Wednesday, December 27, 2023

Out for blood

 


                                             Mousavi: In Israeli cross-hairs. Credit: Tasnim News Agency


Israel’s Christmas Day assassination of Sayyed Reza Mousavi in Damascus this week marks a change in its policy to thwart terrorism. Until now, Israel has destroyed infrastructure in Syria to block Iran’s movements of terrorists and arms. It has bombed the airports at Damascus and Aleppo several times this year. Now it seems to be targeting people rather than facilities. 

Israel, of course, does not comment on its assassinations. But targeting Mousavi was shrewd. True, he was not the head of the Quds Forces, the branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards that supervises foreign military intelligence for Iran.  But he knew more about Syria and Iraq than does the current Quds commander, Esmail Qaani. Indeed, he probably coordinated Iranian-trained militias in Syria. Israel may be targeting leaders now because it found that Iran and allies repaired bombed infrastructure quickly. Or Israel may think that taking out Mousavi will have a more general impact on terrorist logistics than will taking out an airport.

Iran vows revenge. When the Americans in 2020 assassinated Mousavi’s friend, Qassem Soleimani, then-Quds commander, at the Baghdad airport, Iran retaliated by launching rockets on the al-Asad US base near Baghdad. At the time, al-Asad had no air defense. It has better cover now. Last month, when an Iranian militia launched a close-range ballistic missile at al-Asad, an AC-130J Ghostrider struck back immediately.

Iran has not announced its target for retaliation, of course. But an Iranian-linked militia, Kataib Hezbollah, launched a Christmas drone into the al-Harir air base of the Americans in northern Iraq 70 kilometers northeast of the capital city of the Kurdistan province, Erbil. That drone hit a building with troops and wounded three, one critically.

The militias have attacked al-Harir at least a dozen times since October 17, so one wonders how Central Command will protect the air base. One analyst, Paul Iddon, suggests that short-range air defenses should be enough. The more critical need is to defend the American troop stand at Erbil air base, to defend residents of Erbil as well. This might require a Patriot unit and a C-Ram (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) System. But the US Army has only about 16 Patriot battalions, and they are highly sought-after around the world. However, the defense bill passed by Congress December 14 would provide air defense in Kurdistan. 

While Kataib Hezbollah was bombing al-Harir, the Turks were bombing Kurdish allies of the Americans whom Ankara regards as tied to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a charge that the Americans deny. In any event, pressure is growing for the roughly 3,400 American troops to withdraw from eastern Syria and Iraq. When the Americans retaliated for the Kataib Hezbollah attack on al-Harir by bombing three depots for drones for the terrorists, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, protested this as a violation of national sovereignty. Kataib Hezbollah, like other Iranian-linked militias, has influence in the Iraqi government because it fought at the side of Iraqi troops to eject the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIS) almost a decade ago. The Americans are in Iraq strictly at the government's invitation. Doormats come and doormats go.

But it does not look like the Americans will pull out of Syria and Iraq soon. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have rejected recent bills to withdraw quickly from Syria. Even so, pressure is growing, because the troops in Syria and Iraq have been attacked more than 100 times since mid-October and their stated purpose -- to contain ISIS -- seems moot since Daesh lost its caliphate four years ago.

If the Americans do pull out of the region, their Kurdish allies, in the Syrian Democratic Forces, may have to retreat from northeast Syria eastward to the Kurdistan province of Iraq. (See the map below.) Bottled up there, they could be at the mercy of the Turks. At present, the 30 million Kurds are scattered across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Concentrating the thousands of Kurds in the Syrian Democratic Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 6.6 million live mainly in cities, may make it easier for Turkey to keep an eye on them.

Ankara has long sought to establish a buffer across northern Iraq and Syria against assaults by the Kurdistan Workers' Party.  It already has a presence in northwest Syria, although the area is ruled by an al-Qaeda offshoot, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. With the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Americans bowing out of the northeast, Turkey could extend its buffer eastward unless opposed by Iran and Russia, Syria's allies. They have business investments to protect, but the Turks have been known from time to time to cut a deal. 

For example, in 2020, Turkey and Russia negotiated a ceasefire in northwest Syria, where Russian planes fly sorties to harass this region, one of the few remaining strongholds against Assad. I say "fly," because the Russians honor the ceasefire in the breach. A rescue group in Syria, the White Helmets, says that in 2023 it has responded to more than 1,200 attacks by Syrian and Russian forces and by militias linked to them. These attacks killed 161, including 46 children; and they injured 681, including 214 children. The latest Russian air raid, on Christmas, on a farmhouse in western Idlib, killed three children and injured the remaining one, as well as killing their parents, reported Al Jazeera. 


                   Russian air raid west of Idlib city. Photo source: Ali Haj Suleiman, Al Jazeera 

In any event, it is not surprising that the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region in Iraq, Masrour Barzani, criticizes Iran for undermining local autonomy. Iran gained considerable political power in Baghdad last year when a court decision effectively gave its Iraqi coalition a veto over vital policies.

Mousavi's assassination may check this spreading Iranian influence.  But only for a while. -Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com



                                                    Kurdistan. Map based on Google Maps.

 

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson.

           

References

Tara Copp, Lolita C. Baldor, and The Associated Press. Patriot missile defense systems: What they are and what they do | Fortune Europe . December 15, 2022.

Paul Iddon, Rawan Radwan. Who killed Iran’s IRGC operative Sayyed Reza Mousavi in Syria, and why? Arab News. https://arab.news/gb2dw   December 26, 2023.

Paul Iddon. Why The U.S. Should Deploy Air Defenses To Iraqi Kurdistan (forbes.com)  October 23, 2024

Paul Iddon. Iraqi Kurdistan May Finally Acquire Air Defenses After Years Of Unprovoked Missile And Drone Attacks (forbes.com) October 16, 2023.

C. Todd Lopez. AC-130 Strikes Iranian-Backed Militants Following Missile Attack > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News  November 21, 2023.

Reuters. Israeli airstrike in Syria kills senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards member | Reuters . December 25, 2023.

Ali Haj Suleiman and Husam Hezaber. Deadly Christmas in Syria’s Idlib after Russian attack kills five in family | Politics News | Al Jazeera . December 26, 2023.

