Islam] Karimov regarded the…unrest…as a plot by external forces
designed to cause regional turmoil and implicate Uzbekistan in a regional war,”
Khamidov notes. As tensions relaxed,
most refugees returned to Kyrgyzstan
by the end of the month.
Russian incursions in Georgia and Ukraine have rattled
Central Asian leaders, since they may be next. By resolving squabbles among themselves, they
may hold the northern bear at bay, for a while. -- Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@yahoo.com
Good reading
Alisher Khamidov.
What it takes to avert a regional crisis: Understanding the Uzbek government’s
responses to the June 2010 violence in south Kyrgyzstan. 2015. Central Asian Affairs 2(2), pages
168-188.
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