Kyrgyzstan after the referendum and Atambayev: Continuation of consolidation

By Dmitriy Belyanin

How will the impending referendum affect Kyrgyzstan?

On December 11, Kyrgyzstan will host a constitutional referendum for transferring the country from a parliamentary-presidential republic to a purely presidential one. The referendum is backed by President Almazbek Atambayev, who has repeatedly said he would not run for re-election in 2017. Kyrgyzstan has the most liberal political regime in the Eurasian Economic Union and one of the most liberal among the former Soviet republics. (As well as one of the most corrupt.) This article analyzes problems that will remain with the transfer of power to the Parliament, with a new President probable next year.

The Economy

Kyrgyzstan’s political outbursts are kindled by the youth and poverty of its people. Of its 5.7 million residents, nearly half are younger than 25. Only a bit more than a third of the populace lives in cities, which may help account for why nearly a third of Kyrgyzstanis are poor. In contrast, in its northern neighbor Kazakhstan, the share of the population living below the poverty line – known as the poverty headcount ratio – was only 2.8% in 2014, said the World Bank.     

Kyrgyzstan’s grinding poverty owes to its unemployment and low productivity – and more generally to its botched transition to markets. In the Nineties, many newly privatized enterprises, not supported by investments and exposed to foreign competition, went bankrupt. Instability increased prices of key materials and equipment by cutting supply and raising demand, which boosted the costs of producing other goods. Furthermore, monetary policy tools, especially open-market operations, were underdeveloped, which kept the government from controlling the money supply. (In open-market operations, the central bank exchanges securities for money, or vice versa, to precisely manipulate the money supply.) Instability also created political risks, raising interest rates and thus dampening investment.

In adjusting to the novel environment of markets, workers became less productive, so firms would hire them only at low wages. In 1995, the amount produced by an average worker in Kyrgyzstan was only 54% of the 1990 level. The decline was especially sharp for agriculture, wrote Boris Rumer.

Thanks to the small and impoverished population, Kyrgyzstan’s economy is too small to exploit scale economies (i.e., the idea that producing more will cut unit costs). Last year, the value of production (gross domestic product, or GDP) was only $20 billion when adjusted for changes in prices and exchange rates.

  

Kyrgyzstan is trapped in a vicious cycle: Economic instability creates political instability, which stokes more economic instability. In 2008, rising prices of energy and agricultural products, due to poor harvests worldwide, fueled double-digit inflation, disturbing the population. Inflation returned in 2010, fueling the second color revolution. Table 1 shows key parameters of Kyrgyzstan in 2004-2016. The selected years show development of the country under each of its four Presidents.  

Parameter	2004	2007	2010	2013	2016E
Gross domestic product, constant prices, % change	7.027	8.543	-0.472	10.534	3.515
Total investment, % of GDP	20.847	20.945	23.744	26.044	30.716
Gross national savings, % of GDP	25.772	14.966	17.635	11.035	12.273
Inflation, end of period consumer prices, % change	2.764	20.052	18.932	3.970	6.997
Unemployment rate, % of total labor force	8.500	8.200	8.600	7.652	7.379
General government gross debt, % of GDP	92.909	56.805	59.726	46.102	72.337
Current account balance, % of GDP	4.925	-5.978	-6.109	-15.008	-18.442

Source: International Monetary Fund, 2016 World Economic Outlook Database

Table 1: Selected macroeconomic parameters of Kyrgyzstan (2004-2016)

The economy is open as well as small. Gross exports amounted to 38% of GDP, though they were more than half of the economy in 2013, said the Global Competitiveness Report. The export share fell because of recession in Russia, which flattened demand for Kyrgyz-made products. 

Being open, the economy is vulnerable to world trends, which engenders instability as well as growth. The country exports cotton, textiles, gold, mercury, natural gas, electricity, and dairy products. Remittances, mostly from Russia and Kazakhstan, comprised more than a fourth of GDP in 2015, reported the World Bank. In general, Kyrgyzstan has one of the most open economies in the CIS. Its average tariff rate is 2.5%. 

Especially vulnerable to global forces is Kyrgyzstan’s tormented currency, the som.

Kazakhstan buys about 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s exports, not including gold, so the swift weakening of the tenge last summer raised the tenge price of what Kyrgyzstan sold to its northern neighbor. Incomes of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia fell 30-40% due to ruble depreciation, reports Kloop.kg.

