Wednesday, February 25, 2015

News brief: ArcelorMittal cancels pay cuts



Kazakhstan’s largest steelmaker has ended severe pay cuts that it had blamed on a weak global market for its products, according to news reports.  The incident may illustrate political pressures on foreign-owned firms here.

Trade unions had called for the government to investigate the legality of ArcelorMittal’s wage decreases to nearly 30,000 miners and metallurgists in Kazakhstan, announced in late January.  Officials of the Karaganda oblast (similar to a state in the US) said they had detected illegal pay cuts, according to the business weekly Panorama.  The firm’s Temirtau plant is the largest steel mill in Central Asia.

Foreign specialists at ArcelorMittal Temirtau faced a slash of 50%; domestic specialists, 25%.  The Indian-owned company said these reductions were temporary and were due to a lack of cash as well as to its “complicated situation” in sales, Panorama reported.  The main “complication” seems to be the fall since mid-2014 in resource prices; ArcelorMittal said it could no longer cover unit costs.  Weakening of the ruble since last summer had also reduced Russian demand for its steel, the firm said.

Monopsonies galore

Trade unions retorted that they had not agreed to the wage cuts and that ArcelorMittal should complete a pact-in-progress with them and with involved agencies.  This pact was agreed about two weeks ago, under pressure from oblast officials.  It was not clear from news reports whether ArcelorMittal would cancel the cuts in pay to foreign workers as well as those to domestic ones.

The steelmaker asserts that it has overpaid value-added taxes by 12 billion tenge (about $65 million) since 2010 and that repayment would help alleviate the need for wage reductions.  So far, the Kazakhstani government has agreed to refund at least 4.1 billion tenge, reported Tengrinews.               

In 2006, coal miners in the Karaganda region struck against ArcelorMittal for several weeks over pay and work conditions.  It narrowly avoided another strike in 2012 by raising wages to steel and coal workers by about a tenth, backdated six months.

Factory towns in Kazakhstan are often dominated by a single employer – a Soviet legacy.  Sans political interventions, the employer may be able to dominate the labor market more than is possible in a competitive, non-Soviet setting.  –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


References

Panorama.  Profsouzi osporyly zakonnost’ snyzhenye zarplat v ‘ArcelorMittal’.  [Trade unions questioned the legality of pay reductions at ArcelorMittal.]  February 6, 2015.

Assel Saltubaldina.  ArcelorMittal Temirtau asks workers to yield to wage cuts.  Tengrinews.  February 9, 2015.  Online. 

Assel Saltubaldina.  ArcelorMittal Temirtau employees to receive full salary.  Tengrinews.  February 11, 2015.  Online.  

Assel Saltubaldina.  Kazakhstan to return 4.1 billion tenge of VAT payments to ArcelorMittal Temirtau.  Tengrinews.  February 13, 2015.  Online.  


Dmitry Solovyov.  ArcelorMittal agrees pay deal with Kazakh workers.  Reuters.  July 17, 2012.  Online.  

Sunday, February 15, 2015

The midnight stomp



This weekend’s ceasefire pact in Ukraine led to last-minute fighting that may destroy the value of the eventual cessation.  This is no surprise.  Russia and Ukraine (plus Western allies) are stuck in the vicious game known as Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Each side can choose between two actions: To observe an early peace, or to continue fighting until the ceasefire.  Think of the game from Ukraine’s point-of-view.  If Russia keeps fighting, then Ukraine cannot gain by rolling over and playing dead, so it will continue combat, too.  If instead Russia lays down arms, then Ukraine can gain ground in the east by battle.  Thus, no matter what Russia does, Ukraine will fight.

A similar analysis holds true for the Kremlin: It will deploy arms regardless of what Ukraine does.  Although a general peace would benefit all, neither side will resort to it unless it believes that it will be heavily penalized should it wage war instead.  Judging from news accounts, the ceasefire agreement provided no such penalty.  –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Reference

Andrew E. Kramer.  Ukraine cease-fire goes into effect, but rebel leader in key town repudiates accord.  New York Times.  Feb. 14, 2015.

         

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Fibs and glut


  
We all know that a glut has lowered oil prices.  We know this because the media has repeated it ad infinitum for six months.  The only problem with the assertion is that it's wrong.

