Sunday, June 14, 2015

Inflation – a blast from the past





The West doesn’t worry about inflation.  So why should the East?

In rich countries, the rate of inflation – the average rate of increase in all prices – is so small that it has almost vanished from the economist’s radar screen.  In the United States, Europe and Japan, annual inflation is in the neighborhood of 2% or less.  From 2010 through 2014, the average rate of inflation was 2% in the US and .42% (that is, four-tenths of 1%) in Japan, according to the World Bank.  In the euro area, inflation averaged a mere .2% in 2014. 

Western inflation was generally placid as well as low.  A common measure of volatility, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, was just .36 (or 36%) in the US.  The exception was Japan, which suffered deflation in 2010-12; the ratio there was 3.2 (320%), mainly because inflation suddenly rose to 2.7% in 2014.    

But developing economies don’t even need radar:  Inflation is visible to the naked eye.  In Kazakhstan, it averaged 6.6% from 2010 through 2014.  In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, inflation averaged 8.3% and 7.1% respectively.  Moreover, inflation in those two countries gyrated.  The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean was .61 in Kyrgyzstan and .42 in Tajikistan.  Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has tended to follow Russia’s pattern for inflation.  Russian inflation (7%) is slightly higher than Kazakhstan’s, and both countries have little volatility.  The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean was .19 in Kazakhstan and .18 in Russia.

The World Bank provided no data for inflation in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, perhaps because the governments didn’t provide reliable statistics.  According to tradingeconomics.com, the statistical committee in Uzbekistan reports an average rate of inflation of 4.3% for the period from 2006 to 2014 and a rate of 2.6% in the first quarter of 2014.  But the Asian Development Bank forecasts an inflation rate of 9.5% in 2015 and 10% in 2016.  I searched for inflation data in English or Russian on the Web site of Uzbekistan’s statistical committee but found nothing recent.

In short, inflation in Central Asia may be high and erratic.  Some economists shrug and point out that the transition to markets has whipped up a tempest of uncertainty.  In learning how to price, producers will err.  Given the Soviet legacy, they often face little competition, so they will tend to err on the high side.  Maybe 6% inflation isn’t so bad.

Where’s the rub?

Maybe.  But post-Soviet governments often fail to report reliable inflation rates in a prominent place.  There’s the rub.  The lack of information generates uncertainty in economies that already have too much of the stuff.  Pricing errors accumulate and may even lead to a downturn.

A half-century ago, most economists thought that moderate inflation was harmless.  The restaurants would have to print new menus with new prices, and gourmands might wear out their shoes looking for cheap restaurants.  But that was it.  Inflation was not nearly as bad as unemployment.
But in the 1970s, maverick economists, notably the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas, pointed out that uncertainty about inflation could cause unemployment, by obscuring the ability of prices to signal changes in demand.

Among non-economists, this point remains obscure, partly because newspapers misreport inflation.  If the price of oil rises from $60 to $66, reporters say inflation in the oil industry is 10%.  In reality, inflation is the average price rise for all industries, not just one.

Let’s do the numbers

For example, suppose that a typical Kazakhstani buys five pounds of meat and five bottles of kefir each month.  (Yes, in reality she buys more groceries than that, but let’s keep things simple.). The price of a pound of meat is 200 tenge; the price of a bottle of kefir, 100 tenge.  Then the price of the bundle is 1,500 tenge (5*200 + 5*100 = 1,500).

That was last year’s price.  Now suppose that this year the price rises to 2,000 tenge – an increase of 33%.  Then the rate of inflation is 33% (see the Notes).  But this is an average price, not the price of a particular product.  In our example, perhaps the price of meat rose from 200 to 300 tenge – a 50% increase -- and the price of kefir did not change.

In reality, consumer baskets include hundreds or thousands of goods and services, none of which is likely to dominate the basket price.  So we can think of a change in the basket price as an average change for all commodities over time.

The price of a product may rise because of higher demand, lower supply, or inflation.  If inflation hit all prices at the same time, then we could easily observe it and determine whether it accounted for the rise in the price of our own commodity.  For example, if the price of horsemeat rises 10%, and we observe an inflation rate of 10%, then we might infer that neither the demand for, nor the supply of, horsemeat has changed.