One challenge for Kyrgyzstan leaders is that most economic policies have both positive and negative effects in the short run, so their political consequences are rarely clear. Consider the country’s export tax. While taxing exports decreases them, it also makes these goods cheaper at home by increasing their domestic supply. 

The political consequences of trade pacts are especially murky. In 2015, Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union and received $1 billion of Russian loans and grants for subsidies. Low tariffs among Union members spur trade in the Union. These tariffs, along with low wages, give Kyrgyzstan a reputation among producers as one of the cheapest countries in Central Asia. On the other hand, the Union raises tariffs among non-members and adumbrates political restrictions that Russia may someday impose.  

Despite these complications, Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomy has a few fortes. Gross national savings as a share of GDP, which fell from 21% in 2011 to 14% in 2012, rose slowly to 14.2% in 2015, said the World Economic Forum. The government has been racking up small deficits and surpluses, dropping from 0.23% of GDP in 2014 to -1.3% in 2015. Its largest deficit was -5.8%, in 2012. By reducing its red ink, the government takes pressure off interest rates, enabling business to borrow more cheaply and thus to invest more. 

Kyrgyzstan’s financial system is puny. In a well-developed financial sector, savings are invested in bank deposits or securities. Since these assets can easily finance expansion of the capacity to produce, they can raise output and employment. But in 2014, Kyrgyzstan’s bank deposits amounted to just 17% of GDP. In comparison, for Kazakhstan, they were 28%, said DataMarket. Market capitalization of listed domestic companies of Kyrgyzstan came to just 3% of GDP in 2012. For Kazakhstan, the figure was 12% in 2011 and 11% in 2013, said the World Bank.  

Fiscal reforms have been slow and uneven. The government recently introduced a flat tax rate of 10% on personal and corporate income. However, taxation is poorly enforced and administered, and the total tax burden is only 21% of income. The problem is that government spending claims 38% of income, reported the Heritage Foundation, so the fiscal reforms have not enabled the government to balance its books.

Perhaps it is too soon to judge the reforms. In principle, replacing a progressive tax with a proportional one encourages entrepreneurship, because the tax penalty on additional income no longer rises. (In a progressive system, the tax rate increases with income; in a proportional system, the tax rate is a constant.) On the other hand, the reform raises the tax rate on the poor, so income inequality may widen over time.

The government does a poor job of collecting taxes partly because its complicated rules encourage evasion. A typical limited liability company, with at least 60 employees, must make 51 payments to the budget per year. For rich OECD countries, the average is 11 payments. 

Fiscal expansions, which the government can finance by borrowing, are common when governments need voters’ support. In Kyrgyzstan, though, the government runs a deficit not only to get reelected but to avoid another color revolution. Over time, the government has been taxing less and spending more. Spending now exceeds 40% of GDP, said the International Monetary Fund.

Financing fiscal expansions by issuing debt may crowd out private investment. Higher interest rates on government securities attract funds away from the corporate securities market, which is where firms borrow to expand production. And the general rise in interest rates discourages private borrowing. Nevertheless, crowding out is likely to be weaker in Kyrgyzstan than in neighboring Uzbekistan, since the Kyrgyz government does not seize assets and its securities markets are more transparent. Political stabilization after the second Kyrgyz Revolution spurred economic growth in real GDP, due to increased investment.

Even so, investment in Kyrgyzstan faces hurdles. Although Kyrgyzstan is quiet now, the weakness of its central government makes a color revolution more likely than it would be elsewhere. This possibility makes government and corporate bonds prone to default. Agency ratings show that Kyrgyz government bonds are riskier than those of many other CIS countries (Table 2). 

Country	S&P	Descrip.	Moody’s	Descrip.	Fitch	Descrip.
AM	-		B1, stable	Highly spec.	B+, stable	Highly spec.
AZ	BB+, negative	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	Ba1, negative	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	BB+, negative	Non-inv. Grade, spec.
BY	B-, stable	Highly spec.	Caa1, stable	Substantial risks	B-, stable	Highly spec.
GE	BB-, stable	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	Ba3, stable	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	BB-, stable	Non-inv. Grade, spec.
KZ	BBB-, negative	Lower medium grade	Baa3, negative	Lower medium grade	BBB, stable	Lower medium grade
KG	NR	-	B2, stable	Highly spec.	-	-
ML	-	-	B3, negative	Highly spec.	-	-
RU	BB+, stable	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	Ba1, negative	Non-inv. Grade, spec.	BBB-, negative	Lower medium grade
UA	B-, stable	Highly spec.	Caa3, stable	Default imminent	CCC	N/A

Key: AM - Armenia, AZ - Azerbaijan, BY - Belarus, GE - Georgia, KZ - Kazakhstan, KG - Kyrgyzstan, MD - Moldova, RU - Russia, UA - Ukraine, Descrip. - Description.

