A Revolutionary Guards commander in Iran vows to destroy Israel
Since October 17, when the most recent spate of air attacks by Iran-linked militias began on US posts in Syria and Iraq, there have been at least 66, roughly an equal number in either country. Most attacks were with only a few drones or missiles, often no more than three. But this morning (November 21), a truck near the al-Asad airbase just west of Baghdad fired two close-range ballistic missiles that injured eight. A Pentagon spokesperson called the injuries "non-serious," whatever that's supposed to mean. There have been roughly 70 injuries to the US military or contractors since October 17, 10 days after a massacre by Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, in Israel. The Pentagon has characterized virtually all injuries as minor, although the traumatic brain injuries -- concussions -- that follow a rocket attack can turn out to have lasting consequences.
Al-Asad has drawn more militia attacks than the other US bases in Iraq and Syria, probably because it is the largest. When Iran retaliated for the American assassination of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leader, Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, it hit al-Asad. But in addition, there have been more than six air attacks from the Houthi rebels in Yemen, also financed by Iran. Most were from north Yemen and towards south Israel. But on November 15, a US destroyer in the Red Sea shot down a Houthi drone headed towards it. Five days later, the Houthis seized by helicopter a Japanese-owned cargo ship, tied to Israel, in a shipping lane of the Red Sea. They took its 25 crew members hostage. The Houthis say they want to protect Hamas from Israel and that Israel understands force only.
The Pentagon says it will respond in proportion to attacks. Today's attack is a good example. An AC-130 gunship immediately fired on the truck that launched the rocket, killing several militia members. Next, fighter jets hit two centers used by the Hezbollah Brigades militia for operations in Iraq and Syria, near Al Anbar and Jurf al Saqr, roughly 40 miles southwest of Baghdad. Jurf al Saqr was a stronghold of the Islamic State before the city's reconquest. This strike, the fourth retaliatory attack by the US in five weeks, is what the Pentagon means by a proportional response.
In a November 9 press conference, spokesperson Sabrina Singh said the policy of proportional response had succeeded because the Israel-Hamas War had not widened to the region. Her explanation was, to say the least, confused.
Singh said: “…We do not want to see this conflict of
what's happening in Israel and with Hamas widen out to the region. We are going
to continue to message both publicly and privately that, you know, for any
actor that wants to seek to take advantage of this conflict that they don't.
And so that's why you're seeing these self-defense strikes that the United
States took last night and again two weeks ago.”
So, the purpose of the strikes is to contain the Israel-Hamas
War.
But: “First and foremost…we're always going to protect
our troops and our citizens in the region….Our personnel have come under
repeated attacks by these Iranian-backed militia groups, and we have made it
very clear that these attacks must stop….We won't hesitate to take further
necessary measures to protect our people and to do so at a time and place of
our choosing.”
So, the purpose of the strikes is to protect US
troops.
But…but: “…Are these strikes working—look, we want to
make sure that we can contain this conflict to Israel and Hamas. We are not and
have not seen this conflict widen beyond that region—or beyond Israel. So I think it's important to remember that we
are sending a message. I think the messages have been received. And look, if
any attacks continue on our service members and we feel the need to respond, we
will at a time and place of our choosing.”
So, the purpose of the strikes is to contain the
war. No, wait a minute, it’s to protect the
troops. No, wait…
And then, in response to a question about the movement
of US ships to the Red Sea, she said: “Well,
I think I kind of answered this, but look, in terms of deterrence overall, our
goal is to make sure that the conflict that's in Gaza doesn't expand and does
not become a region-wide conflict….We don't think that's happened and we are
going to do everything in our power to make sure that that doesn't happen, and
that's why you're seeing these assets where they are, because they are sending
a very clear message to the region.
“And while we are responding to a number of attacks
against our forces, again, these are defensive strikes, they are not connected
to what's happening, or what Israel is doing in its efforts against Hamas.
So overall, our goal in the region is to not see this
widen into a larger conflict, and I think we have been largely successful at
that.”
So, the ships and planes are there to contain the war.
The attacks on Iranian-linked arms depots in northeast Syria are not related to
this. They are meant to protect troops, after all.
This is the ceiling, this is the floor….