But if we don’t know the rate of inflation, then our habitual optimism may mislead us into concluding that the demand for our horsemeat has risen, so we’d better process a few more nags.  Only after we see our inventories of horsemeat rising will we conclude that demand hasn’t actually risen; that our price rose because of inflation.  Now poorer and wiser, we will cancel our orders for additional edible equines.
If enough industries follow this pattern, then output and employment will rise and fall.  That’s a business cycle.

In short, uncertainty about inflation can destabilize an economy.  The central bank can take a long step toward stability by reporting inflation rates and, if they fluctuate too much, by targeting them.
The National Bank of Kazakhstan does that, but not all central banks in the region are so fastidious.  Like Kazakhstan’s, the central bank in Tajikistan publishes monthly inflation rates right on its home page.  The Kyrgyzstani bank also publishes inflation data but not conspicuously.  The bank in Uzbekistan doesn’t provide inflation rates in English or Russian.  And getting economic data from the government in Turkmenistan is like pulling teeth from a crocodile.  The Web page of its central bank doesn’t even provide a search button.

Until our radar systems improve, economic instability may remain the order of the day in Central Asia. Or maybe we just need somebody in the control tower who isn’t asleep at the switch. – Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Notes

Governments usually express price indices, like the Consumer Price Index, in terms of a base year.  In our example, suppose that the price of the Kazakhstani basket was 1,500 tenge in 2014 and 2,000 tenge in 2015. Then the price index is 100 in 2014 (the base year) and 133 in 2015.  The rate of inflation is calculated as the rate of change in this index – that is, (133 – 100) / 100, or 33%. 
The World Bank’s estimates assume a fixed consumer basket over time; that is, the quantity purchased of each commodity does not change, although the price does.  This is the Laspeyres method.

References

Asian Development Bank.  Asian development outlook.  www.adb.org

Governmental Committee on Statistics in the Republic of Uzbekistan.  www.stat.uz

World Bank.  World Development Indicators.  www.worldbank.org

Saturday, May 30, 2015

Son of Dr. Strangelove




 
 Or, how I learned to love worrying and stop the bomb                                    


Ken Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-eight hours that ended the Cold War.  Broadside Books.  2014.

It was a close shave.

At the end of their October 1986 summit in Iceland, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev nearly pulled off the impossible.  “It would be fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons,” Reagan blurted.

“We can do that,” said Gorbachev.  “We can eliminate them.”

“If we can agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons, I think we can turn this over to our Geneva folks with that understanding, for them to draft up an agreement.  Then you can come to the US and sign it.”

“Well, all right.  Here we have a chance for an agreement.”

Then the euphoria disappeared.

“It is incomprehensible,” said Gorbachev, warming to his favorite theme, “why research, development, and testing of SDI should go on and not be confined to the laboratories.”  He was referring to the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan’s proposal to base in outer space a system to shoot down missiles. 

Reagan warmed to his favorite response.  “I have promised the American people I would not give up SDI.” And that was the end of that.
  
Why did they fail to connect?

Neither leader – much less their staffs – was prepared for the radical step.  Each might have felt pushed by the other to the political brink.  Reagan would have had to fetter his beloved Star Wars system.  Gorbachev would have had to give up the Soviet Union’s advantage in ballistic missiles in Europe and Asia.   

The summit was not a waste of time.  The two sides came to better understand each other.  The US agreed to extend the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty for a decade.  But it would not consign the SDI to the lab – Gorbachev’s condition for deep cuts in arms.  So the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe came off the table.  Adelman, Reagan’s adviser on arms control, recalled telling reporters that “the prevailing narrative – that SDI sank the summit – was wrong.  It was Gorbachev who sank the summit – by tying SDI to nuclear cuts.” 

Like most spins, this was only half right.  The Americans and the Soviets expected too much of one another.  “While [Eduard] Shevardnadze sought to eliminate all strategic weapons, [George] Shultz sought to scrap only strategic ballistic missiles,” Adelman writes of the exchange between the two foreign ministers.  “This formulation left America’s two strengths – strategic bombers and cruise missiles – outside the ban, and put the Soviets’ main strength – ballistic missiles – inside it, on the chopping block.”