United States National Counterterrorism Center.  National Counterterrorism Center | FTOs (dni.gov)  Kataib Hezbollah


Sunday, December 24, 2023

Under pressure


The al-Baqir Brigade in a religious ceremony in Aleppo. Photo source: The North Press Agency. 

In the news:

(1)   In Yemen, Iran has armed the Houthis rebels with intelligence and arms, including drones, for attacking Red Sea shipping, according to The Wall Street Journal. Iranian aid to the Houthis is coordinated by the Quads Force commander in Yemen, Abdolreza Shahlaei.  The US seeks him for planning a 2007 attack in Iraq that killed five American soldiers.

(2)   A drone from Iran hit a chemical tanker flying the Liberia flag Saturday morning in the Indian Ocean, about 230 miles from the coast of India, reported the Pentagon. Iranian drone attacks on shipping occur about twice per year.

(3)   Iran said Sunday it had new cruise missiles that could fly up to 1,000 kilometers (more than 600 miles) as well as advanced drones with electronic intelligence.

(4)   Turkey said its air force Saturday destroyed 29 sites of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey, the US, and the European Union regard as terrorist, in northern Iraq and Syria, in retaliation for the deaths of 12 Turkish troops near the northern Iraq border since Friday. Turkey did not identify the sites bombed.  But Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has often accused the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria of being linked to the PKK. Turkey said last week it had assassinated the head of Democratic Forces. The United States set up the Democratic Forces in 2014 ostensibly to fight the terrorist Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIS). American troops still advise the Democratic Forces. Erdogan said he would not permit a terrorist “structure” in northern Iraq and Syria.

(5)   A leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in the Aleppo area, Al-Haj Karar, ordered the Baqir Brigade militia to send 140 members to Deir ez-Zour Province in northeast Syria to fight the Syrian Democratic Forces, according to a Syrian opposition news site, the North Press Agency. Some of the militants were trained at Khan al-Assal, west of Aleppo, to operate kamikaze drones against US posts east of the Euphrates. The Baqir militants are to coordinate with the Sons of Jazira and Euphrates Movement militias. These are already fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces.

(6)   Since October 17, there have been 102 drone and rocket attacks on US posts in Syria and Iraq, including at least two last week, according to the Pentagon.

(7)   An Iranian mouthpiece, the MEHR News Agency, accused the US last week of ransacking oil and natural gas from northeast Syria. The Syrian regime has made this charge for nearly 10 years. Why is Iran making it now?  

These events suggest growing pressure on US troops in Syria and Iraq to withdraw. This has long been one of Iran’s goals. – Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson.

 

References

Haberin Devami. Erdoğan vows to prevent terrorist 'structure' in northern Iraq, Syria - Türkiye News (hurriyetdailynews.com) . December 23, 2023.

Benoit Faucon, Dov Lieber, and Gordon Luhold. Iranian Spy Ship Helps Houthis Direct Attacks on Red Sea Vessels - WSJ . December 23, 2023.

Reuters.  https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-says-iranian-drone-attack-hit-chemical-tanker-near-india-2023-12-24/  December 23, 2023.

Reuters.  Turkey conducts air strikes in northern Iraq, Syria after 12 soldiers killed | Reuters . 

Arsalan Shahla.  Iran Army Unveils New Hardware as Gaza, Shipping Conflicts Grow (msn.com)  December 24, 2023.

Stella Youssef.   Iran-backed militia sends militants to fight SDF in Syria's Deir ez-Zor (npasyria.com) The North Press Agency.  December 24, 2023.


Saturday, December 23, 2023

A menace to democracy

 

 


        Source: Wikipedia

 

As the Presidential race comes down to the wire, the wire heats up. This week, The New York Times reported on its poll with Siena College. “Mr. Trump leads Mr. Biden 46 percent to 44 percent among registered voters. Among those deemed likeliest to vote, however, Mr. Biden actually edges Mr. Trump, 47 percent to 45 percent.”

Both statements are lies.  The Times itself reports at the bottom of the story that the margin of error in the poll for registered voters is plus or minus 3.5%.  We don’t know whether former President Donald Trump leads President Joe Biden or if Biden leads Trump. It’s basically a dead heat.

As for those likeliest to vote, they comprise a subsample of registered voters. Since the margin of error is inverse to sample size, it is even larger in absolute value than 3.5%. (It’s 3.7%. Why didn’t the Times story note this?) So the race among likely voters is also basically a dead heat.  

But: What is the margin of error?

Any poll is just a sample of the population that interests us. In this case, we want to know about likely voters in next November’s election. We can’t question them all, so we will question a thousand or so. We should choose them at random to get an accurate picture of all likely voters, and of course we should note their responses correctly. But even if we do, and these conditions are by no means givens, the sample will, to some extent, mislead us. No sample perfectly mirrors its population. In the case at hand, many deviations can creep in. We probably want to know the average intentions of the likely voters over a week or so. The opinions they state on a given day may vary from their average for a week. I saw a Fox News attack on Biden this morning, so if you poll me now, I will say that I favor Trump. Had you polled me at any other time this week, I would have named Biden. All kinds of chance events may lead me away from my “true” opinion.

How to read a sample

Suppose that Trump and Biden are in a dead heat. It is extremely unlikely that the poll, being just a sample, will register 50.0% for Biden and 50.0% for Trump. Instead, the results will be influenced by a few random factors, a few errors. How large are these accumulated errors likely to be? A difference of 1% between the candidates? Or 10%?

To answer this question, we assume that each of the two candidates receive 50% of the vote. If we take a lot of samples, their average vote share for a given candidate will also be 50%. But in reality, we take only one sample, so its average is not likely to be exactly 50%. What range of values is likely?

We can visualize the range by looking at the distribution of probabilities associated with certain outcomes. Define the outcome as Biden’s share of votes in a race against Trump. In the figure above, concentrate on the green curve. I’ll explain the others later. If there really is a tied vote, what is the probability that in the sample, Biden receives no more than, say, 47% of the vote? This probability is the area beneath the green curve from 47% leftward to 0% (not shown in the graph). You can see that there is virtually no area beneath the green curve in this range; it is almost on top of the horizontal axis. Since there is virtually no area beneath the curve, the probability that Biden receives no more than 47% of the sample vote when the actual race is a tie, is virtually zero.  You can why this is useful to know: If Biden did receive 47% of the sample vote, then our assumption that the real vote was tied, is probably wrong.