Source: Trading Economics

Table 2: Credit ratings and outlooks of former Soviet republics

Although doing business in Kyrgyzstan is easy by Central Asian standards, it is difficult by CIS standards (Table 3). Kyrgyzstan has ranked 67^th on the Ease of Doing Business Index for the past two years. The country performs very well in registering property and relatively well in dealing with construction permits and getting credit. But getting electricity, paying taxes and enforcing contracts are harder.

Country	Rank	Start a Business	Deal wt. Construction Permits	Get Electricity	RegisterProperty	Get Credit	Protect Minority Investors	Pay Taxes	Trade Across Borders	Enforce Contracts	Resolve Insolvency
GE	24	6	11	62	3	7	20	40	78	13	101
AM	35	5	62	99	14	42	49	41	29	28	71
KZ	41	21	92	71	19	70	25	18	122	9	47
BY	44	12	34	89	7	109	57	63	25	29	69
RU	51	41	119	29	8	42	66	47	170	5	51
MD	52	26	170	104	21	28	36	78	33	67	60
AZ	63	7	114	110	22	109	36	34	94	40	84
KG	67	35	20	160	6	28	36	138	83	137	126
UA	83	30	140	137	61	19	88	107	109	98	141
UZ	87	42	151	112	87	42	88	115	159	32	75
TJ	132	57	152	177	102	109	29	172	132	54	147

Key: AM - Armenia, AZ - Azerbaijan, BY - Belarus, GE - Georgia, KZ - Kazakhstan, KG - Kyrgyzstan, MD - Moldova, RU - Russia, UA - Ukraine, Descrip. - Description.

Source: The World Bank Group

Table 3: Components of the Ease of Doing Business Index for CIS countries

It takes just 3.5 days on average to register property in Kyrgyzstan, compared with about 22 days in Europe, Central Asia and rich countries. Similarly, you can get construction permits more quickly (142 days) than in affluent nations. In general, all four presidents of Kyrgyzstan have encouraged free enterprise, partly to win business support in a politically instable country, and partly because the nation is more poorly endowed with natural resources than its northern neighbor, Kazakhstan. On the legal rights index of the World Bank, which ranges from 0 to 12 (higher numbers are better), Kyrgyzstan scores 8, compared to 6.2 or less for Europe, Central Asia and high-income OECD countries.

Another sign of Kyrgyzstan’s evolution into a market economy is its shedding of subsidies. In December 1998, Kyrgyzstan had to reduce farm subsidies to join the World Trade Organization. The WTO opposes such subsidies because they distort production, leading to inefficiency. In theory, a competitive market in a simple world maximizes value by ensuring that each consumer who is willing to pay the cost of producing some good, can buy it. She is willing to pay the $2 cost of manufacturing a toothbrush because it’s worth $3 to her. For the last buyer in the market, the value to her of the toothbrush ($2) equals its cost of production. A subsidy increases output beyond this point, meaning that some new units will cost more to produce than they are worth to consumers.  

Kyrgyzstan is more successful in providing soft inputs like property rights than hard inputs. Electricity is expensive and difficult to procure. Electrical costs average 892% of annual income per capita, compared with 65% in rich countries. Power prices are high partly because a monopoly dominates the market; no rivals threaten to undercut its price.

A hopeful sign is the spread of the Internet. In 2015, 30% of the population used the Web, up from 20% in 2011. The Internet is a godsend for entrepreneurs: Without it, they are chained to their locations. This increases their fixed costs, raising prices and throttling supply.

The regime and its history

Political controversy in Kyrgyzstan revolves on whether to empower the President at the expense of the legislature.

