Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Prospects for economic diversification in Kazakhstan in the face of worsening Russian-Turkish relations




by Dmitry Belyanin


Introduction

On November 24, Turkey shot down a Russian war plane, the SU-24, which conducted military operations in Syria.  Turkey claimed that the jet had encroached on Turkish airspace.  Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had accused Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar of supporting ISIL terrorists.  Russia responded to the shooting incident by prohibiting tourist flights into Turkey and imports of such Turkish goods as fruits, vegetables and chicken.  This prohibition, in addition to the American and European embargo on food imports from Russia, is expected to affect Russia's major trading partners, particularly members of the Eurasian Economic Union.  Kazakhstan’s opportunities for economic diversification are also affected by the persisting decline in oil prices and by prolongation of the operation against ISIL, which can be attributed to disagreement among the participants, including Russia, Turkey and the United States.  This article analyzes these factors in detail.


Opportunities for Kazakhstan's agriculture

The Russian embargo on Turkish agricultural imports may help Kazakhstan to boost farm exports.  As of 2014, agriculture accounted for only 2.8% of Kazakhstan's overall exports and 14.2% of its exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States, well below the corresponding shares of oil exports, according to Kazdata. Plummeting oil prices weaken the tenge, which may work in favor of exporters to Russia, unless the price decline weakens the ruble more than it does the tenge. But periods of depreciation have been disturbed by interventions of Kazakhstan’s central bank in the foreign exchange market.  Exporters cannot count on tenge depreciation over the long run. 

Moreover, any rise in oil prices is likely to induce the National Bank to temporarily fix the tenge exchange rate, since allowing it to appreciate would offset the gain in tax revenues from oil.  (The National Bank says its prime goal is to cut inflation; but given that its chair serves at the pleasure of the president of Kazakhstan, political goals are not impossible.) Also, it may be less risky to export to countries with more stable national currencies. 

Opportunities for hedging are extremely limited, since the market for derivative securities is underdeveloped.  In 2014, futures accounted for less than 0.1% of trade on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, estimated KASE.  Furthermore, agricultural producers depend on imports of seeds and equipment.  And they face stiff competition from other transition countries, like Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the separatist region of Abkhazia in Georgia. Kyrgyzstan is a particularly powerful rival, since it belongs to the Eurasian Economic Union and has low labor costs.   

Additional revenues from Kyrgyzstan, as it takes advantage of the situation in Russia, may benefit Kazakhstan indirectly.  Kazakhstan accounts for about 8% of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, with the remaining 92% going to Russia.  According to the Eurasian Development Bank, a 1% decline in GDP per capita of Kyrgyzstan will raise labor migration by 0.7%.  Increases in the average income of Kyrgyzstan decrease migration, leaving more jobs for citizens of Kazakhstan.  Also, economic growth in Kyrgyzstan stabilizes the country politically, reducing the chance of another color revolution which could spread throughout Central Asia.  The same logic is true for Uzbekistan.  It does not have a history of color revolutions but may experience one, given the old age of the President, its closed, underdeveloped, and remittance-dependent economy, and its lack of participation in regional alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

Nevertheless, in 2014, Kyrgyz exports to Russia fell 20%, due to declining demand, estimated the World Bank Group.  Since the share of Russia in Kazakhstan’s trade is relatively small, only significant changes in government policy could foster export diversification into agriculture and increase farm exports to Russia.  In 2014, Russia accounted for only 8% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 34% of Kazakhstan’s imports. 

High gasoline prices, too, impede transportation of agricultural products for export.  In spite of decreasing oil costs, gas prices in Kazakhstan remain high, due to the country's dependence on Russia for crude oil and due to politics.  Kazakhstan has only three refineries: In Atyrau, created in 1945 and processing 5.2 million tons per year, and in Shymkent (6.2 million tons) and Pavlodar (8 million tons), both built in the 1970s.  The Pavlodar refinery processes only crude oil from Siberia, while half of the oil used by the Shymkent refinery is from Russia, reported Osmanov.  In Kazakhstan, the government sets gas prices; changes in them lag changes in oil prices by more than three months.  The government fixes gas and diesel fuel prices during crop cultivation and harvesting, and then lets them increase, according to Issayev.

Diversification is also hindered by increasing interest rates on extended credits.  Interest rates on tenge loans to non-banking legal entities rose from 10.6% at the end of January 2013 to 14.8% at the end of November 2015.  Loans in foreign currency are cheaper in terms of interest rates but riskier due to tenge depreciation.  Their extension may be restricted in the future, said the National Bank of Kazakhstan.

At the same time, Turkish citizens who no longer feel comfortable in Russia may prefer Kazakhstan.  As long as Kazakhstan remains neutral about the Russian-Turkish conflict (or at least does not resort to economic measures), Turks may take more jobs here. Unlike Kyrgyz guest workers, Turks will work primarily in high-paying jobs or run their own businesses.  Their willingness to work in Kazakhstan will surely be directly proportional to the stabilization of the exchange rate regime of the tenge, relative to the exchange rate of the Turkish lira.

The new regional transportation network, The New Silk Road, can enable more efficient transportation of exported goods.  Nevertheless, its first route bypasses Russia, and it is unclear when the Road will go there, according to Politforums.net. The Road can also benefit China by expanding its exports – which may benefit Kazakhstan, too.  Though its economy is fast-growing, and though it is portrayed in the Russian media as an alternative to the West, China is usually neutral in geopolitical struggles.  So Kazakhstan will try to strengthen relations with this large player, since this won’t compel it to choose sides in most international disputes.

