What is Iran up to?

 

                             AC130 gunship in 2011 at Hurlburt Field in Florida. Photo: US Air Force.

Tuesday’s attack by an Iranian-linked militia on the American airbase west of Baghdad, al-Asad, upped the ante in the Middle East. Of the 60+ such attacks on US posts in Syria and Iraq since October 17, shortly after the Hamas massacre in Israel, this was the first to use close-range ballistic missiles – that is, missiles with a range of just 300 kilometers. Most other attacks relied on drones, which are smaller and less explosive.  Iran’s most modern drone, Shahed 136, has a warhead of 36 to 50 kilograms.  A close-range Iranian missile, more like 450 to 1,000 kilograms, depending on the missile. The Pentagon did not disclose details about the missile in Tuesday’s attack (go figure).  Iran's main two close-range ballistics are the Fateh-110, with a warhead of 450 kilograms; and the Shahab-1, warhead of 770 to 1,000 kilograms.  Task & Purpose reported that the missile resembled a Fateh-110 but was not the same. As for drones, an equivalent explosive power might require a launch of 9 to 28 of the “Witness.” Such a large launch of drones has been rare against US posts in recent weeks.  

Moreover, Tuesday’s attack seemed well planned. The evidence for this is that an American gunship had enough wind of the assault to be waiting above, unless it was extraordinarily lucky. The AC130 fired back immediately, destroying the truck and killing several members of the militia. In addition, the decision to launch two missiles might reflect the fact that the Shahab hits near its target half the time within a radius of 100 meters and the Fateh half the time in a radius of 500 meters. If the truck launching missiles resembling Fateh-110s was within 500 meters of al-Asad, one would expect one of the two rockets to make its mark. Such an expectation takes planning.

The US responded in proportion by attacking two militia sites in Iraq that fuel and coordinate militia attacks in Syria. On Thursday, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq said it responded with drone or missile attacks on four US posts -- two in northeast Syria and two in Iraq, including Ain al-Asad again.  The Pentagon said there were no injuries or property damage.

What is Iran up to?

Let’s ignore Iran’s ritual protest that the militias act on their own. Iran trains and finances them through the Quds Forces and the ideological-political unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.  The Corps comprises a tenth of Iran’s military. Its purpose is to preserve Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1979 Revolution, dedicated to destroying Israel. That may tell you something about the goals of militias like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella for militias making many recent attacks on American posts in Syria and Iraq. 

The government in Tehran proposed to double the Corps budget in the year beginning March 2021, to $22 billion. To put this in perspective, $22 billion can buy 22 million drones. 

The purpose of beefing up the budget is clear.  Michaël Tanchum, a senior associate fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, said the Corps, “through its use of proxy militias, drones, unconventional naval warfare and missiles, cost-effectively provides Tehran the ability to inflict costs on its neighbors to ensure…deterrent capability….” 

The Corps can stop the militias any time it wants by cutting off their money.  In the militias, each fighter receives a monthly salary of $60 and $80. Officers earn about $100, and they have health care and days off, wrote the CTC Sentinel of West Point. Without funds, the militias would lose talented leaders.

The Hezbollah Brigades, which attacked the al-Asad post Tuesday, is a good example.  One of its commanders, Imad Naji Al-Bahadli, “sought to identify U.S. military installations and U.S. companies that could serve as targets for future [Hezbollah Brigades] attacks, which would be launched on the orders of the [Quds Forces],” wrote the State Department. To prepare, al-Bahadli sent militants to train in Lebanon with Lebanese Hezbollah, “where he himself had been trained.”

Perhaps Iran is raising money for its admitted cause of destroying Israel by staging a glamorous attack. The anti-Israelis are not allergic to money: Through their families, the four leaders of Hamas control $11 billion, reported The New York Post.

Or perhaps Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, who controls the Corps, senses that American resolve to stay in the Middle East is weakening, so he is testing it by pushing slightly harder than before. If the response is proportional, as indeed it was Tuesday, he may launch one last determined push, confident that the American public this time will not permit a proportional response that commits land troops.  Probably the Americans could be pushed out of Syria more easily than out of Iraq. There are almost three times as many troops in Iraq as in Syria. But Iran’s gain would be greater from a US withdrawal from Iraq, where a fragile democracy might collapse.