What’s going on
I have a few questions myself. First: What does the Pentagon want to do? If
it wants to avoid a wider war in the Middle East, then the best policy is
obvious: Don’t send more troops and arms to the Middle East. Any widening would
occur because anti-Israeli forces, primarily Iran, think that they must bring
in allies to defeat Israel. Suppose that
“defeat” means sustaining borders that endanger Israelis. On October 7, Hamas massacred
an estimated 1,200 Israelis, most of them civilians. Israel now controls the
northern Gaza Strip, which Hamas had ruled. But Hamas can still threaten Israel
from the south of the Strip. Even if Israel secures this area, missile attacks
from the Houthis in Yemen remain. So at this point, Iran has no reason to bring
in allies, since it would have to make expensive promises to them and it already
has succeeded in credibly threatening Israel.
There is no reason for the US to try to head off the entry of more
anti-Israelis. If the goal is just to
contain the war when all that Iran wants to do is terrify Israelis.
But consider two more possibilities. One is that Iran doesn’t
want to just endanger Israelis. It wants to eliminate Israel or Jews in general,
to gain regional power, or both. In
either case, merely pressuring Israel from the Gaza Strip will not accomplish
its goal. To eliminate Israel, Iran will probably need missile assaults by Hezbollah
and the Houthis, at least.
The Houthis, at least, are motivated. At Chatham
House, a research group in England, research fellow Farea al-Muslimi says about
the Houthis, “Their ‘death to America, death to Israel’ slogan is not there for
electoral and voter reasons.“ Ahmad
Shafa’I, Revolutionary Guards commander of the Salman Corps in two Iranian cities,
Sistan and Baluchestan, said on October 16: “The Palestinian operation is the
beginning of the resistance movement to destroy Israel.” From the 2015 memoirs of a late commander of
the Fatemiyoun (Afghan militants for Iran): “[Our] wish…is face-to-face
confrontation with the usurping Israeli regime. The Fatemiyoun is training in
Syria, and then we will fulfill the divine promise of [the late Supreme Leader
Ruhollah] Khomeini. Israel must be wiped from the face of the Earth.” Not much ambiguity about that. A total genocide strikes me as almost impossible,
at this point. But the Nazis almost pulled it off.
Anyway, if Iran’s goal to wipe out Israel, then to avoid
a wider war, the US may need to bring in forces, as it has. But from this view,
has a policy of proportional response succeeded? The Houthis are attacking more
directly than ever, and they rule out diplomacy.
To contain or to protect?
The second possibility is that avoiding a wider war in
the Middle East is not, in fact, the overriding American goal. Maybe the US wants to ensure that Israel has
secure borders, or that US troops in the Middle East are protected, or both.
If the goal is secure borders, then the US may need to
credibly threaten Hezbollah and the Houthis. Can a proportional response to
militia attacks in Syria and Iraq guarantee either goal? Instead, Iran may conclude that the US has no
serious intent to stop a missile attack by Hezbollah on Israel, so it might as
well commission it. Hezbollah already has 150,000 missiles aimed at Israel, according
to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.
So a go-ahead signal would not be costly for Iran.
The remaining possibility is that the US wants “first
and foremost” to protect its troops in the Middle East. In that case, a proportional-response
policy has evidently failed. It has not slowed the pace of militia attacks to
what prevailed before October 17. But possibly the arrival of the US submarine Florida
in the region may accomplish this goal. If Iran doesn’t know where the
submarine is, then it cannot stop an underwater launch of its Tomahawk
missiles, said to be as many as 150. Once
launched, the Tomahawk is hard to stop: It flies below radar and loiter and
change direction, reported USA Today.
It can threaten Iran directly. So it may be that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,
who controls the Revolutionary Guards, who in turn run the militias, has
already gotten the message and needs, say, a week or so to rein in the Islamic
Resistance in Iraq, the main militia group launching drones.
Once again: Exactly what does the US want to do right
now in the Middle East? The lack of a clear answer may tempt Iran to think that the US doesn't really know why it's in Syria and Iraq and therefore may yield to one last, determined push out. The Pentagon's confusion endangers the troops.