A fling on the green

Next, move to the right on the green curve. What is the probability that Biden receives no more than 50% of the sample vote in a tied race? You can see that at 50%, half of the area beneath the curve is to the left, and the other half to the right.  By convention, all probabilities sum to 100%. So, the area to the left of the 50% point is 50%. That is, given an actual tie in the population, the probability that Biden receives up to 50% of the sample vote is 50%.  This cumulative probability exceeds that of a sample vote up to 47% (remember that this probability was close to zero!), because we have added tcomes: The one in which Biden receives 48%, 48.5%, 49%, and so forth, up to 50%. We could keep adding outcomes by moving right on the curve, until we have accounted for all possible outcomes in the sample for Biden’s share of the vote, from 0% to 100%. (The figure shows neither extreme.)  The cumulative probability of all outcomes is 100%. This is the total area beneath the green curve. If we are measuring in fractions rather than percentages, then the total area would sum to 1.       

A simple example is a coin toss. Only two outcomes are possible:  Heads, which has a 50% chance; or tails, which also has a 50% chance. The probabilities of the two outcomes sum to 100%. Expressed as fractions, the probability of a head is .5 and of a tail .5. These sum to .5 + .5 = 1.

With this background, we can talk about the likelihood of random errors in the poll sample. First, we assume a tied race. Biden would receive 50%. This corresponds to the middle point in the graph. Because we take only a sample of likely voters, we probably won’t observe an average of exactly 50%.  But the sample average should not be too far from 50%. So, to infer whether the candidates are tied, we look at whether our sample average is close to 50%.

The 95% confidence interval is the range of sample averages that have a 95% chance of occurring if the race is tied. In the figure, the confidence interval is the green horizontal line beneath the figure, from 48% to 52%.  The area beneath the green curve that corresponds to this line is 95%—47.5% to the left, from 48% to 50%,; plus 47.5% to the right, from 50% to 52%.

If the sample average lies in the confidence interval, then by convention, we accept that the race may is a dead heat. If the sample average lies outside of the confidence interval, then we reject the notion of a dead heat. For example, suppose that Biden’s share is 47%. Since this is outside of the confidence interval, we reject the possibility that Trump and Biden are tied. In particular, Trump is leading.

The margin of error is one half of the confidence interval. That’s why we usually express it as, in our example, plus or minus 2% as compared to the mean, which is 50%.

For instance, suppose that Biden receives 49% in the sample. The confidence interval ranges from 48% to 52%. Since 49% is in this range, we consider the race tied. Another way to say this is that the confidence interval consists of Biden vote shares that are within 2% of the mean of 50%, on either side. The margin of error is therefore plus or minus 2%. Now, 49% is only 1% away from 50%, so it is in the margin of error. Thus, if Biden receives 49% of the sample vote, we accept that the race is tied.

Suppose instead that Biden receives 53% of the sample vote. Since 53% is outside of the confidence interval, we don’t consider the race tied. We conclude that Biden is winning. Another way to say this is that 3% is greater than the margin of error of 2%, so we accept that Biden is ahead.

Throwing a curve

Now look at the other curves in the figure.  You will see that the margin of error increases as the sample size decreases. This should make sense. There is less information in a smaller sample, so the chances for error are greater.

In the Times Siena poll of 1,016 respondents, the margin of error was plus or minus 3.5%. Since 2% is less than 3.5%, we should accept that the race is tied for both registered voters and likely voters. To say instead that Trump is leading is simply wrong. But that’s what The Times did.

Using the 95% confidence interval is a conservative approach. It treats the race as too close to call unless chances are better than 95% that it is not that close. The reason for this caution is to avoid the sort of costly mistake that The Times made. We don't want to say that Trump is leading, or that Biden is leading, without good evidence.   

The margin of error is calculated on the assumption that the pollsters computed the sample average correctly. But in reality, pollsters err in noting, inputting, and tabulating responses. They also often do not take a random sample. For example, minor polls with increasing frequency these days gather responses via online invitations, because this is easy and cheap. But this technique can enable a respondent to bias the results by organizing his friends to submit responses.

The upshot: Pollsters should calculate the change in the expected value of the reported sample average due to errors in selecting the sample and processing the data.  They should thus expand the conventional margin of error. But they rarely do. Siena College didn’t. Indeed, one may question whether its stratification of the sample was truly random selection.

However, things are bad enough as they are. The Times reporters knew about the margin of error. It is at the bottom of their news story. Indeed, one of them claims 15 years of experience in polling, although only God knows how this is possible without stumbling once across a confidence interval. Yet they and their editors chose to ignore the margin of error, probably in hot pursuit of a headline saying Trump led Biden.  

This is truly fake news, and it may reshape the Presidential election. All news media follow The New York Times, unfortunately, and arrogant lies like this one propagate ad infinitum…especially in an era so divisive that small margins in both Houses of Congress have become common, suggesting that Presidential margins may become small, too. In such circumstances, ignoring the margin of error may lead commonly to error in publication.

“Democracy dies in darkness,” says a rival of The Times that has also descended into mediocrity. Isn’t it time that reporters learned how to turn on a statistical flashlight?—Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

 Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson, Paul Higgins, Mark Kennet, and David Schatz.

  

References

Shane Goldmacher, Ruth Igielnik, and Camille Baker.  Trump’s Legal Jeopardy Hasn’t Hurt His G.O.P. Support, Times/Siena Poll Finds - The New York Times (nytimes.com)  December 20, 2023.

Margin of error - Wikipedia

Thursday, December 21, 2023

The historian

 

                       So, President Assad, Auschwitz was fiction?  Photo source: Associated Press


Not satisfied with his considerable achievements in genocide, chemical warfare, civil war, suppression of democracy, and toadying up to more successful dictators, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has become a scholar of world history.

The Syrian Arab New Agency posted his December 18 speech on YouTube. I quote from a transcript by MEMRITV.