Observers usually argue that Iran merely wants to harass American posts without risking war. This doesn't make sense to me. What is the point in just harassing when, with just a little more effort, you could do real damage? I think it more likely that Iran wants to see how far it can go. 

That Iran may be testing US resolve suggests that it does not believe warnings from the Pentagon and the White House. Iran must realize that it cannot prevent an underwater launch of Tomahawk missiles, and that the Tomahawk once in flight is hard to stop. If Iran is testing resolve, it must doubt that the US will send Tomahawks its way. It is calling Biden’s bluff.

It would be logical to retaliate by destroying the weapons depots of the militias.  Iran has moved these to northeast of Hama and to Qalamoun, Deir Attia, Al-Qaryatayn, Al-Sukhna, and Al-Tabqa, which has oilfields, according to the CTC Sentinel. But the US bombed three of these sites with no discernible effect on the pace of militia attacks.

In that event, the most effective American tactic may be a pre-emptive attack on a military post in Iran, say, a regional Corps post in Iran, or a response to a major Iranian attack that is at least proportional and that does not rule out land troops. Either policy runs risks. A pre-emptive attack would probably kill civilians and cost the US support in the Middle East and among Western allies. They would view this attack as evidence of a return to the “bring-it-on” policy of the George W. Bush administration. Committing land troops could cost Biden re-election next November.

How would Iran respond to a pre-emptive attack? It might assault US posts. For this would distract Iranians’ attention from inflation, unemployment, and repression of human rights, and it might even unite the nation behind the government. It would also cement Iran’s leadership of the anti-Israelis; no one else has consistently attacked the United States.

On the other hand, Iran would lose the war if the US fully engages. So the gains would be short-lived.  Their length of life would depend partly on Russian aid to Iran. In eight years, Russia has provided $1.5 billion in military aid to Tehran, only a twentieth as much as to Iraq.-- Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet.

In rocketry, the Circular Error Probable gives the radius for which one could expect that of 100 rockets launched, half would land within the specified range. For example, the Shabab has a CEP of 100 meters, so one would expect half of the missiles to land within 100 meters.

 References

Pierre Boussel.  The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, units, and actions.  CTC Sentinel 16 [6].   The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point June 2023.

HESA Shahed 136 - Wikipedia

Table of Iran's Missile Arsenal | Iran Watch . Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. .

Agnes Helou. Iran more than doubles Revolutionary Guard’s budget in FY22 bill (defensenews.com)  December 16, 2021.

Jeff Schogol.  AC-130 destroys truck US says launched missile attack in Iraq (taskandpurpose.com)  November 21, 2023.

Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio.  U.S. adds Iranian-backed militia, five commanders, and an IRGC operative to list of designated terrorists | FDD's Long War Journal . November 20, 2023

Isabel Vincent and Benjamin Weinthal.  Hamas leaders worth staggering $11B revel in luxury — while Gaza’s people suffer.  The New York Post.  Nov. 7, 2023.  Hamas leaders worth $11B live luxury lives in Qatar (nypost.com)

The real view from Iran

 

                 A Revolutionary Guards commander in Iran vows to destroy Israel

Since October 17, when the most recent spate of air attacks by Iran-linked militias began on US posts in Syria and Iraq, there have been at least 66, roughly an equal number in either country. Most attacks were with only a few drones or missiles, often no more than three.  But this morning (November 21), a truck near the al-Asad airbase just west of Baghdad fired two close-range ballistic missiles that injured eight. A Pentagon spokesperson called the injuries "non-serious," whatever that's supposed to mean. There have been roughly 70 injuries to the US military or contractors since October 17, 10 days after a massacre by Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, in Israel. The Pentagon has characterized virtually all injuries as minor, although the traumatic brain injuries -- concussions -- that follow a rocket attack can turn out to have lasting consequences.

Al-Asad has drawn more militia attacks than the other US bases in Iraq and Syria, probably because it is the largest.  When Iran retaliated for the American assassination of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leader, Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, it hit al-Asad.  But in addition, there have been more than six air attacks from the Houthi rebels in Yemen, also financed by Iran. Most were from north Yemen and towards south Israel.  But on November 15, a US destroyer in the Red Sea shot down a Houthi drone headed towards it. Five days later, the Houthis seized by helicopter a Japanese-owned cargo ship, tied to Israel, in a shipping lane of the Red Sea. They took its 25 crew members hostage. The Houthis say they want to protect Hamas from Israel and that Israel understands force only.  