Perhaps the two sides were too evenly matched.  They found it hard to come up with concessions that could not have left one side stronger than the other.  Since the two antagonists would not upset the delicate balance, history would have to do the honors for them, in the form of the Soviet Disunion.  --Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


Friday, May 15, 2015

Bear trap





Do Central Asians fear Russian intervention?


In the United States, NIMBY – “Not in My Back Yard” – refers to the neighbors’ battle royale against a toxic waste dump.  In Central Asia, the translation is:  Not in Moscow’s Back Yard.  The Kremlin would barge into regional affairs if local politicians didn’t block it.

For example, the 2010 overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s government may have rooted in Russia’s ridding itself of an erstwhile ally, former President Kurmanbek Bakiev.  Under Russian pressure sweetened by Russian aid, he said he would tear up Bishkek’s contract with the US for the military air base at Manas.  But when Washington nearly quadrupled its payments for the base, to $60 million per year, Bakiev changed his mind.  So Vladimir Putin, then the prime minister of Russia, forced him out in April.  “…Moscow suspended the shipment of subsidized fuel to Kyrgyzstan and launched a smear campaign against the Bakiev government…,” writes Alisher Khamidov of George Washington University.

In south Kyrgyzstan, the bloody revolt led to clashes between ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz youths.  When the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian vehicle, refused to intervene, Uzbekistan gave shelter to 80,000 displaced Kyrgyzstanis in mid-June.  “[Uzbekistan] President [Islam] Karimov regarded the…unrest…as a plot by external forces designed to cause regional turmoil and implicate Uzbekistan in a regional war,” Khamidov notes.  As tensions relaxed, most refugees returned to Kyrgyzstan by the end of the month.

Russian incursions in Georgia and Ukraine have rattled Central Asian leaders, since they may be next.  By resolving squabbles among themselves, they may hold the northern bear at bay, for a while.  -- Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@yahoo.com


Good reading

Alisher Khamidov.  What it takes to avert a regional crisis:  Understanding the Uzbek government’s responses to the June 2010 violence in south Kyrgyzstan.  2015.  Central Asian Affairs 2(2), pages 168-188.    

Friday, April 10, 2015

Tenge talk





Will the National Bank of Kazakhstan devalue this summer?

Three things are certain in life:  Death, taxes, and rumors about the tenge.  The latest one says the National Bank will soon begin to devalue the currency in small steps.  For obvious reasons, this won’t occur until after the presidential elections that were hastily called for April 26.

This easy-does-it approach might have advantages over the Bank’s cold-turkey policy in 2009 and 2014, when it devalued the tenge immediately by a fourth and a fifth respectively.  This time, tenge holders wouldn’t suddenly see their wealth vanish in terms of foreign purchasing power.  Also, since it is not certain when the Bank would take its last step, or how large each step would be, speculators might delay their short sales of tenge until they knew more – sales that otherwise might have forced the Bank to devalue sooner than it would have liked.  Finally, devaluing in increments would enable the head of the Bank, Kairat Kelimbetov, to keep his promise made in January not to devalue sharply unless things changed radically.

The seeming flaw of the incremental approach – that it creates uncertainty – applies to most monetary policies that are meant to affect output.  One goal of devaluation is to encourage foreigners to buy Kazakhstan’s exports by artificially lowering their dollar price – that is, by leading buyers to wonder if exports were as costly as they had thought.

Yet the timing is curious.  Tenge devaluation makes sense when the central bank faces the Forex Trifecta:  A declining oil price, a weakening ruble (since Russia is a leading partner in trade), and a drying up of dollar reserves.  But oil prices are rising.  The monthly spot price of Brent crude in Europe, a common benchmark, increased from $47.76 per barrel in January to $58.10 in February, up by about a fifth, according to the United States Energy Information Administration.  And the official ruble has been strengthening steadily in terms of the tenge and the dollar, by roughly a fourth since early February, according to daily data from the Russian central bank.  Finally, Kazakhstan’s hard currency reserves are an embarrassment of riches.  Assets of the National Oil Fund alone, consisting mainly of export taxes, were $69.7 billion in March.  This was down by 5% since January but still equal to almost 14 months of imported goods and services, according to the National Bank of Kazakhstan.  Net international reserves were $28.3 billion -- up 1.4% since January and equal to five or six months of imports.  There’s no reason to panic.     

