By Dmitriy
Belyanin
Introduction
Many small economies of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) depend highly on personal remittances
from larger countries, particularly Russia.
Some industries, such as construction, have particularly high shares of
migrant workers being employed. With the
accession of some of these countries into the Eurasian Union, the costs of
migration have decreased. Nevertheless, depreciations of exchange rates, caused
by plummeting oil prices, which can be attributed at least partially to the
geopolitical turbulence, in which the expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union
played a clear role, decrease their purchasing power over foreign products in
the short run.
Regional conflicts relating
to the accession of countries into the Eurasian Economic Union -- most notably,
the battles in Ukraine -- resulted in refugees who compete with migrant workers
from other CIS countries for jobs. This article will assess the impact of
Eurasian integration on migration and remittances in detail.
Reasons for
labor migration
After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, some former Soviet republics became heavily dependent on
remittances from migrants. Having the
highest average nominal incomes in the CIS, Russia became their most popular
destination.
As of 2012, according to the
migration service of the Russian Federation, there were 9.1 million guest
workers from the former Soviet Union, China, Southeast Asia, and Europe,
reports Peter Roudik of the Global Legal Research Directorate. As of August 2013, migrant labor amounted to
7-8% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP), according to Vladimir Volokh,
Chairman of the Public Council Under the Federal Migration Service of the
Russian Federation, reports REGNUM.
According to Larisa Kalioma, of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in 2009
Russia ranked first in Europe and second in the world in terms of the number of
immigrants, after the United States.
Employers took advantage of
cheap low-skill labor of migrants during the labor shortage of the oil boom. Lower labor costs enabled construction firms
to grow and hire more high-skill laborers.
However, free migration also led to tax evasion, large outflows, ethnic
tensions and higher crime. According to
Konstantin Romodanovsky, ะกhair of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian
Federation, as of 2006 Russia was losing $8 billion annually due to tax evasion
by illegal immigrants. Over $10 billion were
transferred out of Russia unreported, and about 10 million illegal immigrants,
mostly from the former Soviet republics, resided in Russia, reports
RBC.ru. These problems, along with the
similar and more pungent migrant crisis in Europe, induce Russia and Kazakhstan
to restrict immigration.
In some remittance-dependent
countries, such as Tajikistan, economies were torn by conflicts. In others, protectionism and the lack of economic
reforms led to stagnation; workers would have been better off had they
emigrated. Most remittance-dependent
countries have had higher unemployment rates than Russia and Kazakhstan (Table
1).
Country
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
Armenia
|
33.6
|
27.8
|
28.6
|
28.4
|
16.4
|
18.7
|
19.0
|
18.4
|
17.3
|
16.2
|
17.1
|
Azerbaijan
|
8.0
|
7.3
|
6.6
|
6.3
|
5.9
|
5.7
|
5.6
|
5.4
|
5.2
|
5.0
|
5.2
|
Belarus
|
6.5
|
6.4
|
6.4
|
6.3
|
6.2
|
6.1
|
6.2
|
6.1
|
5.9
|
6.0
|
5.9
|
Georgia
|
12.6
|
13.8
|
13.6
|
13.3
|
16.5
|
16.9
|
16.3
|
15.1
|
15.0
|
14.6
|
13.4
|
Kazakhstan
|
8.4
|
8.1
|
7.8
|
7.3
|
6.6
|
6.6
|
5.8
|
5.4
|
5.3
|
5.2
|
4.1
|
Kyrgyzstan
|
8.5
|
8.1
|
8.3
|
8.2
|
8.2
|
8.4
|
8.6
|
8.5
|
8.4
|
8.3
|
8.1
|
Moldova
|
8.1
|
7.3
|
7.4
|
5.1
|
4.0
|
6.4
|
7.4
|
6.7
|
5.6
|
5.1
|
3.4
|
Russia
|
7.8
|
7.1
|
7.1
|
6.0
|
6.2
|
8.3
|
7.3
|
6.5
|
5.5
|
5.5
|
5.1
|
Tajikistan
|
12.1
|
11.8
|
11.8
|
11.7
|
11.3
|
11.5
|
11.6
|
11.4
|
11.1
|
11.2
|
10.9
|
Turkmenistan
|
11.1
|
11.1
|
11.0
|
11.0
|
11.1
|
10.8
|
10.9
|
11.0
|
10.8
|
10.7
|
10.5
|
Ukraine
|
8.6
|
7.0
|
6.0
|
6.0
|
6.4
|
8.8
|
8.1
|
7.9
|
7.5
|
7.2
|
7.7
|
Uzbekistan
|
11.0
|
10.9
|
11.0
|
11.0
|
11.0
|
11.0
|
10.9
|
10.9
|
10.8
|
10.8
|
10.6
|
Source: The World Bank World
Development Indicators
Table 1:
Unemployment in CIS countries as a % of the labor force (2004-2014)
The construction boom of the
early and mid-2000s was rampant in countries that underwent financial
liberalization, but it was weaker in repressed economies. Under rising oil prices, the ruble
appreciated rapidly, which increased the purchasing power of migrants' incomes
in their home currency. When the global
financial crisis began, remittances decreased.
