Iran vows to “answer” Israel’s destruction of its consulate in Damascus Monday in a big way.
And it has told the US that it holds it responsible for the bombing that
killed three Iranian generals, including the former head of Iranian operations
in Syria and Lebanon. The US denies knowing anything in advance about the attack. How might Iran retaliate?
Iran knows that it would lose a war with either Israel
or the US, much less both. But neither can it ignore the attack. An attack on
an embassy amounts to an attack on home soil; certainly, the Iranian public will
view it that way. It also infuriates Iranians because it occurred on the
holiday marking the death of the founder of Shi’a Islam, Iran’s dominant
religion.
Iran’s problem is to retaliate in a way that discourages
assaults on Iranian soil, without provoking a war that would shatter its economy. It is already troubled by annual inflation running
close to 40%, or 10 times higher than in the US. The demands of fighting a war would
drive prices much higher, squeezing households.
Iran might attack either many sites to a moderate
degree, or one site to a massive degree. Which response would best serve its
purposes?
Many paths to revenge
Attacking many sites, but no one site with many
missiles, has the advantage of getting the world’s attention without necessarily
killing a soldier at any one site. Should a US soldier die, Congress would
pressure the Pentagon to retaliate to a degree that might bring on war.
Attacking one site with many missiles ensures gratifying damage but risks deaths.
What might Iran do?
Consider two cases in which it has faced this problem.
After the bombing of the al-Aqsa Hospital in Gaza City
about October 17, falsely blamed on Israel, Iranian-linked militias attacked US
posts in Syria and Iraq more than 170 times. They didn’t kill anybody until about
January 28, when a drone killed three American soldiers at a small supply post in Jordan
near Iraq and Syria. On February 2, the US responded by attacking more than 85
sites in Syria and Iraq associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps, Tehran’s regional troublemaker. The
militia attacks stopped. This suggests that Tehran prefers to harass the US by coordinating
many small attacks until one goes wrong.
The second case was Iran’s response to the American assassination on January 3, 2020, of the charismatic commander, Qasem Suleimani, of the Quds Force,
the military intelligence arm of the Revolutionary Guards. On January 8, Iran responded by launching more
than 12 ballistic missiles at the US post at Baghdad, al-Asad, which had no air
defense at the time. But Iran warned of the attack in advance. As a result, no
Americans died, although scores were treated for concussions. Again, Iran had stopped
short of war.
My guess is that Iranian militias might launch drones simultaneously
at several US posts, such as al-Tanf in eastern Syria, near the highway running
between Baghdad and Damascus; posts near Deir ez-Zour in northeast Syria, a
province that is close to militia supply sites; al-Asad; and two US posts near Erbil,
the capital of the Kurdistan province in northern Iraq, near Turkey.
A second possibility is a massive attack on the Kurdistan post more distant from Erbil, al-Harir; for its defenses are relatively weak, as was demonstrated by an October 18 attack on the site that nearly destroyed the barracks. For Iran, the advantage of this site over the one nearer Erbil is that fewer civilian casualties are likely.
Mark Kennet notes a third possibility: An eye for an eye -- an attack on an Israeli ambassy. It has happened before. On March 17, 1992, a bombing of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires killed 29 and injured 252. The Argentina Supreme Court assigned responsibility to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, with planning and financing by Iran. A similar attack on July 18, 1994, on the building of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, killed 85. For these details, I draw upon House Resolution 201 of 2017, introduced by then-Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Fla.), who chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee.
An embassy attack might gratify the Iranian public's sense of justice. And it is nothing new in the Middle East. In early December, seven mortars hit near the US embassy in Baghdad. No injuries were reported, but terrorism of US embassies is not confined to the region. On August 7, 1998, nearly simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killed 224 and injured 4,500. The FBI attributed these attacks to al-Qaeda, not to Iran. But they suggest a need for precaution now at American embassies. As far as I can tell, the US State Department has not urged caution upon the embassy and consulate in Astana and Almaty, Kazakhstan, at least.
When could an attack occur? After the Suleimani killing, Iran retaliated in five days. This might suggest a need for vigilance in the next day or two.
Of course, this post is just speculation. But when Iran warns of a response, it is not prudent to call its bluff. --Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com Seymour, Indiana
References
Steven Erlanger.
Strike
in Damascus Escalates Israel’s Undeclared War With Iran - The New York Times
(nytimes.com) . April 2, 2024.
Farnaz
Fassihi and Matthew Mpoke Bigg. Iran
Says the Deadly Israeli Strike in Damascus Will Not Go Unanswered - The New
York Times (nytimes.com) April 1,
2024.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. East African Embassy Bombings — FBI
Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, Timour Azhari. US embassy in Baghdad struck with seven mortars as attacks escalate | Reuters December 8, 2023.
US House of Representatives Resolution 201 of 2017. https://www.govinfo.gov/.../html/BILLS-115hres201ih.htm
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