As the Bank for International Settlements politely puts it, assertions of an oversupply “seem to fall short of a fully satisfactory explanation of the abrupt collapse in oil prices.”  The deviation from trend in demand and supply – that is, unexpected oversupply -- is only about an eighth as large as occurred in 1996 to 1998, when the world oil market really was awash; the annual Brent spot price -- the usual benchmark price for the global market -- fell below $13 in 1998.  The yo-yo nature of oil prices since summer is reminiscent of a financial asset, suggesting that speculation – not demand and supply – may be the real problem.  The BIS did not specify the oil price that it had examined. 

Other financial factors may affect the price, notes the Bank.  The energy industry has borrowed steadily, and heavily, since 2007.  Low oil prices reduce the value of its collateral, so oil firms wind up selling crude at basement prices in order to raise cash.  This may be particularly true of oilers in emerging market economies (Kazakhstan, anyone?) who borrowed in dollars.  Since the buck has been strengthening for months, the interest payment in terms of the local currency has risen.  Finally, oil firms are finding it harder to hedge their financial bets, since no one wants to buy from them an asset with a falling price.  “The build-up of debt in the oil sector is a reminder that high debt levels can induce significant macro-financial interactions,” writes the BIS, which is effectively the central bank for central banks.  The full report is to appear in the BIS Quarterly Review next month.

The supposed glut was mainly a media event, I think.  Such newspapers as the New York Times, the Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal intone relentlessly that the oil market is oversupplied by two or three million barrels per day.  They fail to note that this amounts to only about 2-3% of the global market and may well be in the range of a typical fluctuation (see the Notes below).  It wouldn’t kill a reporter to learn how to calculate a percentage change.

The problem is not that energy reporters ask the wrong questions.  The problem is that they don’t ask questions, period.  They are shills for their sources.  One example is the story in the Financial Times on the BIS report.  You would think that as a leading proponent of the glut theory, the newspaper would at least ask an analyst who believes in oversupply to comment on the report.  No such luck.  The Financial Times rewrote the first paragraph of the BIS report, and that was about it.  It should have just published the link and let it go at that. 

The economic reporting in Kazakhstani business weeklies, and in blogs that cover Central Asia, notably eurasianet.org, is even worse.  Skepticism is out of fashion among these journalists, and they are rarely worth reading.  --Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Notes

Consider supply fluctuations given the Great Recession and its lingering effects.  From 2008 through 2013, the annual mean of world crude oil production was about 88 million barrels per day, according to data from the United States Energy Information Administration.  The standard deviation was about 2 million barrels per day, or 2.2% of mean output -- roughly equal to the excess supply reported for the past several months.  Or one could consider the periods of 2009 through 2013 (2.3%) and 2010 through 2013 (1.5%).  


References

Bank for International Settlements.  Box: Oil and debt (February 2015).  www.bis.org/statistics/gli/glibox_feb15.htm


Neil Hume.  BIS says financial flows partly to blame for oil collapse.  Financial Times.  February 7, 2015.  

United States Energy Information Administration.  International energy statistics.  www.eia.gov

      

Saturday, February 7, 2015

The case of the forgetful stenographer


Plus ça change….

This week’s issue of Panorama has a front-page story on consumer inflation.  Don’t worry – you don’t have to spend your hard-earned tenge on this business newspaper.  You can download the press release from the National Bank of Kazakhstan for free.

Panorama (read: The central bank) reports that the annual rate of inflation rose to 7.4% in 2014, more than half higher than the 2013 rate, 4.8%.  The usual suspects are paraded:  The 19% devaluation of the tenge in February, which pushed up import prices and will cause the prices of domestic goods to levitate as well when export growth resumes; higher prices of gasoline and diesel fuel, as well as of some services, later in the year.  “The National Bank continues to take measures to keep inflation within the target corridor of 6-8%,” Panorama proudly announced.

As usual, the paper’s stenographer forgot a slight detail: The money supply.  Bank data paint a curious picture.  The forms of money that are easiest to spend – cash, checks, small savings accounts – shrank considerably over 2014.  Currency (the jargon is “M0 money”) was down 25.8% last December, relative to the previous December.  This won’t surprise anyone who has tried recently to make change at a grocery store.  But broad money – M3, which includes the less liquid forms of moolah as well as cash, checks and small savings – was up 10.5%.  The least liquid forms of money rose 60.1%.

