Monday, March 30, 2020

The market enthusiast



The United States is facing a crisis that may confront Central Asia someday. The states implore President Donald Trump to order companies to produce anti-viral equipment – such as face masks, gloves, hand sanitizers, and ventilators―to satiate their shortages. Trump would prefer to leave it to the market to determine how much anti-viral equipment is purchased by each state.


But the market is not efficient in this case, because the equipment confers what economists call “positive externalities.” Each case avoided of the coronavirus averts another two cases or so that would have occurred through transmission of the original infection. Since the purchaser of the equipment cannot cash in on the two averted cases, he will be willing to pay too little for the masks and sanitizers. The low prices will discourage production.


A better solution is for the government to subsidize the manufacturing. Perhaps second-best is for the government to order ramped-up production, which effectively forces the stockholders to subsidize it. –Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com

The race for affluence



In the coronavirus crisis, we’ve seen a sharp contrast in the fates of the rich and the poor. In high-income countries, typical citizens may wait out the quarantine in their comfortable homes, albeit anxiously; and in low-income countries, like India, migrants may be forced to take to the road to return to villages more than 100 miles away. But the crisis is surely temporary. In the long run, can we expect poor countries ever to catch up with the rich?

There are grounds for optimism. With the Internet, poor countries can adapt, more easily than before, technologies devised by the West. Since their physical capital embodying these technologies is newer on average than those of the West, they may grow more rapidly. Moses Abramowitz set forth a similar argument three decades ago. And studying the period 1960-1988, Steve Dowrick found that technological catch-up was especially apparent among the poorer members of the oil cartel OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries).

Optimists also point to the liberating effects of trade. Money these days can move easily around the world, seeking out the highest rates of return. Because capital per worker is scarcer in poor countries than in rich, it may deliver a higher rate of return than in the West. Western investors will plunge their money into Third World projects, growing their economies. In general, wrote Sachs and Warner in 1995, “…open economies tend to converge, but closed economies do not. The lack of convergence in recent decades results from the fact that the poorer countries have been closed to the world.”

And indeed, in the first decade of the 21st century, developing economies showed signs of growing more quickly than developed ones. Vietnam, for example, may become a middle-income nation in just a few years, given its current rate of growth, according to the economists Paul Johnson and Chris Papageorgiou. On the other hand, Niger may need 734 years.

Unfortunately, growth in poor economies is volatile. In Kazakhstan, growth accelerated in 2000 and decelerated just six years later. For a typical poor economy, the rate of growth in one decade poorly predicts its growth in the next, conclude Johnson and Papageorgiou. This raises the possibility that poor economies lack the institutions that can sustain growth, as the late Mancur Olson argued. In Tajikistan, a civil war destroyed the social structure that the country had inherited from the Soviets. Over the Nineties, income in that Central Asian country plunged by nearly 10% per year.

Don’t fall into the gap

How can we determine whether poor economies are catching up with the rich? Perhaps the simplest way is to look at the relationship between the level of average income and its ensuing rate of growth. If low-income countries are converging in income per capita with high-income ones, they should have a higher rate of growth. Thus the initial level of income should correlate negatively with the growth rate.

A less direct approach would determine whether the income gap between poor countries and rich is diminishing over time. One could do this by computing the variance, which is the sum of the squared differences divided by the number of cases. Suppose that Country A is $3 richer than Country B and $2 poorer than Country C. Then the variance is $3 squared ($9) plus -$2 squared ($4), or $13 in all, divided by 3. The variance is $13/3 = $4.33. We square the difference because we care only about the size of the difference, not about whether it is positive or negative. If the variance falls from $4.33 last year to $3 this year, then that could imply convergence.

Reviewing the statistical studies of income convergence over the past half-century, Johnson and Papageorgiou find no strong evidence that the poor are catching up with the rich in the simplest sense. Instead, we observe convergence within groups of countries. Rich countries may converge among themselves, but the group of poor countries does not seem to be closing its income gap with the rich group. Contrast this to the apparent signs of catch-up in the years after World War II when many colonies became independent (perhaps boosting morale and thus output) and when nations ravaged by the war, like Germany and Japan, rebuilt, raising their rates of growth.