“Most of us do not know that the rise of Nazism between the two world wars happened with American support…loans, and investments.”

[Undoubtedly, this was why Hitler declared war on the US on December 11, 1941. The key to success is to war on your financiers.]

“There is no evidence that six million Jews were killed [in the Holocaust]…True, there were concentration camps, but what shows you that this is a politicized issue, and is not a humanitarian issue, and is not real, how come we talk about these six millions, and not the 26 million Soviets who were killed in that war? Are those six millions more precious?”

[Evidently, Assad’s evidence that six million Jews were not killed is that 26 million Soviets were. The Holocaust Encyclopedia documents the estimate that the Nazis killed six million Jews. This includes 2.7 million at the killing centers of Auschwitz-Birkenau (1 million), Treblinka II (925,000), Chetmno, Belzel, and Sobibor. It also includes 2 million in mass shootings at 1,500 points in Eastern Europe; 800,000 to 1 million in ghettos, labor camps, and concentration camps;  and 250,00 in antisemitic riots and other acts of violence.

[The Russian Academy of Sciences in 1993 put the number of Soviet deaths in World War II at 27 million, including deaths due to famine. Contrary to Assad’s claim that no one talks about this statistic, there is a ferocious controversy in Russia among historians about the accuracy of the estimate, by the Russian Ministry of Defense, of 8.7 million military deaths.

[But the key, and obvious, point is that the estimate of Soviet deaths has nothing to do with the veracity of the estimate of six million Jewish deaths at the hands of the Nazis. The reader can judge for herself whether this estimate is scrupulous: See The Holocaust Encyclopedia, cited below.]    

“There was no method of torture or killing specific to the Jews. The Nazis used the same method everywhere. However, this issue was politicized, in order to falsify the truth, and later to prepare for the transfer of the Jews from Europe to other areas, or [rather] to Palestine.”

[The Wiener Holocaust Library offers online more than 1,000 eyewitness accounts of Nazi persecution of Jews, including at Auschwitz. For eyewitness accounts exclusively at Auschwitz, see the Web page of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, cited below. 

[According to The Holocaust Encyclopedia, Jews comprised by far the largest group murdered by Nazis. Other groups included 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war and 1.8 million non-Jewish Poles. The Nazis also killed up to perhaps 500,000 Romani, or Gypsies; but this estimate is particularly imprecise.]

“The Jews who came to Palestine are Khazar Jews, from east of the Caspian Sea. They were pagans who converted to Judaism in the eighth century. They emigrated to Europe, and from there, came to this region. They have nothing to do whatever with the [ancient] people of Israel.”

[The Times of Israel writes, “The claim that modern Jews are descended from Khazars…is an antisemitic conspiracy theory long used by people trying to discount Jewish claims to the land of Israel.”]

What was the purpose of Assad’s error-clogged, illogical speech? Note that it appears at a time when Hamas and other anti-Israeli groups are conducting a successful public relations campaign against Israel over the Israel-Hamas War. In this campaign, denial of the legitimacy of Jewish land claims would be particularly useful. The speech may also curry favor with Assad’s allies who invest in his country: Iran, which denies the Holocaust, and Russia.

Assad may not be a historian.  But he is non pareil as a sycophant. – Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

References

Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum. Witnesses accounts / Liberation of KL Auschwitz / Auschwitz-Birkenau

The Holocaust Encyclopedia.  Documenting Numbers of Victims of the Holocaust and Nazi Persecution | Holocaust Encyclopedia (ushmm.org)

Middle East Media Research Institute.  Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad Claims U.S. Supported Nazis | MEMRI

Shira Silkoff.  Syria's Assad claims Holocaust was a lie fabricated to justify creation of Israel | The Times of Israel . December 20, 2023.

Testifying to the Truth: Eyewitnesses to the Holocaust - The Wiener Holocaust Library

 Wikipedia.  World War II casualties of the Soviet Union. World War II casualties of the Soviet Union - Wikipedia


Wednesday, December 20, 2023

Betrayal


                                                      Source: The New Yorker


The Colorado Supreme Court voted 4-3 Tuesday to bar former President Donald Trump from running again for President in the state’s Republican primary March 5.  The court based its decision on the ban on insurrectionists in Section 3 of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. One purpose of the 14th was to keep former Confederates from taking over Congress after the Civil War. The Southern Democratic Senators had been powerful and skillful before the South seceded.

Section 3 is worth quoting:

“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”

The section disqualifies from any office, federal or state, someone who resorted to insurrection despite a Constitutional oath. From time to time, Congress has exempted politicians from the Section’s disqualification. Late in Reconstruction, in 1872, it exempted most Confederates except for Congressmen, military officers, and important bureaucrats. In 1898, it exempted them, too. But there is no chance that Congress will exempt Trump in 2024. The section requires two-thirds approval of both houses, and the Democrats, who comprise nearly half of the House of Representatives, and half of the Senate, will not blithely sweep the thorns out of Trump’s way, heel spurs or not.

On CNN, Ty Cobb, a Trump attorney who later broke with him, argued that Section 3 did not apply to the President or Vice President because it did not specify them as federal officers. Cobb contended that one does not vote for an officer, for example, a Secretary of State. He identified three cases in which Supreme Court justices, including John Roberts, did not identify the President or Vice President as officers. He predicted a 9-0 ruling by the US Supreme Court rejecting the Colorado ruling.

Section 3 does seem to distinguish between an officer, civil or military, and a Congressman, state legislator, or Presidential elector, all of whom are elected. The Denver district court had accepted that Section 3 deliberately refused to characterize the President as an officer. This conclusion was based partly on the fact that an early draft of the section did specify the President, but this specification was deleted.  

Caveat City

The Colorado Supreme Court countered that as a matter of common sense, the President was a federal officer. Congress surely deleted the reference to the Presidency because it was so obviously an office.    

One might add that a historical motivation for the 14th Amendment was to inhibit Confederate influence in Congress. Logically, that inhibition should extend to the White House.    

Another issue is federalism. A state cannot impose its own interpretation of the Constitution. That question was resolved in the ratification debate of the early 1790s, when the Anti-Federalists argued that a state should have the right to read the Constitution as it wished. They lost the fight handily.  Today the US Supreme Court will have to impose a one-size-fits-all solution on all states. 

Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina introduced a bill to block other states from keeping Trump off the ballot. This may be constitutional. I quote Section 4 of Article 1 of the Constitution:

"The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." 

Thus Congress can impose national restrictions to avoid state-by-state chaos. For example, it sets one Election Day for all Congressional races. Perhaps another example is the need to avoid insurrection limits on national candidates that vary from state to state.

In effect, we need a federal answer to the question of whether Trump supervised an insurrection. My own sense is that he did not. He supervised a rebellion. An insurrection is an armed struggle against the government; a rebellion is an armed struggle to overthrow it. As I see it, Trump is a rebel, a traitor.

But he still deserves due process. Trump isn’t much, but he is an American. Quoting from Section 1 of the 14th Amendment:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Professional reputation amounts to property, and the Colorado Supreme Court wants to reduce Trump’s without giving him so much as the right to subpoena to defend himself. Here, too, the US Supreme Court must fashion one size to fit all.

On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court argued that the district court had provided due process.  There was a lot of time for prehearing motions, and the trial itself lasted for five days.  

A practical solution may be to delay Colorado’s ban on primary campaigning until after the end of Trump’s federal trial for the events of January 6, 2021. Trump is not charged with insurrection. But he is charged with conspiring to violate the rights of citizens, a charge that affords him the chance to rebut the accusation of insurrection. And to appeal a conviction for conspiracy.

As a practical matter, the courts won’t resolve all of this before March 5.  So Trump will be on the Colorado GOP ballot. He may win, if he ducks debates. A lot of good that a primary win will do him in the state that Biden won in 2020, 55.4% to Trump’s 41.9%.

The most practical impact of the Colorado court ban is to inspire fund-raising for Trump.  Even so, the ban is a good sign.  It shows that someone takes the 14th Amendment seriously, particularly its ban on power-grabbing by rebels.  And if a national consensus emerges that Trump supervised an insurrection or rebellion, he could be prevented from running for President altogether, if the Supreme Court will show some guts. The Court probably won't.

Speaking of guts, the Republican contenders for the White House have consulted their fund-raising crystal balls and decided that they can’t afford to exclude an insurrectionist from the Oval Office. It’s The People’s decision! But the Constitution makes clear that we are not to trouble The People with a rebel. We are not to reward rebellion with a third shot at the Presidency, if only because Article 2 characterizes treason "or other high crimes and misdemeanors" as impeachable offenses that upon conviction require removal from office. If the serious candidates – Nikki Haley, Chris Christie, and Ron DeSantis – cannot stand up to a rebel on home ground, how will they fare against Vladimir Putin? – Leon Taylor, Baltimore, tayloralmaty@gmail.com

 

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet.

 

References

CNN. (130) Former Trump WH lawyer on why Trump will see Colorado ruling as a win - YouTube December 20 2023.

Epps, Garrett. The 14th Amendment and the fight for equal rights in Post-Civil War America.  Henry Holt. 2013.

Foner, Eric. The second founding: How the Civil Waer and Reconstruction remade the Constitution.  W. W. Norton. 2020.

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist papers.

Library of Congress. Fourteenth Amendment Section 3 | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress


Tuesday, December 19, 2023

Poisoning the statistics

 


                                        The toxicologist.  Photo source: Drew Angerer, Getty Images


Donald Trump’s outrageous comment that immigrants are “poisoning the blood” of America has stirred TV news analysts. On CNN NewsNight Monday, Abby Phillip commented:

“In Iowa, for example, likely Republican caucus-goers say that some of Trump's most authoritarian-inspired solutions and statements make them actually more likely to support him. Sweeping raids, giant camps, mass deportations, well, 50 percent support that. Root out the vermin, 43 percent support that. Immigrants are poisoning the blood of America, 42 percent.

“And you hear it, the adulation of authoritarians. And you hear the adulation that they crave wherever Trump goes.”

Granted: Trump is a cretin. But the question here is whether such remarks lead Republicans to support him. The poll results quoted by Phillip are sketchy. But note that if 42% of likely Republican caucus-goers polled say the “poisoning the blood” remark would make them more likely to support Trump, 58% do not. If all 58% said that they were less likely to support Trump because of the remark, then one can conclude that the typical respondent is less likely to back him. 

Phillip didn’t give data on “don’t know” or “neutral” responses, much less a margin of error, or even which poll it was. (It was the Des Moines Register poll.) . But CNN This Morning gave a few details today (Thursday): 28% of the respondents said they were less likely to support Trump because of the remark, and 29% were basically neutral. I will account for rounding error or for untabulated responses by increasing "neutral" responses to 30%.

We want to know whether a vitriolic remark would make a Republican more likely to support a candidate.  So let's calculate the average response of respondents in a way that measures the respondent's love of vitriol.  Let's assign a 1 to a "more likely to support" response, a -1 to a "less likely" response, and a 0 to "neutral" responses. Now let's calculate the average response. I get 1*.42 - 1*.28 + 0*.3 = .14. This is a positive value. That is, the average respondent was more likely to support Trump because of the remark. And this conclusion is probably statistically significant.  In other words, it is probably true of all likely Republican caucus goers in Iowa, not just those in the sample. I can't be certain of this, because CNN This Morning gave few details about the poll. At minimum, one needs to know the number of respondents; usually the margin of error can be roughly estimated from this. But it is probably safe to say that the typical caucus goer is slightly more likely to support Trump because of the remark...although I would like to know more about how the question was phrased and how the poll was carried out.       

My point is this: When we want to know about the average respondent, we should look at the average response and not just at a particular response.

Not a complicated point. But it sure stumps journalists. On CNN This Morning, Michael Gold, political correspondent for The New York Times, said: "I would also look at the 30 percent of people who said they don't matter [that is, add the neutral responses to the positive responses] because I think those two numbers together are really telling." Gold needs to go get a clue. The negative responses matter, too. Why can't Times reporters do grade-school math?

As CNN demonstrates, statistical misreporting is most severe among TV journalists, because they are more actors than reporters. They strike Authoritative Tones and Glowers.  But the truth is that when it comes to statistics, they have no idea what they are talking about. Come to think of it, maybe that's the reason for the A. T. and G. 