Like Russia, Kazakhstan
experienced a construction boom, but it did not attract nearly as many migrant
workers, even from its southern neighbors.
This trend may be explained by lower nominal incomes, a less diversified
economy (implying a narrower choice of jobs), and more frequent interventions
in foreign exchange markets to keep the tenge from appreciating. On the positive side, the relatively small
share of migrants and the similarity of their culture to that of Kazakhs helped
Kazakhstanis keep their jobs, and it prevented ethnic tensions.
History of
Eurasian integration
The establishment of the
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which evolved into the
Eurasian Economic Union, brought changes for migrants. We can identify three periods
-- the establishment of a free trade zone (1994-2010), the creation of the
Customs Union (2010-beginning of 2014) and the establishment of the common economic
space and the Eurasian Economic Union.
During the third period, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia joined, and new tensions
in relations between Russia and the West arose due to regional wars in Syria
and Ukraine, which led to inflows of labor migrants to Europe and Russia
respectively.
As stated on the Eurasian
Commission website, between May 2001 and May 2014, the EuraSEC was active. This was an interim organization for
establishing the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, which initially
consisted of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On January 25, 2006, a protocol for the accession
of Uzbekistan to the EuraSEC was signed.
Ukraine and Moldova have had observer status since May 2002, and Armenia
since January 2003. On October 6, 2007,
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to form a customs union. Its customs code
took effect on July 6, 2010. Common
tariffs towards non-members ensued. Trade restrictions among members are
non-existent, except anti-dumping and compensatory measures.
During the next stage of
integration, which created the Eurasian Economic Union, governments agreed on
free movement of labor and capital, and they said they would coordinate
monetary and tax policies. On October
10, 2014, the EuraSEC ceased to exist, and the European Economic Union became
effective January 1, 2015. Unlike the
EuraSEC, this union has been formally registered as a legal entity, reports
Bullin from BBC.
CIS countries that did not
join the Union could still take part in the CIS free trade zone, the agreement
for which was signed October 18, 2011.
The agreement replaced over 100 international pacts regulating free
trade on CIS territory, reports RIA Novosti. Members of the agreement
included Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Armenia,
and Ukraine. The latter dropped out of
the free trade zone in December 2015 and entered a free trade zone with the
European Union. Goods shipping from
Ukraine to Kazakhstan can now pass only through special transit routes on the
Russian-Belarussian border, reports Rudashevskaya.
Impact of free
trade and the Customs Union on labor migration and remittances
Free trade in the CIS has
been conducive to creation of domestic enterprises and subsidiaries of multinational
corporations in Russia, which took advantage of scale economies. The increased demand for Russian labor
created jobs and raised wages in the early and mid-2000s. Goods assembled or
manufactured in Russia were often cheaper than the same brands manufactured or
assembled elsewhere, implying more purchasing power for the average customer in
Russia and abroad -- especially in Kazakhstan, due to a relatively free trading
regime and easy access to consumer loans.
This sparked demand for mortgages and services for construction workers
and hence remittances. Personal
remittances as a percent of GDP increased considerably for Armenia, Moldova,
Georgia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Table 3).
While free trade with Russia contributed to employment in these
countries, construction booms there were not as common.
