Tuesday’s attack by an Iranian-linked militia on the American airbase west of Baghdad, al-Asad, upped the ante in the Middle East. Of the 60+ such attacks on US posts in Syria and Iraq since October 17, shortly after the Hamas massacre in Israel, this was the first to use close-range ballistic missiles – that is, missiles with a range of just 300 kilometers. Most other attacks relied on drones, which are smaller and less explosive. Iran’s most modern drone, Shahed 136, has a warhead of 36 to 50 kilograms. A close-range Iranian missile, more like 450 to 1,000 kilograms, depending on the missile. The Pentagon did not disclose details about the missile in Tuesday’s attack (go figure). Iran's main two close-range ballistics are the Fateh-110, with a warhead of 450 kilograms; and the Shahab-1, warhead of 770 to 1,000 kilograms. Task & Purpose reported that the missile resembled a Fateh-110 but was not the same. As for drones, an equivalent explosive power might require a launch of 9 to 28 of the “Witness.” Such a large launch of drones has been rare against US posts in recent weeks.
Moreover, Tuesday’s attack seemed well planned.
The evidence for this is that an American gunship had enough wind of the assault
to be waiting above, unless it was extraordinarily lucky. The AC130 fired back
immediately, destroying the truck and killing several members of the militia. In addition, the decision to launch two missiles might reflect the fact that the Shahab hits near its target half the time within a radius of 100 meters and the Fateh half the time in a radius of 500 meters. If the truck launching missiles resembling Fateh-110s was within 500 meters of al-Asad, one would expect one of the two rockets to make its mark. Such an expectation takes planning.
The US responded in proportion by attacking two militia sites in Iraq that fuel and coordinate militia attacks in Syria. On Thursday, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq said it responded with drone or missile attacks on four US posts -- two in northeast Syria and two in Iraq, including Ain al-Asad again. The Pentagon said there were no injuries or property damage.
What is Iran up to?
Let’s ignore Iran’s ritual protest that the militias act on their own. Iran trains and finances them through the Quds Forces and the ideological-political unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Corps comprises a tenth of Iran’s military. Its purpose is to preserve Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1979 Revolution, dedicated to destroying Israel. That may tell you something about the goals of militias like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella for militias making many recent attacks on American posts in Syria and Iraq.
The government in Tehran proposed to double the Corps budget in the year beginning March 2021, to $22
billion. To put this in perspective, $22 billion can buy 22 million
drones.
The purpose of beefing up the budget is clear. Michaël Tanchum, a senior associate fellow at
the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy and a nonresident
scholar at the Middle East Institute, said the Corps, “through its use of proxy
militias, drones, unconventional naval warfare and missiles, cost-effectively
provides Tehran the ability to inflict costs on its neighbors to ensure…deterrent
capability….”
The Corps can stop the militias any time it wants by
cutting off their money. In the
militias, each fighter receives a monthly salary of $60 and $80. Officers earn
about $100, and they have health care and days off, wrote the CTC Sentinel of West Point.
Without funds, the militias would lose talented leaders.
The Hezbollah Brigades, which attacked the al-Asad
post Tuesday, is a good example. One of
its commanders, Imad Naji Al-Bahadli, “sought to identify U.S. military
installations and U.S. companies that could serve as targets for future [Hezbollah
Brigades] attacks, which would be launched on the orders of the [Quds Forces],”
wrote the State Department. To prepare, al-Bahadli sent militants to train in
Lebanon with Lebanese Hezbollah, “where he himself had been trained.”
Perhaps Iran is raising money for its admitted cause
of destroying Israel by staging a glamorous attack. The anti-Israelis are not allergic
to money: Through their families, the four leaders of Hamas control $11 billion,
reported The New York Post.
Or perhaps Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, who controls the Corps, senses that American resolve to
stay in the Middle East is weakening, so he is testing it by pushing slightly
harder than before. If the response is proportional, as indeed it was Tuesday, he may launch
one last determined push, confident that the American public this time will not
permit a proportional response that commits land troops. Probably the Americans could be pushed out of
Syria more easily than out of Iraq. There are almost three times as many troops
in Iraq as in Syria. But Iran’s gain would be greater from a US withdrawal from
Iraq, where a fragile democracy might collapse.
Observers usually argue that Iran merely wants to harass American posts without risking war. This doesn't make sense to me. What is the point in just harassing when, with just a little more effort, you could do real damage? I think it more likely that Iran wants to see how far it can go.
That Iran may be testing US resolve suggests that it
does not believe warnings from the Pentagon and the White House. Iran must
realize that it cannot prevent an underwater launch of Tomahawk missiles, and that
the Tomahawk once in flight is hard to stop. If Iran is testing resolve, it
must doubt that the US will send Tomahawks its way. It is calling Biden’s
bluff.
It would be logical to retaliate by destroying the weapons depots of
the militias. Iran has moved these to northeast
of Hama and to Qalamoun, Deir Attia, Al-Qaryatayn, Al-Sukhna, and Al-Tabqa,
which has oilfields, according to the CTC Sentinel. But the US bombed three of these sites with no
discernible effect on the pace of militia attacks.
In that event, the most effective American tactic may
be a pre-emptive attack on a military post in Iran, say, a regional Corps post
in Iran, or a response to a major Iranian attack that is at least proportional
and that does not rule out land troops. Either policy runs risks. A pre-emptive
attack would probably kill civilians and cost the US support in the Middle East
and among Western allies. They would view this attack as evidence of a return to
the “bring-it-on” policy of the George W. Bush administration. Committing land
troops could cost Biden re-election next November.
How would Iran respond to a pre-emptive attack? It
might assault US posts. For this would distract Iranians’ attention from
inflation, unemployment, and repression of human rights, and it might even unite the
nation behind the government. It would also cement Iran’s leadership of the
anti-Israelis; no one else has consistently attacked the United States.
On the other hand, Iran would lose the war if the US fully
engages. So the gains would be short-lived.
Their length of life would depend partly on Russian aid to
Iran. In eight years, Russia has provided $1.5 billion in military aid to Tehran, only a twentieth as much as to Iraq.-- Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com
Notes
For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet.
In rocketry, the Circular Error Probable gives the radius for which one could expect that of 100 rockets launched, half would land within the specified range. For example, the Shabab has a CEP of 100 meters, so one would expect half of the missiles to land within 100 meters.
Pierre Boussel. The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, units, and actions. CTC Sentinel 16 [6]. The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point June 2023.
Table
of Iran's Missile Arsenal | Iran Watch . Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. .
Agnes Helou. Iran
more than doubles Revolutionary Guard’s budget in FY22 bill (defensenews.com) December 16, 2021.
Jeff Schogol. AC-130 destroys truck US says launched missile attack in Iraq (taskandpurpose.com) November 21, 2023.
Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio. U.S.
adds Iranian-backed militia, five commanders, and an IRGC operative to list of
designated terrorists | FDD's Long War Journal . November
20, 2023
Isabel Vincent and Benjamin
Weinthal. Hamas leaders worth staggering
$11B revel in luxury — while Gaza’s people suffer. The
New York Post. Nov. 7, 2023.
Hamas
leaders worth $11B live luxury lives in Qatar (nypost.com)
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