One unfortunate possible consequence of the incorrect reasoning by Phillip, Gold, & Company is that Trumpists may be a lot more inspired to try their own vitriolic remarks to win votes. Judging from this one polling question, the average caucus goer does support vitriol -- but only slightly; not to the extent that Phillip and Gold suggested. The expected value of the response was only .14. A very enthusiastic response to vitriol would have been much closer to 1. 

Here's another way to interpret the result: Of 100 caucus goers, 14 more are more likely to back a candidate because of venom than oppose him because of it. The other 30 are indifferent. Thus venom can boost one's chances of winning among Iowa Republicans, if one's morals are slippery enough. But it would not be safe to build a campaign on vitriol. It is a side issue.  

So let's not overstate the political profit in vitriol. One cretin in the primaries is enough. –Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson, Paul Higgins, and Mark Kennet.  

 

References

CNN NewsNight with Abby Phillip.  CNN.com - Transcripts  December 18, 2023, 22:00 ET.


Sunday, December 17, 2023

Lies, damned lies, and Politico

 



                              Nikki Haley: Now you see it, now you don't. Photo source: Getty Images


Why, in the words of the Politico title, does Nikki Haley poll better against Joe Biden than Donald Trump does? One reason: Reporters bungle the poll results.

Nowhere in this article does Steven Shepard even mention a margin of error – that is, the absolute value in which the reported difference between two candidates may well mislead us. For example, suppose that the margin of error is 2% but the pollsters report that in their tabulation, DeSantis leads Biden by 1%. This statement means nothing. We don’t know whether DeSantis leads Biden, or Biden leads DeSantis, in even the polled sample itself. Errors occur in hearing, writing down, and tabulating a respondent’s response.  It would not be unusual for such errors to affect 1% of the reported responses. In addition to that, the sample is almost never a 100% accurate mirror of the population that interests us—for example, of likely primary voters. Pollsters normally do not distinguish between the error that occurs in reporting the sample and the error that occurs in projecting the sample to the population. They just report one margin of error. So it would be best if reporters stuck to results falling outside of the margin of error.  For example, the article reports that in the Fox News poll, Trump leads Biden among men by 13 percentage points.  No respectable poll can have a margin of error as large as 13%. So the reader can safely infer that Trump leads Biden among men.

The article mentions 36 statistical comparisons or potential comparisons of poll results. Eight of them, or 22% of them all, imply a margin of 4% or less. This is within a common margin of error in national political polls. In other words, more than a fifth of the results reported by Shepard may well be flat wrong. Somebody should take away this guy’s fishing license until he learns how to fish. – Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com   

Notes

For helpful comments, I thank but do not implicate Paul Higgins, Mark Kennet, and David Schatz.

 

Reference

Steven Shepard. Why Nikki Haley polls better against Biden than Trump - POLITICO . December 9, 2023.

 


Surprise

 

                                US destroyer Carney: In harm's way?  Photo: US Navy, Bill Dodge

 

The pace of attacks of Iran-linked militias involving the American military seems to be increasing.  On Saturday, December 16, the US destroyer Carney in the Red Sea intercepted 14 drones from Yemen, undoubtedly from the Houthis rebels, reported Politico. The British destroyer Diamond also shot down a Houthi drone. The Brits reported Monday a possible explosion within two nautical miles of a ship near Yemen, according to Reuters. A nautical mile is a bit longer than a land mile (about 15% longer) and equals one minute of latitude. US sources reported Monday an attack on a Norwegian-owned vessel, M/V Swan Atlantic, that damaged its water tank. It was not clear whether this attack related to the possible explosion reported by the British authorities.

For several weeks, the Houthis have fired drones or ballistic missiles in the direction of either Israel or vessels in the Red Sea.  The Houthis are armed at least partly by Iran; and according to Israeli intelligence, their missile firings are directed by an officer of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, the branch of the Iranian military dedicated to the 1979 Revolution that vowed to destroy Israel.  The Houthis say they will keep launching missiles until Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, where the Israeli Defense Forces have hunted down Hamas terrorists to avoid a repeat of the October 7 Hamas massacre of 1,200 Israelis.

The world’s two largest shippers of containers, MSC and AP Moller-Maersk, have suspended shipping near the Bab al-Mandab Strait that connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and then the Indian Ocean. This strait, at the southwestern tip of Yemen, is critical to Red Sea transport and thus to the Suez Canal, which leads to the Mediterranean. In particular, MSC says it will avoid the Suez Canal, reported Reuters. This route accounts for at least 30% of the world’s container shipping, reported The Financial Times. The fifth largest shipper of containers, the German firm Hapag-Lloyd, is suspending Red Sea shipping until Monday. The Houthis fired on one of its ships Friday.   Maersk Tankers may reroute oil transport around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days to the delivery date. A ship sticking to the Red Sea may have to pay thousands of dollars more in insurance.

In Syria and Iraq, Iran-affiliated militias have fired upon US posts 98 times since October 17, when the Al-Ahli Arabi Baptist Hospital was hit by an explosion in Gaza City, a tragedy initially and, it turned out, falsely blamed on Israeli bombing. An Iranian mouthpiece, Mehr News Agency, claimed that there were two targetings of two US posts Saturday in Deir Ezzour Province in northeast Syria, near gas and oil fields. 

The Pentagon says its posts in northeast Syria are meant to prevent the terrorist group Daesh from seizing vital sources of Syrian fuel as well as of water. The Kurds destroyed the Daesh caliphate in Raqqa, a city in northeast Syria on the Euphrates River, more than five years ago.  But remnants of Daesh still exist in cells among some Arab tribes in northeast Syria, close to Iraq. Daesh is the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Sham is the Levant, that is, the eastern Mediterranean region that includes Syria.

The Pentagon’s response to the attacks in the Red Sea, Syria, and Iraq, has been measured. It has never targeted the Houthis missile sites, although it has added three destroyers to the Ford carrier strike group in the Mediterranean. The Pentagon says it is assembling an international patrol for Red Sea shipping. (More targets for the Houthis?)