Part of the new money in M3 just paid for new goods and services; the Bank estimates that output rose 4.1% in the first nine months of 2014, compared to the same period in 2013.  What remains of M3 could account for most of the year’s rise in prices, if it were spent.  So a long-standing question remains:  To what extent does illiquid money spur spending in Kazakhstan?  ---Leon Taylor, tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Notes

The phrase "least liquid forms of money" refers to M3 - M2.


References

National Bank of Kazakhstan.  Statistical Bulletin, December 2014.  www.nationalbank.kz


Panorama.  Dolia bankovskovo sektora vo vneshnem dolge strani snizilas’ do 7%.  [The banking sector’s share of the national external debt fell to 7%.]  February 6, 2015. 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

And now, live from the Kremlin crypt…


  
Paul R. Gregory.  Lenin’s brain and other tales from the secret Soviet archives.    Stanford, CA:  Hoover Institution Press.  2008.


Paul Gregory, the most influential Western economist in the Soviet specialty, presents here a kaleidoscope of 14 case studies drawn from archives of a conservative American think tank, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

Some chapters are more entertaining than even Dracula.  After Lenin died in 1924, the Soviets preserved his brain in a jar and launched an 11-year confidential study of its size in order to prove his brilliance. They called in a German, Oskar Vogt, styled by Kremlin bureaucrats as “the only world specialist on this question.”  This arrangement became less comfortable as Nazi aggression grew.  Finally the Soviets took over the project themselves.  Thirty-one thousand brain slices later, they found “a high degree of organization” in Lenin’s noggin, not to mention a high ratio of the temporal lobe to total brain mass.  Ergo, Dear Leader was a genius.  The Kremlin did not publicize this discovery; Gregory speculates that in the purge-year 1936, Stalin did not enthuse over the prospect that his predecessor may have had a larger brain than he.   

The Afghanistan chapter will interest Central Asians.  In 1978, a pro-Soviet government, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, came to power in Kabul.  Politburo members doubted its staying power in “a primitive country without a strong working class and…challenged by religious fanatics, foreign interventionists, tribal warlords and bourgeois elements,” writes Gregory.  In April 1979, the Politburo decided not to send in troops to prop up Taraki because, it said, this would “seriously harm our international integrity and would turn back the process of détente.  It would also reveal the weak position of the Taraki government and further encourage counter-revolutionaries inside and outside Afghanistan….”  That September, Taraki was overthrown by his prime minister. Hafizullah Amin. 

Do the Kremlin flip-flop

By December, a controlling minority of the Politburo had changed its tune.  “…An increasingly paranoid…gerontocracy accepted the KGB’s theory that imperialist forces, headed by the United States, intended to threaten [Soviet] southernmost republics from Afghanistan as part of a vast conspiracy to create a second Ottoman Empire,” notes Gregory.  In the Christmas season, KGB troops shot down Amin in cold blood.  This was announced by an alleged “Afghan People’s Revolutionary Council” that in reality was broadcasting from Uzbekistan.  Mikhail Gorbachev ended the futile invasion in 1989. 

Leonid Brezhnev’s misadventure had stemmed from a perception that the US, China and Pakistan controlled “the levers of the conflict,” Gregory concludes.  “Viewing the world through the prism of Marxist thought, there [sic] was no room in their vision for a Taliban, a Mullah Omar, or an Osama bin Laden.  The absence of this insight came back to haunt post-Brezhnev and post-Gorbachev Russia in Chechnya and in the growing restiveness of the Muslim populations of Central Asia.”  That passage illustrates both Gregory’s political acuity and his uncertain command of grammar.        

The book is absorbing but flawed.  Gregory’s blunt prose can be a bit wearisome, and the editing is abominable.  Often Gregory will summarize a document and then extract from it a passage making exactly the same point.  He also repeats himself:  On the same page, we read of “KGB head Yury Andropov” and “Yury Andropov, the head of the KGB”; of “Kosygin, the head of state,” and seven lines later, “the head of state and Politburo member, Aleksei Kosygin”; of “the general secretary of the Afghan party, Taraki” and, in the next line, “President (and party general secretary) Taraki.”  Hoover readers must have short memories.  Gregory’s vocabulary is also limited, but one payoff is that students in the post-Soviet space, speaking English as a second language, will find the book within their ken.         