In the 1990s, the political regime largely resembled those of other Central Asian countries. President Askar Akayev strove to centralize power in his hands while conducting superficial political reforms. During the first election in 1991, President Akayev ran unopposed; in 1995 he was reelected with over 70% of the vote. In the next year, a referendum approved a constitutional amendment granting more power to the President and restricting the power of the legislature. In 1998, the country imposed a moratorium on the death penalty that many human rights activists welcomed. However, in July 1998, the Constitutional Court let President Akayev run for a third term in 2000, and he was elected for another five years. International observers said the election was flawed.

During the early 2000s, the opposition condemned the Akayev government, which then cracked down on opposition leaders. In March 2000, Felix Kulov, former national security minister, was arrested for alleged abuse of office. He was released in July 2000 but re-arrested in May 2002. That year, a state commission showed that senior government officials had been responsible for the deaths of five peaceful protesters in March, and the government of Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev resigned. Nikolai Tanayev replaced him. In November 2002, the opposition demanded Akayev’s resignation.

The President tried to calm the protesters with skin-deep political reforms but failed. In February 2003, another referendum transferred some presidential powers to the Parliament, but many argued that it assured the President’s hold on power. Later, the February 2005 parliamentary elections caused massive protests because opposition candidates were not allowed to run. After the second round of the elections, protests escalated, inducing Akayev to flee to Russia. Parliament appointed Bakiyev as the acting President and Prime Minister, and it freed the opposition leader Felix Kulov from jail, dropping charges against him. In April 2005, Akayev resigned. 

Bakiyev’s victory in the July 2005 elections marked a new era for Kyrgyzstan. In August 2005, he nominated Kulov to become Prime Minister. But corruption and crime remained rampant, spurring protests.

In February 2006, protesters demanded constitutional reforms and measures against crime and corruption. In November 2006, the besieged Bakiyev approved a new constitution limiting his powers. 

In the late 2000s, government dismissals and constitutional amendments were frequent. In December 2006, the Kulov government resigned, leading to early parliamentary elections. In January 2007, Bakiyev appointed Azim Isabekov, previously Agriculture Minister, as the new Prime Minister. Nevertheless, he was an administrative, rather than a political, figure, so he did not satisfy the opposition, reported RT. He resigned in March, anticipating opposition demonstrations. Almazbek Atambayev, a moderate opposition leader, was named Prime Minister.  

Though the Bakiyev administration compromised with the opposition, it barely clung to power. In April 2007, a week-long demonstration in Bishkek demanded Bakiyev’s resignation, and the police cracked down. In October 2007, voters supported constitutional changes, which the opposition condemned as authoritarian. Bakiyev dissolved Parliament and announced new elections. In November 2007, Atambayev quit, criticizing the President for nepotism and corruption. In December 2007, Bakiyev’s party won 71 out of 90 seats in questionable Parliamentary elections. In July 2009, Bakiyev won 76% of the vote, but the opposition and the OSCE said the election results were falsified.

Foreign policy too was questionable. In February 2009, Bakiyev accepted $2 billion in aid from Russia and promised not to prolong the lease of the military base by the United States in the Manas Airport in Bishkek. Nevertheless, in June 2009, he let the US Army stay after it offered $60 million to continue using the base. The opposition also blamed Bakiyev for diverting Russian aid to his six brothers and two sons, who held key posts.

Rising unemployment and prices on housing and utilities ended Bakiyev’s regime. In early 2010, several opposition newspapers were closed for “damaging” publications about Bakiyev and his family. When it was reported on April 7, 2010 that three major dissidents -- Omurbek Tekebayev, Temir Sariyev and Atambayev -- were arrested, protesters called for their release and stormed government buildings. Bakiyev fled to Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan but refused to resign. However, the new government warned that he and his family would be arrested if he did not. On April 16, he threw in the towel and high-tailed it to Belarus. He still argues that his overthrow was illegal, report Michael Coffey and co-authors.

Roza Otunbayeva, leader of the ruling Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, became the head of the interim government. Having held government positions in the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic and in the independent Kyrgyz Republic as a moderate, she maintained closer ties to the Kremlin than to the White House. She had supported Bakiyev during the Tulip Revolution but quickly lost faith in his regime, reports The Telegraph. She served as interim President from May 2010 until the end of 2011.