Overall, the Pentagon says it responds in moderation because it does not want to “widen” the Israel-Hamas War.  Spokesman Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder says Defense will decide upon responses “very deliberately, very thoughtfully, again with the broader objectives in mind of protecting our Forces, and making sure that this does not spin out of control into a broader regional conflict.”

Speak loudly and carry a small stick

How does this work? Usually, a bully won’t hit you if you make clear that you will hit back. But if you convince the bully that you won’t put up your fists, he is more likely to haul back for a haymaker. If “widening” the war means inducing more nations to attack Israel, isn’t the Pentagon’s reticence more likely to do this?

Washington has signaled, loudly and clearly, its tolerance of Iran. President Joe Biden is not enforcing sanctions against Iran, looking the other way while it sells oil to China. He permits Iraq and South Korea to pay up to $16 billion that they owe Iran for electricity and oil. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says the money is carefully monitored to ensure that it is spent on humanitarian goods. There is such a thing as fungibility. If Iran saves $100 million on food, it may spend the money instead on mortars. Anyway, the point is that the concession signals to Iran that the US won’t stick to its guns.

Iran has never made bones about its desire to replace the United States as an influence in the Middle East. This would mean chasing the Americans out of Syria and Iraq. There are roughly 900 troops in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq (but bear in mind that these estimates are two years old). One view is that the Iran-linked militias want to harass the Americans without risking a direct attack on Iran, which trains, arms, and directs the militias, partly through its coordination center in Damascus.  The Middle East Institute, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, has detailed the operations of this center.

Iran plans  

Iran has deployed several militias in Syria. They train partly by fighting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime in the civil war that broke out in 2011 over demands for democracy. 

One Iran-linked militia is the Saraya al-Khorasani, notes the Middle East Institute. The "Khorasani Brigades" formed in 1995 in Iraq and is utterly loyal to the Iranian Revolution. Since 2013, the militia has trained in al-Hasakah city in northeastern Syria, with Abdulkadir Hamo, a drug dealer who commands a pro-Assad militia. The Brigades, with Lebanon Hezbollah, have recruited perhaps 1,200 in al-Hasakah with promises of lucrative income.  

Another militia directed by Iran is the Task Force of Lebanon Hezbollah, in rural Qamishii of south Syria. The Task Force is run by Hajj Mahdi, whose son the Israelis recently killed in attacks on southern Syria. Mahdi has recruited hundreds of members by offering payments of $100 per month.  This is big money in a country where 90% of the population survives, barely, on $2 or less per day, and where prices are doubling each year. The Task Force has 1,200 members.  

The Dimas Camp near Damascus, and camps near al-Mayadsan city, train the militias to fire drones and missiles. 

Iran also encourages certain Arab tribes in northeastern Syria to rebel against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.  The Americans organized the Forces in 2015. This was ostensibly to keep an eye on Daesh. But it was really also to hold the fort against Assad. After 12 years, the dictator's civil war has regained almost all of Syria -- but the northeast region is still holding out, partly because of the Democratic Forces.  Armed by the Americans, the Forces rule the region, not always with much sensitivity. 

Arab tribes populate the region, and they regard the oil, gas, and water as their own. They object to the Kurds' say-so over those resources. This resentment extends to the Americans, for whom the Kurds are acting. The rancor boiled over in August, when the Kurds arrested a corrupt Arab leader for plotting with Assad's regime. Several Arab tribes revolted, and the ensuing battles with the Kurds claimed roughly 100 lives.  The Kurds still rule the region, but barely.

Turkey also indirectly pressures the Americans to leave northeast Syria. The Turkish government believes that the Kurds leading the Democratic Forces are linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which seeks autonomy in Turkey and which the United States as well as Turkey regard as terrorist.  The US and the Democratic Forces deny any link to the Kurdistan Workers' Party. But Sunday, Turkey announced its assassination of a leader of the Democratic Forces, Sherwan Hassan. As a NATO ally, the US cannot confront Turkey openly. So it may resolve the matter by leaving the area -- at least leaving Deir Ezzour, where the assassination occurred, an area bitter about the Kurds and thus the Americans. 

Until recently, it appeared that Iran had toned down militia attacks on US bases, to avoid massive retaliation.  But as far as I know, the US has struck back only three times—on October 26, November 9, and November 12—largely by destroying specific arms depots.  The Pentagon calls this a policy of “proportional” response—a familiar term.

The lack of a strong response may have tempted Iran to try larger operations. In recent weeks, troops from the Saraya al-Khorasani militia have moved to Deir Ezzor province, closer to US posts. Arms, including sniper rifles, night-vision goggles, machine guns, and small drones, were flown weekly on Ilyushin aircraft from Damascus to the Qamishii airport, at least until the Israelis bombed the Damascus airport to smithereens. Militia observers keep an eye on the al-Shaddadi post and the Kharab al-Jir post of the Americans in northeastern Syria, according to the Middle East Institute.  Despite a flailing economy, Iran's legislature has just increased the annual Guards budget by about 90% (adjusting for inflation).

Not just another headache

So far, the only American death related to the Iran-linked assaults has been the heart attack of a contractor that followed a false alarm. Of the 66 injuries from the attacks over the past two months, nearly 30 have been diagnosed as traumatic brain injuries. More may follow, since headaches and ringing of the ears can be symptoms of concussion. Permanent brain injuries could account for roughly 1% of the total US force in Syria and Iraq. This figure is both comforting and troubling: Comforting, because it is not larger; and troubling, because of what may come.

Suppose that Iran decided to try to push the Americans out of Syria and Iraq. What would it do? Well, it might instruct the Houthis to step up assaults on the Red Sea. This ties up American military ships at little expense to Tehran, because any American response would be more than 1,400 miles away (see the map below).



                                               Map of the region. Source: Google Maps


It might also plan a surprise attack on all posts in Syria and Iraq at once, to ensure injuries and to shake the confidence of the American public. An attack on Christmas might have PR value. It would humiliate the Americans in the eyes of the world.  It would hit the posts on a day of rest for weary troops on an unexpectedly stressful deployment. And it would spark public demands in the US to bring the troops home. Another date to bear in mind is January 3. The Americans assassinated Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Forces, which oversees foreign military intelligence for Iran, that day in 2020 at the Baghdad airport. And, of course, there is January 1.

