Does
the pollution market pollute?
A few days ago, the European Parliament refused
to pull many pollution permits off the market.
This sparked accusations that the permit market somehow worsens
pollution – a mindset
akin to that of the Incan emperor who throttled the bearer of bad tidings.
To restrict carbon emissions, the
European Union prints a limited number of pollution permits. Plants (and others) can buy and sell these
permits among themselves. The reason for
this policy is to reduce pollution as cheaply as possible. Plants that can decrease carbon emissions
cheaply – say, by shifting to a cleaner fuel, like nuclear energy – sell their
permits to plants that can’t control emissions easily. As a result, most of the cleanup is by plants
that clean up cheaply.
For example, suppose that Plant A can reduce carbon
emissions by a ton for 50 euros. This would cost Plant B 100 euros. Then A can
sell its permit to B for 75 euros. This
reduces the real cost of cleaning up the ton by 50 euros (100 minus 50). The savings can preserve jobs and hold down
electrical bills.
Is a
monopoly in the making?
Moreover, the permit market gives us vital information. The permit price reflects the cost to the
polluter of reducing emissions by a ton, since he will buy a permit only if its
price is below the cleanup cost. If
cleanup is cheap for most firms, then they will refuse to buy a permit until its
price falls. That’s the situation
today. Economic anemia in Europe, stemming from the difficulty of governments in
paying their bills, has slowed production, so the European economy is
using less electricity than it otherwise would.
The demand for permits has fallen sharply, and their price approaches zero.
This is not the fault of the market. It simply is telling us that Europeans don’t
value more cleanup because economic stagnation has already reduced
pollution. If some Europeans want more
cleanup anyway, then they can buy lots of permits and donate them to a bonfire. This, more or less, was the proposal from the
European Commission – to yank permits off the market and possibly reissue them
later. The Parliament voted it down.
In fact, we might get too much cleanup in the years to come. Since permits are cheap now, an agent could
corner the market by buying them up and then releasing only a few later, at a
price that is high because of their artificial scarcity. Without permits, many power plants won’t be
able to produce, so we may get too little electricity.
Central Asia is not a player in the permit market. But it should follow its performance in order
to learn about the European energy market.
Compared to coal, oil is a costly but cleaner fuel (though not as clean
as natural gas). A fall in the permit
price indicates that the demand for oil – as a substitute for coal – is falling
because additional cleanup of carbon emissions is not valued as highly as
before.
Moral of this story: Beware of Incan emperors. –Leon Taylor, tayloralmaty@gmail.com
Moral of this story: Beware of Incan emperors. –Leon Taylor, tayloralmaty@gmail.com
Good reading
Robert N. Stavins, editor. Economics of the environment: Selected readings. Fifth edition. W. W. Norton. 2005.
References
Stanley Reed. European lawmakers to
vote on tougher carbon measure. The New York Times. April 15, 2013.
Stanley Reed. Europe
vote sets back carbon plan. The New York Times. April 16, 2013.
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