Perhaps the Bank is reacting to long-run trends in oil and currency markets – that is, to annual prices.  That would be prudent but difficult to explain to the public.

The bucks stopped here

Or maybe, as the street says, the devaluation is for political reasons, not economic ones.  This would call the Bank’s credibility into question.  Again.

Apropos of this, an American story might offer pointers.  In the 1940s, the Federal Reserve helped the government to pay for World War II cheaply by purchasing its bonds (that is, by lending it money) at low interest rates.  In the early 1950s, President Harry Truman wanted to repeat the trick for the Korean War.  But the Fed worried that printing more money would aggravate inflation, so it told Truman to take a hike.  Since then, the Fed’s inherent independence of politics has never been in question, although a few Fed governors from time to time have chosen to please the tenant at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Unfortunately, the charter of the National Bank of Kazakhstan makes clear that the Bank is ultimately controlled by the President, since its head serves at his pleasure.  Astana could take a long step towards a competitive economy by making clear that the Bank is not a political patsy.  –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com


References

Bank of Russia.  Foreign currency market.  www.cbr.ru

National Bank of Kazakhstan.  International reserves and assets of the National Oil Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  www.nationalbank.kz

United States Energy Information Administration.  Europe Brent spot price FOB.  www.eia.gov

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

Beauty pays. Why?



Are handsome people more productive?

In 1976, an attractive young secretary to a powerful US Congressman, Wayne Hays, acknowledged that she couldn’t type, file or answer the phone.  Elizabeth Ray's skills were rather more tactile than that.

In the past 20 years, economists have studied whether good looks lead to good wages.  The answer might help explain why fashion is a booming industry in Kazakhstan.  Production of clothes in January and February was 79% above that for the same period in 2014, according to the government’s committee on statistics.  The trick is to find an industry in which beauty adds nothing to productivity and yet earns a premium.  Congressmen may not be the only employers to discriminate in favor of knockouts.

The task is not simple.  Even in industries where beauty is not a work skill, it may enable the beautiful to produce more, because they are more self-assured.  In central banking, good looks don’t directly make inflation forecasts more accurate; but comely forecasters may have the confidence to present their tentative results to colleagues, gathering feedback that improves their work.  We must disentangle two effects of beauty on wages: The direct one, which reflects the employer’s tastes; and the indirect one, which reflects the employee’s confidence.  

In a 2005 experiment, Markus Mobius and Tanya Rosenblat construct a workplace in which beauty cannot directly affect productivity – the solving of computer mazes, reminiscent of those in white-rat studies.  In the experiment, each "worker" estimates the number of mazes that she thinks that she can complete in 15 minutes; this is a measure of her confidence.  A separate panel of high school students computes a beauty score for each worker by examining her photo.

Beauts and bias

Each "employer" estimates, for each worker, the number of mazes that she can solve, given what he knows of her, including her beauty.  These estimates are used to determine the worker’s expected wage.  Employers may learn about workers through resumes, photos, and interviews by phone or face-to-face.  If beauty matters to the employer, then he may estimate a higher productivity for a worker by examining her photo than he would have done had he only interviewed her by phone.

The researchers conclude that beauty raises the worker’s estimate of his own productivity – as well as the employers’ estimates.  Of the latter, roughly 80% relate to the bosses’ own observations of beauty, and 20% to the greater confidence of more beauteous workers. 

Beauty affects the employer’s estimate of productivity when he learns about the worker through photos, phone interviews, and -- above all -- through face-to-face interviews.  However, Mobius and Rosenblat find no evidence that employers discriminate in favor of the handsome.  They conclude this by looking at whether beauty increases the employer’s estimate of productivity when he knows that this calculation will determine the worker's wage.  Beauty has no such effect. 

In the study, good looks affect the employer’s estimate of productivity even when he only interviews her over the telephone.  Mobius and Rosenblat speculate that beauty may relate to “certain oral communication skills” aside from influencing confidence.  Maybe Ms. Ray should have learned how to answer the phone. 

