Friday, July 21, 2023

The road to famine is paved with bad intentions

 


Photo source: World Food Programme

 

Famine has a seven-league reach.

Wheat prices rose 13%, roughly a seventh, on news this week that Russia would block wheat exports from Ukraine. Bread is a staple for Syria, where more than a decade of civil war has left nine tenths of the population poor. Syrians cannot afford a decent meal as it is.          

What will happen now to food prices and supply in Syria?  The answer depends on how people react to a rise in food prices. Economists calculate this reaction with an elasticity, the percentage change in one variable in response to a one-percent change in another variable.  For example, suppose that the elasticity of food demand with respect to price is -2.  Then a 1% increase in food prices will trigger a 2% fall in the amount of food that people would demand.

I know of no recent reliable estimates of this elasticity for Syria. So let’s make one up. The World Food Programme calculates that bread prices in Aleppo rose 20% immediately after the February earthquakes.  Suppose that the price increase was due entirely to the destruction of bakeries; that this destruction was proportional to the general destruction; and that the general destruction in Aleppo was proportional to the general destruction in Syria. The World Bank estimates that the February earthquakes reduced national output, real gross domestic product, by 2.3%. The implied price elasticity of food demand is -.115. That is, if prices rise 1%, demand will fall one-ninth of one percent. If prices rise 13%, demand will fall just 1.5%. In short, most Syrians will pay sharply higher prices for wheat.

But the news is even worse, because the elasticity assumes that Syrians can buy all the wheat that they want at the going price. They can’t. The power of the Syrian pound to buy imports has halved in a year, probably because the central bank lacks enough dollars to defend its currency. A Syrian can buy only half as much food as a year ago unless she cuts back on housing and transport. The central bank just gave up on an import financing platform because it couldn’t stabilize the currency, reported The Syrian Observer.

Moreover, Syrians are poor, so they cannot pay prices as high as, say, Europeans. Since Russia is reducing Ukrainian exports, buyers must decide where to cut back on their secondary sales. Undoubtedly, they will cut back on Syria rather than on Europe, since they cannot expect to make as much money in Syria. So the implied fall in wheat consumed in Syria is greater than 1.2%. On the other hand, Syria’s bumper harvest of wheat this year enabled it to halve imports, reported the Ministry of Agriculture.  If you can believe a word out of Damascus. In 2020 the agriculture minister, Hassan Qatna, who had pledged to feed the nation, blamed famine on "external factors beyond his ministry's will," such as the smuggling of food to the neighbors. (Doesn't Reuters ever check out the clippings morgue?) 

All things considered, the fall in real income for Syrians seems critical. Famine in Idlib, in the opposition region of the north, one of the poorest provinces in Syria, is likely. 

The UN's World Food Programme, in Rome, the world’s largest humanitarian agency, serves more than a third of all Syrians. Even in January, before the earthquakes and of course before the Russians blockaded Ukrainian wheat exports, it predicted that 70% of Syrians “may soon be unable to put food on the table for their families.” In March, it estimated that 12.1 million Syrians, more than half the population, are in “the grip of hunger,” whatever that means; that 2.7 million Syrians are “severely food-insecure” and that 2.9 million more Syrians ”are at risk of becoming food-insecure,” whatever that means, but anyway the latter figure is a 52% increase in one year. One of the frustrating things about the World Food Programme, and about the UN in general, is that they won’t explain satisfactorily how they arrive at their statistics. But these numbers suggest that the chances for Syrian famine are rising rapidly.

The immediate problem is to get food baskets through the Turkey-Syria crossing, al-Hawa, that the UN docily handed over to Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has a score or two to settle with the starving opposition.  But money will soon matter.  Because donations are falling, the Programme plans to stop food aid to 2.5 million Syrians beginning this month. The price of a food basket is four times the salary of a schoolteacher, reported the Programme.  One reason why nations balk at donating to the Programme, aside from the natural desire to keep the money for its own citizens, is that gifts of food to a poor nation might discourage its farmers, constricting its ability to feed itself. This is probably right in the long run. But Syria is in the hour of need.

In raising funds, the Programme has fallen behind the times. It appeals to small donors with heart-breaking testimonies and pictures (see above), a strategy that succeeded in the TV-oriented Seventies. But the big money today is in the endowments, which want careful statistics. The Programme’s use of stats is an embarrassment: Crude averages, straight-line projections based on three data points, undocumented figures, undecipherable graphs, no mathematical statistical reasoning to spoil the palate. Its food security “analysis” for Syria is more than three years old and only five pages long, including 11 photos. The analysis consists mainly of focus-group discussions.  The Programme’s real concern is illustrated by a popup window on its Web page: “Do you recall seeing or hearing anything about WFP Executive Director Cindy McCain in the last week?” Click Yes or No. –Leon Taylor, Baltimore, tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

References

Al-Modon.  Central Bank of Syria cancels import financing platform following lira’s depreciation. Central Bank of Syria Cancels Import Financing Platform Following Lira’s Depreciation - The Syrian Observer  .  July 2023.

Aram Abdullah.  Syrian Agriculture Minister attributes failure to sanctions, climate change, smuggling.  North Press. August 18, 2021.  Syrian Agriculture Minister attributes failure to sanctions, climate change, smuggling - North press agency (npasyria.com)

Reuters.  Syria expects to halve wheat imports after 'very good' harvest, minister says.  Syria expects to halve wheat imports after 'very good' harvest, minister says | Reuters.  June 5, 2023.

World Bank. Syria Earthquake 2023 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) [EN/AR] - Syrian Arab Republic | ReliefWeb.  March 2023.

World Food Programme. Hunger soars to 12-year high in Syria, WFP chief calls for urgent action | World Food ProgrammeJanuary 2023.

World Food Programme.  Syria emergency | World Food Programme (wfp.org)  June 2023.

 World Food Programme. Syria food security analysis. March 2020.

docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000113454/download/?_ga=2.25043130.1206222107.1689959936-506538537.1689959936

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