As a member of the World Trade Organization, Kazakhstan cannot subsidize exports or much agriculture. Farm subsidies are restricted to 8.5% of the gross value of the product.  Only 3% of agricultural producers are classified as large, and smaller producers are much less likely to survive the tough competition, said KazakhZerno.  Furthermore, the need to balance its budget during the current crisis implies that the government will weaken its support of agriculture.

On the domestic market, agricultural producers will face increased imports from Turkey.  From the prohibition of the export of tomatoes alone, Turkey is expected to lose about $300 million.  Turkey will attempt to substitute other CIS markets, like Kazakhstan, for the Russian market, noted Kazdata.   
Most important, however, is that the economy of Russia remains in recession. And while the Kremlin favors importers from the Eurasian Economic Union over other importers, it favors domestic producers over importers.  Smuggling of falsely labeled products may induce Russia to restrict trade again.  For these reasons, export diversification into agriculture appears extremely risky.


Impact on Tourism

Tourist sites in Kazakhstan may benefit from Russia’s prohibition on visiting Turkey, but they face tough competition from Kyrgyzstan (mainly Issyk-Kul Lake) and from Russia itself.  Together with recession in Kazakhstan, this rivalry may compel Kazakhstani sites to provide discounts. The GDP share of tourism in Kazakhstan is only 0.3%, much less than the potential share.  Nevertheless, the sector has been growing. In 2012, income from tourism amounted to 151.7 billion tenge, almost double that of 2008, and there were 641,300 tourists, compared to 630,600 in 2011 and 485,600 in 2010, estimated Adilet. The depreciation of the tenge may attract tourists not only from Russia, but from other CIS countries, whose currencies have not weakened as rapidly.  Relative political stability in Kazakhstan, which is likely to persist throughout Nazarbayev’s reign, attracts tourists. However, hotels and other facilities in Kazakhstan are inferior to those in Turkey, at comparable prices.  The dollar prices of traveling to Turkey for Kazakhstanis, too, may fall, but this may be offset by tenge depreciation. 

Having lost Russian tourists, Turkish facilities will try to appeal to Kazakhstanis but will probably fail, due to declining dollar incomes of clients -- and to some loss of reputation, to the extent that they believe Russian claims that Turks support terrorism.


Production of military equipment

The conflict between Russia and Turkey, along with other regional conflicts, creates demand for arms.  This can be satisfied by such producers as the joint enterprise LLP “Kazakhstan Paramount Engineering,” whose new factory produces armored wheeled equipment.  But diversifying into military equipment may diminish Kazakhstan’s geopolitical neutrality and its reputation for being peaceful. 


Other sectors and industries

While the Eurasian Economic Union favors textile producers from Kyrgyzstan over those of Turkey by definition, the worsening of Russian-Turkish relations precludes accession of Turkey into the Union soon, and it creates the threat that Kazakhstan may prohibit some Turkish imports. At the same time, Turkish producers may discount their goods for Kazakh importers.  Nevertheless, though Turkish clothing has not fallen under the Russian embargo, demand for it may plummet throughout the region.  Importers might replace it with Chinese- and Kyrgyz-made clothing.  In addition, consumers who believe that Turkey backs the ISIL may buy goods from other countries. 

Since clothes from Turkey cost more than those from China and Kyrgyzstan, recession would especially cut demand for the former.  The emerging textile industry of Kazakhstan may take advantage of this.  As with agriculture, false labeling of products as being made in Kazakhstan is an issue, though tenge depreciation makes this practice more expensive for the scofflaws. 

Consumers are likely to be less sensitive about such Turkish-made products as detergents and packaged food products, since these are aimed at low-income consumers who don’t always read product labels.    


Conclusion

Worsening Russian-Turkish relations create opportunities for Kazakhstan to diversify its economy.  But these are limited by competition, primarily with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Russia; a decline in consumer demand due to falling income; and by geopolitics.  The decay in relations will weaken the tenge, lowering the cost of Kazakhstani exports and raising the cost of imported inputs.  Finally, the worsening of Russian-Turkish relations may well strengthen Kazakhstan’s economic relations with China and Kyrgyzstan.

Dmitriy Belyanin has a Master’s of Business Administration degree in finance and a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from KIMEP University.  Since 2007, he has been writing on economics and finance issues ranging from stock markets to environmental economics. He is the associate editor of this blog.


References

Adilet.  “On the project of the decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On ratifying the conception of development of the tourist industry in the Republic of Kazakhstan Until 2020.’"  2015.
Eurasian Development Bank. “Labour migration and human capital of Kyrgyzstan: Impact of the Customs Union.”  2012.

Kazakh Zerno. “How will WTO accession affect agriculture of Kazakhstan?  An analysis of the situation.” 2015.
Kazdata. “Parameters of foreign trade and the structure of imports and exports of the RK.” 2014.
Kazdata. “Kazakhstan and Turkey: Imports and exports, trading relations after the imposition of sanctions in 2015.” 2015.
National Bank of Kazakhstan. “Interest rates of banks on extended credits.” 2015. 
Politforums.net. “The first train on the New Silk Road bypassing Russia arrived in Georgia.  Russia walked again.”  2015.
http://www.politforums.net/eng/world/1450021330.html

Z. Osmanov. “Competitiveness of the oil and gas industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” Oil and Gas Journal.  2012.  <http://old.group-global.org/ru/storage-manage/download-file/21246> 

World Bank Group. “Kyrgyz Republic: Adjusting to a challenging regional economic environment.”  2015.  <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/ECA/centralasia/Kyrgyz-Republic-Economic-Update-Spring-2015-en.pdf>