The Pentagon says it will respond in proportion to attacks.  Today's attack is a good example. An AC-130 gunship immediately fired on the truck that launched the rocket, killing several militia members. Next, fighter jets hit two centers used by the Hezbollah Brigades militia for operations in Iraq and Syria, near Al Anbar and Jurf al Saqr, roughly 40 miles southwest of Baghdad. Jurf al Saqr was a stronghold of the Islamic State before the city's reconquest. This strike, the fourth retaliatory attack by the US in five weeks, is what the Pentagon means by a proportional response. 

In a November 9 press conference, spokesperson Sabrina Singh said the policy of proportional response had succeeded because the Israel-Hamas War had not widened to the region. Her explanation was, to say the least, confused.

Singh said: “…We do not want to see this conflict of what's happening in Israel and with Hamas widen out to the region. We are going to continue to message both publicly and privately that, you know, for any actor that wants to seek to take advantage of this conflict that they don't. And so that's why you're seeing these self-defense strikes that the United States took last night and again two weeks ago.”

So, the purpose of the strikes is to contain the Israel-Hamas War.

But: “First and foremost…we're always going to protect our troops and our citizens in the region….Our personnel have come under repeated attacks by these Iranian-backed militia groups, and we have made it very clear that these attacks must stop….We won't hesitate to take further necessary measures to protect our people and to do so at a time and place of our choosing.”

So, the purpose of the strikes is to protect US troops.

But…but: “…Are these strikes working—look, we want to make sure that we can contain this conflict to Israel and Hamas. We are not and have not seen this conflict widen beyond that region—or beyond Israel.  So I think it's important to remember that we are sending a message. I think the messages have been received. And look, if any attacks continue on our service members and we feel the need to respond, we will at a time and place of our choosing.”

So, the purpose of the strikes is to contain the war.  No, wait a minute, it’s to protect the troops. No, wait…

And then, in response to a question about the movement of US ships to the Red Sea, she said:  “Well, I think I kind of answered this, but look, in terms of deterrence overall, our goal is to make sure that the conflict that's in Gaza doesn't expand and does not become a region-wide conflict….We don't think that's happened and we are going to do everything in our power to make sure that that doesn't happen, and that's why you're seeing these assets where they are, because they are sending a very clear message to the region.

“And while we are responding to a number of attacks against our forces, again, these are defensive strikes, they are not connected to what's happening, or what Israel is doing in its efforts against Hamas.

So overall, our goal in the region is to not see this widen into a larger conflict, and I think we have been largely successful at that.”

So, the ships and planes are there to contain the war. The attacks on Iranian-linked arms depots in northeast Syria are not related to this. They are meant to protect troops, after all.

This is the ceiling, this is the floor….

What’s going on

I have a few questions myself.  First: What does the Pentagon want to do? If it wants to avoid a wider war in the Middle East, then the best policy is obvious: Don’t send more troops and arms to the Middle East. Any widening would occur because anti-Israeli forces, primarily Iran, think that they must bring in allies to defeat Israel.  Suppose that “defeat” means sustaining borders that endanger Israelis. On October 7, Hamas massacred an estimated 1,200 Israelis, most of them civilians. Israel now controls the northern Gaza Strip, which Hamas had ruled. But Hamas can still threaten Israel from the south of the Strip. Even if Israel secures this area, missile attacks from the Houthis in Yemen remain. So at this point, Iran has no reason to bring in allies, since it would have to make expensive promises to them and it already has succeeded in credibly threatening Israel.  There is no reason for the US to try to head off the entry of more anti-Israelis.  If the goal is just to contain the war when all that Iran wants to do is terrify Israelis.

But consider two more possibilities. One is that Iran doesn’t want to just endanger Israelis. It wants to eliminate Israel or Jews in general, to gain regional power, or both.  In either case, merely pressuring Israel from the Gaza Strip will not accomplish its goal. To eliminate Israel, Iran will probably need missile assaults by Hezbollah and the Houthis, at least.