Atambayev was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Social Democratic Party in Zhogorku Kenesh, the Kyrgyz Parliament. He became Prime Minister in December 2010. He sought a strategic partnership with Russia and said Kyrgyzstan would gradually join the Customs Union. The US aviation base in the Manas airport in Bishkek would function for four more years, reported Vzglyad, a Russian business newspaper.

On June 11, south Kyrgyzstan exploded in ethnic turmoil. In Osh and Jalal-Abad, about 400,000 ethnic Uzbeks had to leave their homes. About 400 people were killed, according to official statistics. Many Uzbeks sided with the interim government, while many Kyrgyz supported Bakiyev, implying that his overthrow may have fed the flames. Otunbayeva admitted that she could not ease tensions and appealed for Russian assistance, but the Kremlin refused to send in peacekeepers, unlike other Central Asian nations. Peace returned in late June.

The government still denies justice to the victims of the interethnic riots. Last April, Muhamad Bizurukov, an Uzbek on trial since 2011, blamed for the 2010 violence, was sentenced to 13 years in jail but released in August on parole. Related cases are pending. 

   

International organizations criticize the probes into the June 2010 violence. While visiting Central Asia last June, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, advised Kyrgyz authorities to investigate and try those responsible for severe crimes, to review convictions that had led to torture, and to cooperate with civil society “to promote interethnic reconciliation.” On the fifth anniversary of the June 2010 conflict, the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities pointed out that “a sense of insecurity is still prevalent among the ethnic Uzbek community” and that investigations had made “little progress.”

Nevertheless, political reforms have progressed since the second color revolution. On June 27, 2010, a referendum transformed the country into a Parliamentary-Presidential Republic. Over 90% of the voters backed the new Constitution, which banned establishing political parties on religious or ethnic grounds. Neither could police officers, military persons and judges join them. Finally, the President can no longer appoint members of the Central Election Commission.

In October 2011, Atambayev won 63% of the Presidential vote in an election that had turned out 57% of the electorate. He had positioned himself as a leader who could heal the country. Adakhan Madumarov and Kamchibek Tashiyev, Atambayev’s main rivals, were southern nationalists; Tashiyev’s rhetoric was harsh.

Under Atambayev, Kyrgyzstan has stabilized, but human rights are still violated. Despite the ban on discrimination based on gender, ethnicity or religion, women -- who make up 52% of the Kyrgyz society and 43% of the labor force -- face domestic violence and are under-represented in the legislature, where they hold less than a fourth of the seats.

In October 2015, Kyrgyzstan organized parliamentary elections, with 14 parties, that contrasted sharply with elections elsewhere in Central Asia. To participate, a party had to offer at least 120 candidates, with each gender making up at least 30% of the list and with ethnic minorities accounting for at least 15%. No party may hold over 65 seats in the 120-seat Parliament, with a 7% threshold to qualify for taking seats. 

The Social Democratic Party won the election with 27% of the votes (38 seats in Parliament). Six parties qualified for Parliament. International observers praised the elections as “competitive,” providing voters “with a wide range of choices.” But ballot secrecy and the inclusiveness of voters were concerns.

Last July four parliamentary factions, including the ruling party, proposed a referendum to amend the constitution. A referendum is legitimate if 30% of all voters participate. The proposed amendments would further empower the Prime Minister and enable a deputy of the Zhogorku Kenesh to become Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister. Atambayev approved the referendum in September. Some of his foes argue that he could become Prime Minister and use the amendments to his advantage. Atambayev denies that he will hold any government position after 2017.   

Predictions and recommendations

The re-election of the Social Democratic Party to the Parliament in 2015, with no protests afterwards, suggests a satisficed populace. Poverty, corruption and human rights violations persist, but many people have wearied of instability.

Though Atambayev plans to step down as President, the Social Democratic Party is likely to be re-elected to the legislative and executive branches. All six political parties holding seats in Parliament are pro-Russian. The Atameken Party -- which leans more towards the west than the other five and is the most critical of the existing regime in Kyrgyzstan -- had received 8%, the smallest share of votes, in the 2015 election. Chances are high that the amendments reforming the Prime Minister’s post will pass, due to a low threshold (just 30% of the vote).

The transition to a pure Parliamentary republic spreads power over more political figures, but it also weakens the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. The mainstream parties may take advantage of this and pass restrictions on minor parties. Political parties may narrow the gap between their programs and positions on foreign policy, to attract voters. Tired of violent protests, most Kyrgyzstanis will accept this trend. 