Country
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
Armenia
|
12.15
|
18.68
|
18.31
|
17.86
|
16.33
|
16.65
|
18.03
|
17.73
|
18.03
|
19.71
|
17.85
|
Azerbaijan
|
2.62
|
4.71
|
3.77
|
3.84
|
3.11
|
2.83
|
2.67
|
2.87
|
2.90
|
2.36
|
2.46
|
Belarus
|
1.11
|
0.66
|
0.73
|
0.64
|
0.96
|
1.02
|
1.04
|
1.49
|
1.66
|
1.66
|
1.62
|
Georgia
|
5.92
|
6.96
|
8.10
|
8.68
|
8.32
|
10.32
|
10.17
|
10.72
|
11.17
|
12.05
|
12.02
|
Kazakhstan
|
0.38
|
0.11
|
0.10
|
0.14
|
0.09
|
0.17
|
0.15
|
0.10
|
0.09
|
0.09
|
0.10
|
Kyrgyzstan
|
8.53
|
12.73
|
16.69
|
18.51
|
23.80
|
20.94
|
26.41
|
27.57
|
30.75
|
31.06
|
30.29
|
Moldova
|
27.14
|
30.62
|
34.50
|
33.88
|
31.18
|
22.04
|
23.25
|
25.85
|
27.27
|
27.45
|
26.17
|
Russia
|
0.42
|
0.45
|
0.39
|
0.36
|
0.35
|
0.42
|
0.34
|
0.32
|
0.29
|
0.32
|
0.42
|
Tajikistan
|
12.14
|
20.18
|
36.00
|
45.46
|
49.29
|
35.11
|
40.87
|
46.91
|
47.50
|
49.59
|
41.70
|
Turkmen.
|
n/a
|
||||||||||
Ukraine
|
0.63
|
2.80
|
2.88
|
3.71
|
3.77
|
5.07
|
4.79
|
4.79
|
4.81
|
5.27
|
5.58
|
Uzbekistan
|
n/a*
|
*While Turkmenistan is a
closed country, labor migration from Uzbekistan has been widely reported, even
though remittances are not on the World Bank website. So this article offers forecasts.
Source: The World Bank World
Development Indicators
Table 2: Share
of personal remittances of CIS Countries in GDP, % (2004-2014)
When the global financial
crisis began, the volume of personal remittances fell. In some industries, such as construction,
there were massive layoffs. The
construction sector in Russia shrank about a fifth in terms of output, say
Danzer and Ivashenko. Often employers
hired migrants because they were still willing to work for low wages.
In 2009, the EuraSEC, on
behalf of the Eurasian Development Bank, established an anti-crisis fund (now the
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development) of $8.5 billion. On June 18, 2010, the fund loaned $70 million
to Tajikistan for social expenditures.
This may have discouraged massive emigration. The fund tries to “help member countries ensure their long-run economic stability and
foster economic integration between them.”
Kyrgyzstan, where
remittances decreased by 28-29%, received $150 million of aid from Russia. The number of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan
working in Russia decreased from 139,200 in January-July 2008 to 85,900 in
January-July 2010, a fall of 38%, according to the Institute of Economics of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, as reported by the Sauran Information
and Analytical Center. This factor, plus
the dependence of the Kyrgyz economy on Kazakh banks, contributed to the second
color revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, which eventually led to a pro-Russian
government and the country's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.
When the Customs Union
formed, it eliminated tariffs between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. In 2011, visas between the three countries
were abolished, too. These measures
might have increased migrant pay, but these economies do not depend on
remittances. During that period, the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan were
recovering, which stimulated remittances to countries outside the Union. Belarus faced a financial crisis in 2011, but
this did not lead to massive emigration.
The Ukrainian conflict,
which began with the dispute over whether Ukraine should ally with the European
Union or the Customs Union, resulted in refugees. According to the Federal Migration Service,
2.6 million Ukrainians were in Russia in November 2015; of those, 1 million
came from the war-torn southeastern regions, reports Liga Novosti. Increased labor supply, plus the Russian recession
that has resulted from low productivity, low oil prices, and anti-Russian
sanctions, drive down their salaries.
Depreciation of the ruble further decreases remittances. Table 3
illustrates the exchange rate trends in CIS countries.