The Houthis, at least, are motivated. At Chatham House, a research group in England, research fellow Farea al-Muslimi says about the Houthis, “Their ‘death to America, death to Israel’ slogan is not there for electoral and voter reasons.“  Ahmad Shafa’I, Revolutionary Guards commander of the Salman Corps in two Iranian cities, Sistan and Baluchestan, said on October 16: “The Palestinian operation is the beginning of the resistance movement to destroy Israel.”  From the 2015 memoirs of a late commander of the Fatemiyoun (Afghan militants for Iran): “[Our] wish…is face-to-face confrontation with the usurping Israeli regime. The Fatemiyoun is training in Syria, and then we will fulfill the divine promise of [the late Supreme Leader Ruhollah] Khomeini. Israel must be wiped from the face of the Earth.”  Not much ambiguity about that.  A total genocide strikes me as almost impossible, at this point. But the Nazis almost pulled it off.

Anyway, if Iran’s goal to wipe out Israel, then to avoid a wider war, the US may need to bring in forces, as it has. But from this view, has a policy of proportional response succeeded? The Houthis are attacking more directly than ever, and they rule out diplomacy.

 

To contain or to protect?

The second possibility is that avoiding a wider war in the Middle East is not, in fact, the overriding American goal.  Maybe the US wants to ensure that Israel has secure borders, or that US troops in the Middle East are protected, or both. 

If the goal is secure borders, then the US may need to credibly threaten Hezbollah and the Houthis. Can a proportional response to militia attacks in Syria and Iraq guarantee either goal?  Instead, Iran may conclude that the US has no serious intent to stop a missile attack by Hezbollah on Israel, so it might as well commission it. Hezbollah already has 150,000 missiles aimed at Israel, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.  So a go-ahead signal would not be costly for Iran. 

The remaining possibility is that the US wants “first and foremost” to protect its troops in the Middle East. In that case, a proportional-response policy has evidently failed. It has not slowed the pace of militia attacks to what prevailed before October 17. But possibly the arrival of the US submarine Florida in the region may accomplish this goal. If Iran doesn’t know where the submarine is, then it cannot stop an underwater launch of its Tomahawk missiles, said to be as many as 150.  Once launched, the Tomahawk is hard to stop: It flies below radar and loiter and change direction, reported USA Today. It can threaten Iran directly. So it may be that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who controls the Revolutionary Guards, who in turn run the militias, has already gotten the message and needs, say, a week or so to rein in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, the main militia group launching drones.

Once again: Exactly what does the US want to do right now in the Middle East? The lack of a clear answer may tempt Iran to think that the US doesn't really know why it's in Syria and Iraq and therefore may yield to one last, determined push out. The Pentagon's confusion endangers the troops.

Ostensibly, the US is in Syria to fight the Islamic State. Some military analysts scoff at this. They say that Daesh (the Arabic acronym for the ISIS) is in tatters and that the troops aren't doing any counter-insurgency, anyway. Moreover, the longer they stay, the greater the chances that a drone will kill a soldier. That could provoke a Congressional demand for retaliation on a scale that could drag the US into a regional war...with Russia conceivably on the other side.

The story is exaggerated. Yes, Daesh lost Mosul, the capital of its caliphate, in Iraq, in 2017.  But Daesh is not a spent force. On November 8, Daesh fighters killed 30 Syrian troops. (You may wonder why Daesh, which is Sunni, opposes the government of Syria, which is mainly Sunni. Well, the Alawite minority rules Syria, and one of the regime's two main allies, Iran, is Shia.) And US soldiers are not sitting in their Syrian posts playing pinochle. They advise and accompany the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led coalition set up by the Americans in 2015, partly to take on Daesh. On the other hand, Daesh is probably not strong enough to justify the presence of 3,400 US soldiers in Syria and Iraq.

The claimed need to fight Daesh is a bit of a cover story. In 2019, President Donald Trump, never a fan of nation-building, ordered the military to withdraw from northern Syria. The Pentagon got him to back away a bit by arguing that the troops were needed to protect oilfields in northeast Syria from Daesh. Oil is the magic word to Trump. The truth is that the troops, in addition to inhibiting Daesh, oppose Syria's dictator, President Bashar al-Assad. Fighting for democracy was the other reason for creating the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Which brings us to the real reason for being in Syria and Iraq: To protect incipient democracy, the same justification as for US aid to Ukraine.  Mark Kennet, who often write about Israel and the Middle East,  believes that the US has an interest in "a strategic front" against countries opposing democracy.  The only stable democracy in the Middle East is Israel, which Iran is trying to destroy. Democracy is strengthening in Iraq but remains immature.     