What will be the main trend in foreign relations is less clear. After the August 30 attack on the Chinese embassy, Kyrgyzstan will need to strengthen ties with Beijing. China needs stability in Central Asia to complete the Silk Road project, which will speed transport of Chinese goods to Europe. Also, destabilization of the area increases the likelihood of protests by Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. China might not remain neutral.

Closer ties between Uzbekistan and Russia affect Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz agricultural exporters face tougher competition for the Russian market, which makes promises to extend welfare more popular. The Social Democratic Party may become slightly more social democratic.

Russia may encourage Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to narrow the gap between their regimes, to prevent conflicts between them, because destabilization of the region makes it vulnerable to extremists. Uzbekistan will become more open, while Kyrgyzstan may adopt tougher laws against extremist groups, which may lead to false convictions and to repression.  

While the foreign-relations picture is murky, Kyrgyzstan’s direction in its economy is crystal clear: It’s still heading toward markets. Its liberal regulations benefit small businesses. Workers gain from liberalization of migration to Russia and Kazakhstan under the Eurasian Economic Union, which lets you become a guest worker without having to register.

WTO rules restrict farm subsidies, but the government may compensate rural residents with more education grants for their children or other subsidies of goods that benefit third parties. For example, a literate resident can learn to become a good citizen, which helps all Kyrgyzstanis. The government must subsidize literacy – not leave it up to the market to produce, since a teacher of reading skills to one resident cannot collect payments from all Kyrgyzstanis, although they all benefit from the resident’s literacy.

Despite their liberal tendencies -- or perhaps because of them – Kyrgyzstanis are not enamored of the Eurasian Economic Union, which Russia leads. In a study by the Eurasian Bank of Development of over 8,600 people in each member state, the Union’s popularity in Kyrgyzstan fell from 86% in 2015 to 81% in 2016, reported Zanoza.kg. But this decline is too small to effect withdrawal from the Union.

The som merits some attention. Kyrgyzstan has a flexible exchange rate – that is, a currency value set by the market, not by the government. So the som can lose value over time, in terms of foreign currencies like the dollar. To use a simple though unrealistic example, the som’s exchange rate may weaken from one som per $2 to one som per $1. Such depreciation raises the foreign demand for Kyrgyzstani goods, since a dollar can buy twice as many som as before and thus twice as much of Kyrgyzstani products. That higher demand will raise Kyrgyzstani prices. That is, it will create inflation. 

What’s wrong with inflation? Well, it imposes costs. Restaurants must revise their menus; shoppers wear out their shoes (and patience) looking for bargains.  Most important, unanticipated price changes complicate planning.  Buyers and sellers make mistakes; unraveling those errors slows down the economy. Unexpected inflation also benefits debtors at the expense of creditors, because the lender is paid back in weaker dollars than she had planned on. Since wages are sticky in the short run, inflation will hurt workers, because their paychecks won’t buy as much as before.

To quell inflation, Kyrgyzstan’s central bank can sell securities for som, thus withdrawing excess money from circulation. This reduces the amount of money chasing each product, so its price will moderate. The bank can strengthen such open-market operations by developing debt markets. 

       

Conclusion

Though President Almazbek Atambayev has relinquished much power to the Parliament and has said he will not run again, his political party will assume more control, with the approval of the populace. Increased competition with Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors and global economic trends can make the ruling Social Democratic Party more socially oriented, even though its policies are, and will remain, less democratic than those of western social democratic parties.

Dmitriy Belyanin has a Master’s degree of Business Administration in Finance and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from KIMEP University. Since 2007, he has been writing on issues in economics and finance ranging from stock markets to environmental economics. He is the associate editor of this blog.

Notes

During Atambayev’s rule, Kyrgyzstan hosted the World Nomad Games twice, in September 2014 and last September. The Games were in the city of Cholpon-Ata near Issyk-Kul. According to Maxat Chakiyev, director of the Tourism Department, 50,000 tourists, of whom over 5,000 were foreigners, attended the first Games. Revenues from these Games were $9.8 million, while $2 million was spent on organizing the Games. World media coverage of the Games burnished the country’s prestige. This and the increases in tourism revenues contribute to the popularity of Atambayev’s team and his party, making their re-election more likely.


Correction

Kyrgyzstan's referendum will be December 11, not December 4. 

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