Curiously, gender does not affect the worker’s confidence.  But men solve 30% more mazes than women do, perhaps because men are naturally rats.

The experiment involved 165 “employers” and 165 “employees” at La Universidad de Tucuman in Argentina.  –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com  


References

Markus M. Mobius and Tanya S. Rosenblat.  Why beauty matters.  American Economic Review 96(1): 222-35.  2006.  The working paper, upon which I draw, was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2005.

Kazakhstan Ministry of National Economy, Committee on Statistics.  Socio-economic development of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  February 2015.  Online.

Wikipedia.  Elizabeth Ray.  Accessed March 25, 2015.

Sunday, March 15, 2015

Russian roulette



Is the Bank of Russia stoking inflation?

When the leaders of Russia’s central bank met last week, they had to choose between their monetarist principles and the Kremlin.  The outcome was never in doubt.

The bank’s ostensible duty is to contain inflation, which may peak at 20% this year.  This would mean printing fewer rubles, which are feeding high prices.   But contracting the money supply would also curtail spending.  That would destroy jobs and deepen a recession that already may shrink the economy as much as 4% to 7% this year.  So the Kremlin prefers more rubles to fewer.  And the Bank of Russia, under Elvira Nabiullina, is playing along by cutting interest rates – this time by 1% on the key rate, to 14%; last January, by 2%. 

Like most large central banks, Russia’s governs the money supply by tweaking the interest rate on securities – in Moscow’s case, on “repo” loans that mature within a week.  When the bank buys more repos, it forces up their price, which means a fall in the return that they pay to their holder.  That return is an interest rate.  By buying a lot of securities, the central bank can force interest rates to fall throughout the economy. 

The Bank of Russia also affects the money supply directly:  When it buys the security, it pays out rubles.

The Bank says that won't create inflation since this is due not to abundant money but to weakening of the ruble, which raises domestic prices for foreign products, and to "external trade restrictions."  These factors will disappear by the end of the year, it claims.       

Certainly, money growth in 2014 did not cause much concurrent inflation.  M2 -- "broad money," which includes cash and most monetary accounts except for credit -- rose only 2.2%, while consumer prices rose 11.4%, according to the Bank of Russia.  For 2010 through 2013, the correlation between M2 growth and inflation in the same year was only .53.  And as long as the Russian economy remains below capacity, inflation is unlikely to soar.  Sellers won't raise prices when they're losing their shirts.  

Nevertheless, money may fuel inflation, although it may may take more than a year to show up.  Over the long run, Russia has had both high inflation and rapid money growth.  For 2010-13, inflation averaged 6.8%; M2 growth, 20%.  When the Russian economy is running again at full speed, sellers won't be shy to raise prices -- and buyers, flush with rubles, won't be shy to pay them.

Incredible

Even if the Bank manages to mop up the excess rubles in time, it may not be able to repair the damage done by easy money to its credibility as an inflation fighter.  When the economy begins surging, sellers may doubt that the Bank will curtail impending inflation.  So they will raise prices immediately, since inflation will raise their input costs and erode the purchasing power of their earnings.  Similarly, households may buy goods right away rather than wait for prices to get out of hand.  So even if the Bank can tighten the money supply, the rate of spending (the jargon is "velocity") may rise, pressuring prices to rise.  
     
Easy money may soften the recession, but it probably won’t address the real problem.  The Kremlin seems to think that the recession is driven by a fall in demand for Russian products.  Were this true, prices as well as output would fall.  In reality, both unemployment and prices are climbing -- the classic symptoms of stagflation.  This is usually due to a decline in supply:  When input costs increase, firms produce less than before at given prices for their goods and services.  This will eventually drive up those prices.

The most obvious cause of the stagflation is the Western sanction against Russia.  This has cut off some foreign inputs to Russia -- and raised the domestic price of others, via a 40%-plus plunge in the ruble since last summer.  To end the recession, the Kremlin could come to terms with the US and Europe over its intervention in Ukraine.  Fat chance.  So the best that the Russian people can hope for is some relief from unemployment, bought at the expense of accelerated inflation.  Twenty percent?  You ain’t seen nothing yet. –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Notes 

Data on Russian consumer inflation and M2 money come from the Bank of Russia and from the World Bank.  Curiously, the Bank of Russia does not provide English translations for recent inflation statistics, although it does post them in Russian.   