Dowrick reached a similar conclusion in his study of 1960-1988. Rich countries grew more rapidly than poor ones. Technologies did diffuse from rich countries to poor, but growth in these decades really was driven by increases in labor and physical capital.

So the coronavirus may become yet another barrier to the convergence of affluence across economies, unless it causes rich economies to contract more rapidly than poor ones. Convergence like that, we don’t need. --Leon Taylor tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Good reading

Moses Abramowitz. 1986. Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind. Journal of Economic History 46: 385-406.

Steve Dowrick. 1992. Technological catch-up and diverging incomes: patterns of economic growth, 1960-88, Economic Journal 102: 600-610.

Paul Johnson and Chris Papageorgiou. 2020. What remains of cross-country convergence? Journal of Economic Literature 58(1): 129-175.

Mancur Olson. 1984. The rise and decline of nations. Yale University Press.

Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner. 1995. Economic reform and the process of global integra- tion. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 1–118

  

Sunday, March 15, 2020

Will the National Bank’s new interest rate go viral?




When a central bank jiggles its monetary policies, economists say it is “fine-tuning.” Last week, the National Bank of Kazakhstan turned up the radio full blast.

The central bank raised the base interest rate, a benchmark for the national economy, from 9.25% to 12% per year. Even a change in the base rate of just half a percentage point would be big news. The rise of nearly three percentage points may lead commercial lenders to raise their own rates sharply.

The National Bank worries about the exchange rate, which has skyrocketed above 405 tenge to a US dollar, the highest it’s been since at least 1993, according to National Bank data. High interest rates can steady the exchange rate by rewarding investors for buying tenge-denominated assets that pay interest.  Why? Because investors will sell dollars for tenge in order to buy the assets. The asset purchases raise demand for tenge, relative to the dollar, so the tenge will strengthen in terms of bucks. In other words, the exchange rate will fall. For example, suppose that the exchange rate declines to 200 tenge. (It won’t, but never mind.)  Then the value of the tenge will rise from 1/405 of a dollar to 1/200. 

The steep increase in the base rate also signals the Bank's determination to hold the line on the exchange rate. The National Bank would prefer that the foreign exchange market stabilize on its own, but it says it will intervene in the foreign exchange market “if necessary.”  In that case, the Bank might buy tenge and sell dollars. It reports $30 billion in dollar reserves.

The National Bank also worries about inflation, the average rate of increase in prices. Inflation hit 6% last month, which is the upper bound on the Bank’s target range for inflation (4% to 6%).

Unfortunately, high interest rates can also throttle an economy. They make it more expensive for firms and people to borrow―say, to build a factory or buy an education―so they will spend less. Nationwide demand will fall. Goods will pile up in warehouses, so retailers will not order more supplies. Warehouse workers will lose their jobs and thus cut back their own spending, causing the grocery to lay off workers, and so on. The economy will slow down.

In that light, this may be exactly the wrong moment for raising the interest rate.  The World Health Organization announced last week that the covid-19 disease has become a pandemic. In Kazakhstan, university classrooms are closing, and international tourism will suffer.

In addition, the spot price (that is, the current price) of Brent crude, a benchmark for the global oil market, has nearly halved since October 2018, to $45.60 per barrel, according to the United States Energy Information Administration.  The price on futures for West Texas Intermediate crude, which reflects expectations, has nearly halved since last year, falling to $31.50. Prices are collapsing partly because of competition within the oil cartel OPEC+ for customers.  In the short run, the price declines can reduce revenues from oil exports, which account for roughly a fourth of Kazakhstan’s economy.

When aggregate demand falls, central banks usually try to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates, not raising them. The National Bank will announce any changes in its base rate on Monday. Stay tuned. –Leon Taylor, tayloralmaty@gmail.com