John Raisian, Hoover’s director, asserts that these tales “produce a surprising [sic] deep understanding of totalitarianism.”  They really don’t.  Gregory selected the tales for their dramatic value; they represent outliers of the Soviet experience, not its mean.  But the extremes that totalitarianism permitted itself are troubling indeed.  – Leon Taylor, tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Sunday, January 25, 2015

News brief: Tenge devaluation not in the works

The governor of the central bank of Kazakhstan said last week that the central bank does not plan to devalue the tenge sharply in 2015, reported the business weekly Panorama. 

The two main factors that would figure into a tenge devaluation are a decline in the exchange value of the Russian ruble and especially in the global price of crude oil, bank governor Kairat Kelimbetov told Majilis and reporters in Astana.  Those factors do not justify a devaluation, since the government can offset a decline in private spending by cutting taxes or spending more, Kelimbetov said.  The National Bank intends to stabilize the foreign value of the tenge throughout 2015, he added.   

The dollar value of the ruble has halved since June but probably depends on the uncertain continuation of Western sanctions against Russia over the Ukrainian crisis.  On the futures market, which reflects expectations, daily crude oil prices have fallen by as much as 55% since June.  But on the spot market, where oil is bought and sold, the annual price of Brent oil, the global benchmark, has fallen only about 12%, according to data from a United States government agency, the Energy Information Administration.  Though backward-looking, the annual spot price is more likely to affect production than the daily futures price since it is less volatile and is seasonally adjusted.  In Kazakhstan, a 10% rise in the annual Brent spot price is normally associated with a concurrent 4.6% rise in real average income (which measures the amount of goods and services that a typical household can buy).

A devaluation is an official reduction of the foreign value of the home currency.  In Kazakhstan, about 184 tenge trade for one United States dollar.  This is called the market exchange rate.  In a tenge devaluation, the National Bank would increase the number of tenge that trade for a dollar – say, to 200 tenge.  This reduces the dollar price of exports from Kazakhstan, since each buck now can buy more tenge than before.  The resulting increase in world demand for Kazakhstani oil, which accounts for a fourth or more of the country’s economy, could offset part of the loss of export revenues that was due to the fall in oil prices.

Late last week, the tenge weakened from 184.1 to 184.4 per dollar, according to xe.com.  At present, the lowest tenge value that the National Bank would permit is 188 tenge per dollar. --Leon Taylor  tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Notes

The futures price quoted above is for Oklahoma oil on the NYMEX market, to be delivered after one month, according to data from the US Energy Information Administration.  Prices for deliveries after two to four months are somewhat higher, indicating that investors expect prices to rise again by the spring.  


References

Zaryna Karymova.  Glava Natsbanka poobeshal ne provodyt’ rezkuyu deval'vatsyu.  (The head of the National Bank promised not to put into effect a sharp devaluation.)  Panorama.  January 23, 2015.

United States Energy Information Administration.  Lots of statistics.  www.eia.gov

xe Currency.  Tracks daily exchange rates.  www.xe.com   

Wednesday, December 31, 2014

The champagne currency


Will the National Bank of Kazakhstan soon devalue the tenge?

Suppose that you are to meet another Almaty resident somewhere in the city.  You don’t know whom you will meet, or anything about him or her; nor do you know when or where.  Then where will you go, and when?  How will you identify yourself?

A favorite answer in this parlor game is that you will meet at midnight December 31 at Republic Square, perhaps at the pavilion of statues.  Probably you will carry a sign saying, “Are you looking for me?”   The point is that you will choose the most obvious time, place and identification, since your unknown partner will do the same.

Currency speculators look for focal points, too.  The word on the street is that the word on the street is that the central bank will soon devalue the tenge. To maximize profits from short sales, you must anticipate when others will close out their positions.  The most obvious focal point is:  Right after the New Year’s break, at a new exchange rate of 200 tenge to the dollar.  What recommends this point is not that it’s logical but that it’s easy to imagine.  (A second possibility is February, since the Bank devalued in that month on both prior occasions.)

If this reasoning is right – and I’m not sure that it is – then we should see a frenzy in the forex market for tenge in the next few days.  Keep your eye on KASE.  Of course, the short sales might compel the National Bank of Kazakhstan to devalue, whether it wants to or not, since the shorters will profit by purchasing dollars for tenge and draining the Bank’s dollar reserves.