References

Howard Amos.  Political pressure fears as Russia’s central bank set to cut rates.  Moscow Times.  March 13, 2015.

Bank of Russia.  Interest rates on the Bank of Russia operations.  Accessed March 15, 2015. Online. 

Bank of Russia Press Service.  On Bank of Russia key rate.  March 13, 2015.  Online.

Bank of Russia.  Inflatsiia na potrebitel'skom rynke Dekabr' 2014 god.  [Inflation in consumer markets, December 2014.]  Accessed March 15, 2015.  Online.

Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova.  Russia lowers key rate to 14% as inflation eases amid slump.  Bloomberg.  March 13, 2015.  Online.

World Bank.  World Development Indicators.  Online.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

The trouble with infinity


Can we estimate the value of a life?

Government programs that try to keep people alive longer, such as policies curtailing pollution and accidents, must somehow value the ensuing benefits in order to know how much to spend.  If we have only $500,000 to spend on either of two programs, with one worth $800,000 and the other only $300,000, then the choice is clear.  But since the usual benefit is an extension of life, we cannot avoid considering the economic value of a life.    

Assume that a life is worth an infinite number of dollars.  It’s certainly reasonable.  Now consider two programs: Plan A would save 50 million lives, and Plan B would save 1 life.  Both would cost the same amount.  Which would we adopt?

Surely, this is a no-brainer: Plan A.  But look again.  Since both programs have the same cost, we would prefer the plan with the higher value.  Apparently, Plan A is worth 50 million times infinity, and Plan B is worth 1 times infinity.  But these estimates are absurd, since infinity is not a cardinal number.  We cannot conclude that 50 million times infinity is greater than infinity, because infinity is incomparable.  If we are to choose between the programs, then we must assume a finite value of life.

The problem does have a practical solution although it is not fully satisfying.  Rather than consider the value of a life per se, think about the value of a slight reduction in the risk to life.  The value of a 1% reduction may be $10,000; of a 2% reduction, $30,000, and so on.  Each of these decreases of risk has a finite value.  And yet life itself has an infinite value, because the value of going from a 100% risk of death to a 99% risk is infinite.  The value of a life is roughly the sum of the values of all the slight reductions, including the one from 100% to 99%, the one from 99% to 98%, and so forth, down to the last one, from 1% to 0%.  This sum is infinite since part of it is infinite. 

No way out? 

This approach is workable, because most programs do attempt small reductions of risk when life is already pretty safe – for example, the avoidance of fatal fires, by requiring a fire detector in each apartment.  It’s sensible to think that such a small decrease of risk has a finite value since you are not willing to pay your entire income for a fire detector; $10 or $15 should do it.  This is like going from a 2% risk of death to a 1% risk. 

Yet the approach is not entirely satisfying. In principle, we should have some way to also evaluate the value of cutting risk from 100% to 99%, since some programs may attempt this reduction.  But we don’t have any such practical method.

Another problem with the marginal approach is that it implies a vastly disproportional change in the value of a reduction of risk.  A decrease in the risk of death from 100% to 99% is worth far more than 100 times the value of a decrease in risk from 2% to 1%.  In fact, the first risk is worth any number of the second risk or even of most larger risks.  But are we truly willing to devote all our time and money to cutting the risk of death to 99% for one advanced cancer patient rather than to reduce risks from 90% to near zero for a million patients in earlier stages of cancer?  Perhaps we must either assume a finite value of life or compare programs without using values.  

One possibility is to prefer the program that saves more lives at the same total cost as other programs.  This rule is enticing but arbitrary -- and too specialized to be of much use, since it applies only to the case of equal costs.  If costs differ between programs, then we must compare them to the various values, which is the dilemma that we were trying to avoid. –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com 


 Notes

Define p as the risk of an early death in percentage terms, varying from 0 through 100.  Define MV(p) as the marginal value of avoiding an early death – that is, of continuing  a life – for given p.  The variables p and MV are continuous.  Integrating MV(p) over the full range of p gives us the total value of a life, which is an improper integral.