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
Kazakh. Tenge
|
119.12
|
118.28
|
145.55
|
145.25
|
144.57
|
146.87
|
150.03
|
177.21
|
220.47
|
Azerbaij. Manat
|
0.90
|
0.82
|
0.80
|
0.80
|
0.79
|
0.79
|
0.78
|
0.78
|
1.01
|
Armenian Dram
|
342.35
|
305.96
|
363.68
|
373.67
|
372.35
|
401.63
|
409.62
|
415.14
|
477.60
|
Belarus. Ruble
|
2150.5
|
2150.6
|
2794.1
|
2962.2
|
5103.1
|
8298.9
|
8852.0
|
10222
|
15918
|
Georgian Lari
|
1.77
|
1.65
|
1.67
|
1.78
|
1.69
|
1.65
|
1.66
|
1.77
|
2.27
|
Kyrgyz Som
|
39.82
|
36.58
|
42.98
|
45.95
|
46.11
|
46.97
|
48.40
|
53.17
|
64.40
|
Moldav. Leu
|
11.78
|
10.16
|
10.92
|
12.17
|
11.52
|
11.88
|
12.33
|
13.80
|
18.49
|
Russian Ruble
|
25.57
|
24.86
|
31.63
|
30.31
|
29.33
|
30.98
|
31.83
|
38.56
|
61.13
|
Tajikist. Somoni
|
3.30
|
3.42
|
4.15
|
4.38
|
4.61
|
4.76
|
4.76
|
4.93
|
6.15
|
Uzbekist. Soum
|
1286.1
|
1317.9
|
1464.2
|
1587.5
|
1716.2
|
1892.9
|
2101.9
|
2303.2
|
2549.1
|
Sources: Historical OANDA
exchange rates and the World Bank
Table 3: Average
exchange rates of the currencies of CIS countries to the US Dollar (2007-2015)
Thus, though the accession
of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan into the Eurasian Union helps their migrants avoid
legal barriers, their remittances will be low for a while. The next section describes prospects for
migrants from several countries.
Predictions for
the future of migrants, remittances and remittance-dependent countries
CIS migrants differ in their
circumstances. In April 2014, Putin
signed a law mandating migrants to pass an exam in Russian. The migrant would then receive a five-year
certificate, reports Lenta.ru. This requirement is likely to decrease migration
from countries in which few are fluent in Russian, such as Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan.
Kazakhstan suffers from
rapid depreciation of the tenge, which had been anticipated even while the
National Bank tried to maintain a fixed exchange rate. Another factor is the ban on mortgage loans
for which monthly interest exceeds half of the borrower’s income, effective
April 2014, stated profinance.kz. This
restriction averts another construction boom and thus reduces remittances.
Starting February 1, only individuals will be able to hire migrants (who reportedly
totaled 128,000 in 2013 in Almaty alone), and only up to five people. These migrants must pay a monthly fee,
reports Astana TV. This will further
decrease remittances.
The accession of Kyrgyzstan
and Armenia into the Eurasian Union puts migrant workers and these countries at
an advantage. The migrants can now avoid
paying unnecessary fees (or bribes) to stay in the country. The threat of instability in Armenia -- in
the form of both protests and possible resumption of the conflict with Azerbaijan
-- will keep Armenian migrants in Russia, which is likely to side with Armenia
in any dispute, due to Azerbaijan's close ties with Turkey. More migrants from Armenia may be expected.
Kyrgyzstan may take
advantage of the Russian embargo against Turkish-made agricultural
products. Through the multiplier effect,
increased farm revenues would increase GDP and decrease migration.
The controversy about Transnistria’s
status is likely to preclude Moldova's accession to the Eurasian Economic
Union. Nevertheless, the current
protests there suggest disappointment with pro-Western parties. Political instability and, possibly, new
arrangements regarding migration are likely to keep Moldovan migrants in
Russia.
Georgia is the most
successful country to survive a color revolution, as revealed by such
indicators as the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
(50th place), the 2015 Ease of Doing Business Index (24th),
and the 2015 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (22nd). Georgia is likely to remain pro-western,
though less so than under its former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Over
time, its dependence on remittance will decrease, since neither Russia nor
Europe will employ many of its citizens.