Why does “everyone” expect devaluation?  Because she “knows” that the Bank intercedes when oil prices, the ruble, and forex reserves all fall.  Indeed, the ruble had weakened before the devaluations of 2009 and 2014; and oil prices and dollar reserves also fell in the run up to the February 2009 reduction of 25% in the target dollar value of the tenge.  This year, since June, the dollar value of the ruble has halved, and the peak-to-trough decline in the daily futures price of some oils has been something like 40%.  Ergo, devalue.

Shooting craps

If we could be sure that oil and the ruble would not recover until 2016, then devaluing the tenge might well make sense.  Historically, Russia has been Kazakhstan’s leading partner in trade; a weaker ruble would eventually reduce Russian demand for Kazakhstani exports and sharpen Russian competition with Kazakhstan in global markets.  Lower oil prices in the spot market reduce Kazakhstan’s export revenues for a while – say, for less than a year – because oil demand is not sensitive to the price in the short run.  That is, the lower price does not induce sales of many more barrels – not right away, at least; so Kazakhstan sells about as many barrels as before, but for less money per barrel.

The operative word in that paragraph is “if.”  The value of the ruble is contingent on the Western sanctions imposed on Russia for intervening in Ukraine.  They are painful for Europe’s largest economy, Germany, and it is hard to believe that Berlin will comply with them until 2016.  More important, a 40% decline in daily oil futures of 40% does not imply a concurrent 40% decline in annual spot prices, which are far more fundamental to production decisions than the speculative, volatile futures are.  At the moment, annual spot prices for Brent crude, the global benchmark, are down by about 12%, according to data from the United States Energy Information Administration.  If this rate of decline continues for another year, then -- judging from its performance since 2000 -- annual Kazakhstani GDP per capita may fall by 6% or less.  However, estimates of the excess supply in the global oil market have been running at one or two million barrels per day, or roughly 1% to 2% of global supply.  It is not evident that this can sustain a 12% reduction in price over all of 2015.

Bandwagon finance

In short, the Bank is in a gray area.  The ruble, and oil prices, may not continue to decline for long enough to enable a tenge devaluation to pay for itself.  Add to this the pernicious consequences of any devaluation for tenge holders, particularly the commercial banks.  When the Bank weakened the tenge this February, social-media rumors led to runs on three financial institutions in Kazakhstan.  Finally, devaluation would be inconsistent with financial reforms that the Bank is considering in tandem with the government, such as increased insurance for tenge deposits, a reduced rate of interest paid on dollar deposits, a rise in tenge liquidity for the banks, and a general move away from dollars and towards tenge (“dedollarization”). 

Were it not for the public pressure, the National Bank would not need to rush into a decision.  Its international reserves are, to say the least, ample.  Last month it held $7.1 billion of gold – slightly lower than in August, when it built its stash to $7.5 billion, but still a 29% gain since January, according to Bank data.  As of November, net reserves had been rising steadily since June to $27.9 billion, a 15% increase over January.  As if this wasn’t enough, the National Oil Fund, consisting mainly of royalties from exports, was nearly triple the Bank’s net forex reserves -- $76.8 billion in November, an 8% increase since January (despite the fall in oil prices).  Combined, the reserves and Fund could pay for merchandise and service imports for more than two years.  (Early this year, imports averaged $4.2 billion per month.)      

At this point, given these conditions and especially the uncertainty surrounding them, a second devaluation within a year is not logical.  However, we are moving beyond logic.  The word on the side of the bandwagon is “devalue,” and the bandwagon is filling up fast.  See you in Republic Square. –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Notes

Net reserves fell from $21 billion in October 2008 to $18.2 billion in January 2009, a 13% decline, according to Bank data.  They did not weaken so graphically in the run up to the devaluation last February.  They had fallen throughout most of 2013 but had been strengthening fairly steadily since November.  However, compared to January 2013, net reserves in January 2014 were down by about 9%.  In sum, the Bank sometimes devalues even when net reserves in prior months have been rising.       


References
     

Nikolai Drozd.  Svyazannii s dedollaryzatsyiy resheniya myagche syshectvovabshyx radykalnix ozhydanii.  Panorama.  December 26, 2014.