The smoke in Tehran

I conclude with two notes. One is about Iran’s claim that it does not control the militias.  For years, Iran has trained recruits to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the militias drawing upon countries throughout the Middle East, at the Shaid Mahalati Higher Education Complex. Half of the training is ideological, writes Saeid Golkar of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. The upshot is that Iran’s Supreme Leader, now Khamenei, is the agent for the Hidden Imam, the eventual savior of humanity. This mission requires the destruction of Israel. 

Iran supplies the militias from depots in northeast Syria, which the US has bombed twice in a month, and from Lebanon, which the US so far is ignored.  Iran’s claim that the militias plan and finance such sophisticated attacks on their own is not, I think, credible. If nothing else, Iran can discourage their attacks by threatening to cut off their funds. The militias depend on hawala finance (basically underground systems) that may be underwritten by Iran, where hawala has long been in operation.

The second note is about Iran’s denial that it wishes to exploit the Israel-Hamas War to gain regional power, perhaps to protect itself from Sunni neighbors. An opposition website in Syria, Zaman al-Wasl, reports a two-hour meeting Saturday night, November 18, at a Homs airport between leaders of the Revolutionary Guards, the National Defense, and the Zainabiyoun (Pakistani militia linked to Iran) to coordinate operations between Homs and Deir ez-Zour, in northeast Syria—the first such meeting in five years.

Another opposition site, Baladi News, says the Revolutionary Guards are relocating thousands of troops from Aleppo, in northeast Syria, an area largely controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a Sunni outfit with past ties to al-Qaeda, and to Homs, Hama, and Deir ez-Zour.

 I am not aware that these reports have been confirmed.  But they worry me.—Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

 

 Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet.  This update corrects an error about Kennet's stance on American policy.

 

References

Kasra Aarabi and Jason M. Brodsky.  Iran's Proxies in Syria Move Toward Escalation With Israel Amid Hamas War (foreignpolicy.com) . November 10, 2023.

ABC News.  US retaliates against Iran-backed militants after ballistic missile strike (msn.com) . November 21, 2023.

Baladi News. Iran Reinforces Positions in Hama, Deir-ez-Zor and Homs, Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Aleppo - The Syrian Observer . November 16, 2023.

Lolita Baldor.  US Navy warship shoots down drone from Yemen over the Red Sea | AP News . November 15, 2023.

Isabel Debre and Jon Gambrell.  Yemen's Houthi rebels hijack an Israeli-linked ship in the Red Sea and take 25 crew members hostage | AP News . November 20, 2023.

Saeid Golkar.  The Supreme Leader and the Guard: Civil-military relations and regime survival.  Policy Notes: Washington Institute of Near East Policy.   1179 (washingtoninstitute.org) .     2019.

Islamic Republic News Agency.  Palestinian operation begins resistance front move to destroy Israel - IRNA .  October 16, 2023.

Jack Jeffery.  Yemen’s Houthis launched strikes at Israel during the war | AP News . November 15, 2023.

Courtney Kube.  Militants believed to be Houthi rebels use helicopter to seize Japanese tanker in Red Sea (nbcnews.com) . November 19, 2023.

George Petras and Stephen J. Beard.  US deploys nuclear submarine to Middle East to deter Israel-Hamas war (usatoday.com)  . November 14, 2023. 

Matt Seyler.  US hits Iran-backed militants with 4th round of retaliatory airstrikes - ABC News (go.com) . November 21, 2023.

United States Department of Defense.  Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing > U.S. Department of Defense > Transcript  . November 9, 2023.

United States Department of Defense.  Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant > U.S. Department of Defense > Release  . November 11, 2023.       

Zaman al-Wasl.  Homs Countryside: Pro-Iranian Militia Leaders Meet at Dabaa Airport - The Syrian Observer .

And now, a word from our shameless sponsor....

So much in Central Asia resembles science fiction that the real McCoy may give parables, or at least a smirk.  See below.  -- Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

  

Amazon.com: The future in a minute: Very short stories of science fiction eBook : Taylor, Leon: Kindle Store