For neighboring Azerbaijan, the
recession and possibly a contretemps with Armenia might increase the number of
citizens working abroad. In the latter case, the country is likely to receive
aid, including loans, from Turkey, the EU, the United States and international
organizations. The aid can help prevent
a massive outflow of migrants, which would add to Europe's migrant crisis.
Though the Kazakh tenge has
been depreciating against the dollar, economic ties with Russia will prevent it
from depreciating against the ruble enough to induce massive migration into
Russia.
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
are in a more difficult situation. They
don’t belong to the Eurasian Economic Union, and many of their citizens speak
little Russian. So they are likely to suffer from increasing unemployment
stemming from the return home of migrant workers.
Due to the old age of the
current President and to growing economic problems, Uzbekistan is likely to
face a change in power soon. Most
likely, Islam Karimov will appoint a successor, possibly among his
relatives. There may be a fight for
power among Uzbek elites, which might spur protests. However, in spite of Uzbekistan's ambiguous
standpoint on geopolitical issues, none of the key geopolitical players in the
region wants revolution there, since it establishes an undesirable precedent
for them and threatens to spread extremism.
The new government of Uzbekistan will probably receive aid from Russia,
Kazakhstan, China or Iran. Uzbek farmers
may receive easier access to the Russian and Kazakh markets, especially
considering the need for inexpensive imported food there.
Seeking popular support, the
new President of Uzbekistan will probably spend the money on jobs or social
programs. Unpopular market reforms,
though necessary for sustainable economic development, will be avoided. The country's relations with Russia will
improve, but it probably will not join the Eurasian Economic Union. This would be due to uneasy relations with
Kyrgyzstan, unwillingness to join an organization similar to the USSR, and the
fear of spreading information about higher standards of living in Belarus and
especially Kazakhstan.
For Tajikistanis, the
near-term outlook is pessimistic.
Tajikistan too is likely to receive loans and aid, but it is also likely
to spend most of it on a crackdown on extremists (and perhaps on peaceful
opposition), rather than on maintaining employment and social programs. Its
history of civil war precludes a color revolution, since most citizens are
probably content with peace in poverty, but small protests are likely. The average Tajikistani can only hope for
improvements in the economy, and particularly in exchange rates, in Russia or
Kazakhstan. Growing use of alternative energy sources, the lifting of sanctions
on Iran, and the lifting of the ban on oil from the United States are likely to
keep oil prices low, even if they rebound.
Thus migrants must hope that Kazakhstan and Russia diversify their
economies -- which would occur slowly and would not lead to volumes of
remittances comparable to what existed during the construction boom.
Conclusion
When Eurasian integration
began, trade liberalization increased immigration to and remittances from
Russia and Kazakhstan, through scale economies.
This created jobs and demand for real estate. Many construction workers
who benefited were migrants. Russia
attracted more Central Asian immigrants than did Kazakhstan, due to higher
nominal incomes, larger cities (which offered more jobs), and longer periods of
currency appreciation.
During the Great Recession
of the late 2000s, remittances declined.
The EuraSEC Anti-crisis Fund was established to create jobs in
remittance-dependent countries.
Tajikistan borrowed from the fund, and Kyrgyzstan received direct aid
from Russia.
The elimination of visas for
Customs Union members, when only Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus were members,
had comparatively little impact on migrants, since these countries are not
remittance-dependent. Very different was
the case with the accession of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
The conflict in Ukraine
resulted in competition of Ukrainian refugees with other migrants for
jobs. The accession of Armenia and
Kyrgyzstan into the Eurasian Union eased the legal aspects of their migrants
staying in Russia, but recession and exchange rate depreciation made their stay
more difficult. Nevertheless, staying
for migrant workers from countries outside the Eurasian Economic Union is even harder. The requirement for all foreigners working
in Russia to pass an exam in Russian will further decrease their number and
total remittances.
Among the remittances-dependent
countries of the CIS, Armenia is the most likely to remain dependent on them
and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the least, with Tajikistan's prospects remaining
bleak. Tajikistani citizens can only hope for economic recovery in Russia or
Kazakhstan.
Dmitriy Belyanin
has a Master’s degree of Business Administration in Finance and a Bachelor of
Arts degree in Economics from KIMEP University.
Since 2007, he has been writing on issues in economics and finance
ranging from stock markets to environmental economics. He is the associate
editor of this blog.
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