Ostensibly, the US is in Syria to fight the Islamic State. Some military analysts scoff at this. They say that Daesh (the Arabic acronym for the ISIS) is in tatters and that the troops aren't doing any counter-insurgency, anyway. Moreover, the longer they stay, the greater the chances that a drone will kill a soldier. That could provoke a Congressional demand for retaliation on a scale that could drag the US into a regional war...with Russia conceivably on the other side.
The story is exaggerated. Yes, Daesh lost Mosul, the capital of its caliphate, in Iraq, in 2017. But Daesh is not a spent force. On November 8, Daesh fighters killed 30 Syrian troops. (You may wonder why Daesh, which is Sunni, opposes the government of Syria, which is mainly Sunni. Well, the Alawite minority rules Syria, and one of the regime's two main allies, Iran, is Shia.) And US soldiers are not sitting in their Syrian posts playing pinochle. They advise and accompany the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led coalition set up by the Americans in 2015, partly to take on Daesh. On the other hand, Daesh is probably not strong enough to justify the presence of 3,400 US soldiers in Syria and Iraq.
The claimed need to fight Daesh is a bit of a cover story. In 2019, President Donald Trump, never a fan of nation-building, ordered the military to withdraw from northern Syria. The Pentagon got him to back away a bit by arguing that the troops were needed to protect oilfields in northeast Syria from Daesh. Oil is the magic word to Trump. The truth is that the troops, in addition to inhibiting Daesh, oppose Syria's dictator, President Bashar al-Assad. Fighting for democracy was the other reason for creating the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Which brings us to the real reason for being in Syria and Iraq: To protect incipient democracy, the same justification as for US aid to Ukraine. Mark Kennet, who often write about Israel and the Middle East, believes that the US has an interest in "a strategic front" against countries opposing democracy. The only stable democracy in the Middle East is Israel, which Iran is trying to destroy. Democracy is strengthening in Iraq but remains immature.
The smoke in Tehran
I conclude with two notes. One is about Iran’s claim that it does not control the militias. For years, Iran has trained recruits to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the militias drawing upon countries throughout the Middle East, at the Shaid Mahalati Higher Education Complex. Half of the training is ideological, writes Saeid Golkar of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. The upshot is that Iran’s Supreme Leader, now Khamenei, is the agent for the Hidden Imam, the eventual savior of humanity. This mission requires the destruction of Israel.
Iran supplies the militias from depots in northeast Syria,
which the US has bombed twice in a month, and from Lebanon, which the US so far
is ignored. Iran’s claim that the
militias plan and finance such sophisticated attacks on their own is not, I
think, credible. If nothing else, Iran can discourage their attacks by
threatening to cut off their funds. The militias depend on hawala finance
(basically underground systems) that may be underwritten by Iran, where hawala
has long been in operation.
The second note is about Iran’s denial that it wishes
to exploit the Israel-Hamas War to gain regional power, perhaps to protect
itself from Sunni neighbors. An opposition website in Syria, Zaman al-Wasl,
reports a two-hour meeting Saturday night, November 18, at a Homs airport between leaders of
the Revolutionary Guards, the National Defense, and the Zainabiyoun (Pakistani
militia linked to Iran) to coordinate operations between Homs and Deir ez-Zour,
in northeast Syria—the first such meeting in five years.
Another opposition site, Baladi News, says the
Revolutionary Guards are relocating thousands of troops from Aleppo, in northeast
Syria, an area largely controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a Sunni outfit with
past ties to al-Qaeda, and to Homs, Hama, and Deir ez-Zour.
I am not aware that
these reports have been confirmed. But
they worry me.—Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com
Notes
For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate
Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet. This update corrects an error about Kennet's stance on American policy.
References
Kasra Aarabi and Jason M. Brodsky. Iran's
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Baladi News.
Iran
Reinforces Positions in Hama, Deir-ez-Zor and Homs, Withdraws Thousands of
Troops From Aleppo - The Syrian Observer . November 16, 2023.
Lolita Baldor. US
Navy warship shoots down drone from Yemen over the Red Sea | AP News .
November 15, 2023.
Isabel Debre and Jon Gambrell. Yemen's
Houthi rebels hijack an Israeli-linked ship in the Red Sea and take 25 crew
members hostage | AP News . November 20, 2023.
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The Supreme Leader and the Guard: Civil-military relations and regime survival. Policy Notes: Washington Institute of
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(washingtoninstitute.org) . 2019.
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