A simultaneous attack would also have logistical value for Iran. To avoid sanctions, Iran must smuggle exports out of the country via overland routes. The Israelis are bombing the main airports and port. But US posts are on the most strategic routes, including the highway from Baghdad to Damascus. Iran would find it convenient to push the posts aside. In particular, the Khorasani Brigades planned training centers and an arms depot on the M4 highway, noted the Middle East Institute in April. American attacks on a supply route at al-Qaim crossing, in the vicinity of Deir Ezzour, had created the need for a new supply route to the provinces of Iraq friendly to Iran: Einjar, Rabia, and Tel Afar. 

Attacking the Americans may also give Iran political insurance. At the moment, Tehran exerts a lot of authority in the Iraqi government, because a 2022 Supreme Court decision in Iraq requires two-thirds legislative approval of major decisions. In effect, this gives a veto to Iran-linked militias connected to political parties in Baghdad. The interim Parliamentary Speaker, Mohsen al Mandalawi, belongs to the Shia Coordination Framework, a coalition of pro-Iranian parties. On December 4, Mandalawi met in Tehran with Iran's first vice president, Mohammad Mohsen, who praised Iraq for approving a law that "criminalizes relations with Israel." As Speaker, Mandalawi replaced a Sunni politician, Mohammad al Halbousi, who the Supreme Court removed November 14; Halbousi said the replacement was illegal, reported the Institute for the Study of War. Some observers believe that the Court is trying to create momentum to remove the Americans from Iraq. The US troops are there at Baghdad's invitation. 

Pocketed veto?  

In short, Iran indirectly can veto decisions in Baghdad. But this veto could easily disappear should the Court ever reverse its decision of last year to require a two-thirds majority and return to a simple majority. To enforce its will in Baghdad, Tehran may wish to stock the militias’ arms, again via overland routes, from the Hezbollah depots in Lebanon east to Syria and Iraq.

And there would be political benefits to Iran’s government closer to home. The Iranian public is restive: Tehran enforces its morality code harshly, culminating in the September 2022 death in custody of Mahsa Amini, 22, who was arrested for not wearing her hijab, or headscarf. Her death touched off national demonstrations that the morality cops put down by killing hundreds, according to Amnesty International. Despite Iran’s oil reserves and its willingness to sell more oil than OPEC would permit, nearly a third of Iranians are poor by World Bank standards.  A foreign adventure might divert Iranians from their household worries.

The government is already dominated by Guards fanatics, who comprise the majority of the Cabinet of President Ebrahim Raisi, himself a hardliner. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader who leads the Guards, is 84 and ailing.  He may want to make his mark before it's too late. He does not have an obvious successor.

Endgame 

Today's news brings a troubling close to our story. It reports a shootout between Jordan's border guards and Syrian drug smugglers; several guards were hurt. The Iran-linked militia in Syria have long financed operations by selling Captagon, the poor man's cocaine, in the Middle East and beyond, for billions of dollars...compensating the Assad family with a comfortable pension. The Assads control production and distribution of the highly addictive drug via a branch of the Syrian army directed by Bashar's brother. 

Monday, Jordan's army noted that the drug business had entered a new stage: Instead of just smuggling, the Iran-linked militias are challenging the border openly. Jordan's army stated: "The last few days have seen a spike in these operations that are changing from infiltration attempts and smuggling to armed clashes with the goal of crossing the border by force and targeting border guards." Reportedly, Jordan's air force bombed Sweida province in southwestern Syria Monday night to break up the drug route.  

To sum up: Iran has vowed for decades the destruction of Israel, which requires the removal of the US from the Middle East. In Syria, Iran has long recruited, trained, financed, and directed militias to act in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. It also finances more distant attacks, by the Houthis in Yemen. Against this backdrop of careful coordination, Iran is now beefing up militias near the US posts in eastern Syria, and its militias openly push back Jordan's army. What can one conclude?     

Clearly, my suggestion of a Christmas attack is speculation. But forewarned is forearmed – Leon Taylor, Baltimore tayloralmaty@gmail.com  


Notes

For valuable comments, I thank but do not implicate Annabel Benson and Mark Kennet.

 

References

Samir al-Ahmad.  “Carpet weaving” east of the Euphrates: Iranian proxy groups expand their influence in Syria’s Hasakah Province | Middle East Institute (mei.edu) September 12, 2023.

Samir al-Ahmad.  Iranian-backed militia attacks on coalition forces threaten to ignite eastern Syria | Middle East Institute (mei.edu)  November 13, 2023.

Associated Press. An airstrike likely carried out by Jordan's air force targets drug dealers in Syria, reports say | AP News  December 18, 2023

William Christou.  Turkey announces assassination of prominent Syrian Kurdish commander Sherwan Hassan.  The New Arab.  December 17, 2023.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter. Iran Update, December 4, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)   

Matthew Lee. US extends sanctions waiver allowing Iraq to buy electricity from Iran | AP News  November 14, 2023.

Paul Mcleary.  Houthis launch more attacks in Red Sea as US warships head to region.  Politico.  December 16, 2023.  Houthis launch more attacks in Red Sea as US warships head to region - POLITICO

Mehr News Agency. Drones target two US bases in eastern Syria - Mehr News Agency . December 17, 2023.

Lukanyo Mnyanda, Robert Wright, David Sheppard, and Oliver Telling.  Shipping companies avoid Red Sea after Houthi attacks. Financial Times.  December 15, 2023.

 New America. How Raqqa Became the Capital of ISIS: Raqqa: ISIS Capital (newamerica.org)

Reuters. Jordan army says guards injured, weapons seized in clashes along Syrian border | Reuters December 18, 2023.

Reuters. Possible explosion reported near vessel off Yemen's coast (msn.com) December 18, 2023.

Reuters. Vessel attacked in Red Sea off Yemen coast, U.S. officials blame Houthis (msn.com) December 18, 2023.

Task & Purpose.  5 US troops awarded Purple Hearts since Iraq, Syria attacks began (taskandpurpose.com) December 15, 2023.