The Wall
Street Journal reports with much evidence that Iran tightly controls the
militias in Syria and Iraq that are associated with it, and that it helped plan and
approve the Hamas attack on Israel October 7. The militias have already
assaulted US posts in Syria and Iraq more than a dozen times in little more
than a week. Whether they attack the posts again in the next few days depends
on whether Iran thinks that the benefits to it would exceed the expected cost
of an American response.
Whether militias do attack depends on whether Biden can convince Khamenei that he would indeed destroy the militias if they attack US posts again…and that Iran itself may pay a price in a bombing of one of its military centers, either in Iran or in one of its allies such as Syria. Khamenei, not the Iranian military, directly oversees the Revolutionary Guards, which in turn control the militias. And it is not clear that Khamenei cares much about the militias.
It helps that Central Command sent two F16s early Friday morning (Damascus time) to bomb an ammo and munitions depot near Al-Bukamal in northeastern Syria, on the Euphrates River in Deir Ez-Zour province. The terrorist Islamic State had its last Syrian urban fortification there, and Syrian Arab tribes hostile to the US are in the area. The depot has, or had, the sort of munitions used to attack al-Tanf, a US garrison in southeastern Syria that trains recruits for the Kurdish-led group, the Syrian Democratic Forces, that spearheads the American fight against the Islamic State. The bombing at Al-Bukamal was retaliation.
Israel will hold off its invasion until the US positions its pieces—the USS Eisenhower in the Gulf, the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), a sophisticated defense against ballistic missiles, and battalions of the older Patriot defense missiles at various sites. But might militias take advantage of this delay to attack US posts? Since everyone expects the militias to assault only after Israel invades, the militias might try to surprise the Americans with an advance attack. I hope that I'm overanalyzing.
In any event, the American retaliation has left the situation better than it was. A key militia, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which claimed responsibility for the al-Tanf attack, is crippled, and the others will take note. But as the Israeli invasion begins to launch, Khamenei may smell blood. This is his chance to seize leadership of the Shiite Middle East, and perhaps beyond: Iran has designs on Central Asia.
The Pentagon reports that at al-Tanf, drone attacks in the past week resulted in 15 traumatic brain injuries, and two other minor injuries. TBI is hard to diagnose: It initially shows up as headaches and ringing ears that troops may find easy to dismiss. I would guess that there are roughly 200 to 300 people at al-Tanf. So the annual risk of TBI at al-Tanf could be 5% to 7.5%. This strikes me as high. The Pentagon may underestimate the problem.
I suppose that TBI occurs partly because of disruption of dopamine, serotonin, or other hormones that aid concentration. Ritalin may be a good treatment. In any event, the political headache for Americans of Iranian drone assaults may just be beginning. –Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com
References
Courtney Kube and Mosheh Gains. Drone attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria injured two dozen (nbcnews.com) . October 25, 2023.
Dan Lamothe. Biden urged to punish Iranian proxies after attacks on U.S. troops - The Washington Post . October 26, 2023.
Summer Said, Dov Lieber, and Benoit Faucon. Hamas Fighters Trained in Iran Before Oct. 7 Attacks - WSJ . October 25, 2023.
I would guess (total guess, as I have no real knowledge of the facts) that American capability already so significantly outweighs capability of the militias, and American military thinking would be so covering all possibilities, that the militias wouldn't have a chance of surprising the Americans with an advance attack. What's your bet?
ReplyDeleteOf course, the militias might not appreciate that, or might be so goaded by Khamenei that they have to mount a fool's errand or fool's foray. But even then it seems that Biden by his actions has shown Khamenei that Khamenei will be held responsible for actions of the militias.
Am I guessing this out reasonably right - or not? :-)
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DeleteYour analysis is certainly reasonable, but more drones seem to be getting through the American air defense. Since March, there had been few attacks on US posts. Suddenly, in the past week, there have been more than a dozen attacks on US posts in Syria and Iraq. In each of the two attacks at al-Tanf, one drone caused injuries, although only two drones were fired last Thursday and probably not many on Monday. So I would like to know about the defense at al-Tanf. For example, was there any warning? Al-Tanf sits behind a 55-kilometer deconfliction zone. When the posts anticipate drones, they can scramble F-15s to shoot them down. That apparently didn't happen last week, so al-Tanf probably relied on the Coyote, a ground-based unmanned defense system, launched from tube, which has failed to stop all drones before (in January and March, 2023, and in 2021, for instance). Also, the militias are not firing El Cheapo drones. Iran produces some of the world's best drones. In the past, the militias have sometimes fired the Shahed-129, which can fly for 24 hours as far as 1700 kilometers and as high as 7300 meters (in theory). The Shahed 136 is a loitering drone that can fly at 185 kilometers per hour, but I’m not sure if the militias used it last week. I have read few details from the Pentagon about last week's drone attacks. // I agree that the American retaliation will make the militias think twice. It was a useful response, because the US has not always responded to drone attacks in the past. But I'm not sure that Khamenei cares about what happens to the militias. They're pawns. Yes, Biden undoubtedly told Khamenei that the Americans would inflict damage on Iranian posts or Iranian-allied posts in case of more drone attacks. Was Khamenei listening? As far as Khamenei is concerned, things are going well. The Americans look vulnerable, Israel's neighbors are hostile to its campaign, and Hezbollah is heavily-armed. He may take the chance to press his luck. Strictly speculation.
DeleteThanks. So many players and uncertainties.
DeleteThe number of players may be a root of the problem. Except for Saudi Arabia and Israel, most Middle Easten economies are too small to realize scale economies. This is the idea that due partly to high-speed machinery and to almost costless methods of distribution, the more you produce, the cheaper it gets to produce a little more. So, aside from oil, the Middle East doesn't export much, large because it can't produce on a scale that makes it competitive globally. Thus there is a lot of competition in the region for the region's income, which -- aside from domestic oil revenues, which are dominated by the governments -- is small per capita. Naturally, so much competition for so little money creates friction. Just my speculation.
DeleteSeparately, which Cental Asian countries are Shiite, and how serious are political ramifications of the Shiite/Sunni difference between countries? We hear a lot about it here in the US - or at least did when Iran and Iraq were warring - but it strikes me as one of those things that Western journalists could easily misunderstand and then repeatedly misrepresent as they parrot each other.
ReplyDeleteIt's a good point. Iran and Iraq are largely Shia. In Lebanon, the Shia and the Sunni each comprise about a third of the population. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and the UAE are largely Sunni. But as you say, the Sunni v. Shia dichotomy doesn't always matter politically. For example, the minority Alawites rule Syria. Lebanon tries to maintain a delicate balance among the religious groups, not always successfully. Militarily and politically, Hezbollah is in the driver's seat, and it's Shia.
DeleteAnd is Hamas also Shia?
DeleteAnother good point. Like the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in general, Hamas is Sunni....ostensibly. I would argue that it is really a firm in the industry of terrorism, which profits by selling atrocities to foreign clients (in the form of aid) and to Gazans (in the form of revenues from taxes levied on Gazans by Hamas). Iran is one of its biggest customers, so it does not object to Iran's Shia ideology.
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